Opinion
What the Exchange Rate Conceals: Ghana’s hidden cost of living crisis
While Ghana’s headline macroeconomic indicators—falling inflation, a sharply appreciating cedi, and IMF programme progress—have earned international praise, a deeper, quieter crisis continues to erode the daily lives of ordinary citizens, writes Dominic Senayah. In this powerful opinion piece, the policy analyst and international relations professional argues that the country’s recent exchange-rate stability masks a structural cost-of-living emergency that no salary can reasonably sustain.
What the Exchange Rate Conceals: Ghana’s hidden cost of living crisis
By Dominic Senayah
There is a quiet arithmetic to suffering. It does not make front pages. It does not generate dramatic headlines that bring in international cameras or set Parliament alight. It happens instead at the market stall, at the landlord’s door, at the end of the month when the salary notification arrives, and the mental calculation begins and fails. It is the arithmetic of a country where the cost of simply existing has outpaced the means by which ordinary people are expected to exist. This is Ghana’s hidden cost of living crisis, and those of us who love the country, who hold its passport, who carry it with us wherever we go in the world, can no longer afford to normalise it.
I write this as a Ghanaian living and working in England. The distance has not made me detached. If anything, the contrast has sharpened my concern. I know what a functioning relationship between wages, housing, and food looks like in practice. And I know that what Ghana has at present falls far short of what it is capable of delivering to its people.
The Rent That No Salary Can Justify
Let us begin where every life begins, with a roof. As of early 2026, a one-bedroom apartment in Accra commands around GH₵2,200 per month, with Cantonments, Airport Residential, and Labone pushing considerably higher. But the monthly rate is only part of the punishment. It is normal in Ghana to pay one or two years of rent upfront, placing an enormous financial demand on a tenant before they have even moved in. The average monthly salary sits at approximately GH₵2,579 — roughly $210 at current exchange rates — with entry-level civil servants earning between GH₵2,200 and GH₵3,200. A mid-level public servant asked to pay two years upfront on a modest Accra flat faces a demand exceeding a full year of gross salary, payable before a single sock has been unpacked.
The comparison with Nigeria is instructive. Lagos — Africa’s most commercially intense city, far larger and more complex than Accra, regularly offers comparable housing at lower dollar-equivalent rates. That a smaller city prices its residents more aggressively is a structural anomaly deserving frank scrutiny. Ghana’s landlord class, hedging against cedi depreciation through dollar-denominated rents, has turned housing into a mechanism of extraction that the wage economy cannot support. The result is a generation of professionals commuting three to five hours daily because they cannot afford to live near where they work.
A Country That Grows Food and Cannot Afford to Feed Itself
Ghana spans multiple agro-ecological zones supporting cocoa, yams, plantains, cassava, tomatoes, pepper, groundnuts, maize, and rice. The ecological potential is profound. And yet the price of tomatoes in an Accra market routinely exceeds what the same produce costs in countries that must import it from thousands of miles away. This is a policy failure, not a natural one. According to the World Food Programme, Ghana loses US$1.9 billion annually to post-harvest waste due to poor road networks, inadequate storage, and the near-total absence of cold chain infrastructure, with losses estimated between 20 and 50 per cent across various crop types. The farmer in Brong-Ahafo who watches tomatoes rot on the roadside because the truck did not come is not a lazy farmer. He is a farmer abandoned by systems never built with sufficient urgency.
At the consumer end, supply is erratic, middlemen extract margins at every link, and what arrives in the city comes bruised and expensive. Ghana, once a significant tomato producer in West Africa, now imports over 7,000 metric tons of tomatoes annually from neighbouring countries. The same logic applies to rice, poultry, and a growing range of processed foods. Ghana has fertile land and an empty value chain, and until the infrastructure connecting the two is treated as a national emergency, this contradiction will persist.
Salaries, Corruption, and the Structural Explanation Nobody Wants to Give
Petty corruption in Ghana is routinely framed as a moral failure. The condemnation is not unwarranted, but it rarely arrives at the structural diagnosis necessary for real solutions. When a port official takes an unofficial payment or a nurse charges informally for a service that should be free, the issue is often not characterised. It is mathematics. If the average salary is GH₵2,579 and a basic one-bedroom flat in Accra costs between GH₵1,500 and GH₵2,800 per month, the gap between income and shelter is insurmountable before a single meal or school fee is considered. People in structurally impossible positions find structural workarounds. Ghana cannot build trustworthy institutions on the foundation of a workforce that cannot survive on its formal income. The enforcement agencies expected to police corruption while living within these same constraints are being asked to do something human societies have always found very difficult to sustain.
The Import Economy’s Double Standard
Walk through any Ghanaian market, and the shelves are full of Chinese electronics with dubious longevity, imported cooking oil, and imported clothing. The quality differential between goods manufactured for African markets and those produced by the same factories for Western consumers is not accidental. It is a calibrated response to weak regulatory environments. Where consumer protection law lacks enforcement, the incentive to produce durably disappears. Ghanaian consumers are being sold shorter lifespans in their goods and longer suffering in their wallets. Capital that could fund agro-processing in the forest belt or cold chain infrastructure in the north instead cycles through import speculation with a six-month horizon, extracting from the population rather than building it up.
Towards Price Regulation: What Is Actually Feasible
This is where most commentary on Ghana’s cost of living crisis falls short, diagnosing the problem without engaging seriously with solutions. Full command-style price fixing is not the answer. Ghana tried broad price controls under the Rawlings era, and the outcome was predictable: market distortions, shortages, and a thriving black market that harmed the very people it was meant to protect. But there is a meaningful space between laissez-faire chaos and discredited command economies, and Ghana has both the institutional architecture and the precedent from comparable economies to occupy it.
The first viable intervention is a national reference pricing system for staple goods. The government already publishes some commodity price data, but inconsistently and with almost no reach into the market itself. A properly resourced weekly publication of government-verified benchmark prices for staple foods displayed at market entrances, bus terminals, and broadcast via radio and SMS to rural communities arms the consumer with information, which is the most powerful and least distorting check on seller greed. Rwanda has implemented this model for agricultural produce with a measurable effect on price gouging at the retail level. It preserves market freedom while eliminating the information asymmetry that predatory pricing depends upon.
The second is a functioning rent tribunal. Ghana’s Rent Act of 1963 technically prohibits excessive advance payment demands, but it is widely ignored because the mechanism for enforcing it is inaccessible to ordinary tenants. A simplified housing tribunal modelled on those that operate effectively in South Africa and the United Kingdom, that allows tenants to challenge dollar-denominated rents and multi-year upfront demands, would be a targeted, enforceable intervention requiring legislative update rather than significant fiscal outlay. The legal framework exists. What is missing is the political will to resource and publicise it.
The third is deeper utilisation of the Ghana Commodity Exchange, launched in 2018 but still dramatically underused. A functioning commodity exchange creates transparent, publicly visible price discovery for agricultural goods, which structurally reduces the power of middlemen to arbitrarily inflate margins between farm gate and urban market. Integrating smallholder farmers and market women through mobile phone access is both technically feasible and commercially attractive given Ghana’s mobile penetration rates. This is not a distant aspiration. It is an operational gap in an existing institution.
The fourth is consumer protection enforcement with genuine deterrent value. Current fines under the Consumer Protection Agency Act are derisory relative to the profits available from price exploitation. Raising penalty thresholds meaningfully and giving the agency a publicised rapid-response function, a hotline that triggers market inspection within 48 hours of a complaint,t would shift the risk calculus for sellers without requiring price fixing of any kind. None of these measures alone resolves the crisis. Together, they constitute a coherent, Ghana-feasible regulatory architecture that addresses greed at its structural root rather than its moral surface.
Where the Government Has Done Well — And What Must Follow
Macroeconomic honesty requires acknowledging what has been achieved. Inflation fell for thirteen consecutive months, from 23.5 per cent in January 2025 to 3.8 per cent in January 2026, single digits for the first time since 2021. The cedi appreciated 40.7 per cent against the dollar in 2025, reversing the prior year’s 19.2 per cent depreciation, earning World Bank recognition as the best-performing currency in Sub-Saharan Africa. The IMF completed its fifth Extended Credit Facility review in December 2025 with positive assessments across growth, reserves, and debt trajectory. Currency stability anchors import prices, reduces the landlord’s dollar-denomination incentive, and creates the predictability businesses need. But stability is the floor of a better economy, not its ceiling. The ceiling requires structural transformation in agriculture, manufacturing, institutional quality, and the wage-to-cost relationship,p which stabilisation enables but cannot itself deliver.
The Reorientation Ghana Needs
Ghana will not become Denmark overnight, and no reasonable person expects that. But the distance between where Ghana is and where it is capable of being is not as vast as learned helplessness suggests. Wealthy Ghanaians must be persistently encouraged, through deliberate policy incentives andcultural expectationsn, to invest in domestic productive capacity rather than import speculation or offshore accumulation. Patient capital that builds agro-processing, cold chain networks, or quality housing is less glamorous than a Shenzhen container but far more durable as national wealth.
Young Ghanaians expressing frustration are not being ungrateful. They are giving accurate feedback to a system that has not yet decided to work for them. Their constrained futures are not the inevitable consequence of poverty but the outcome of choices about investment, infrastructure, and the relationship between wages and the cost of living that can be made differently.
The exchange rate is the number the world watches closely. What it conceals is the daily life Ghanaians actually live. The stability of 2025 has been earned. Now comes the harder, more human work of making it mean something to the nurse in Tamale, the graduate in Kumasi, and the family in Nima who still cannot make the numbers add up.
About the Author
Dominic Senayah is an International Relations professional and policy analyst based in England, specialising in African political economy, humanitarian governance, and migration diplomacy. He holds an MA in International Relations from the UK and writes on trade policy, institutional reform, and Ghana–UK relations for audiences across Africa, the United Kingdom, and the wider Global South.
Opinion
Resetting Sovereignty: Mahama’s Foreign Policy and the Constitutional Revival of NKRUMAHISM 60 years after the 1966 Coup
This opinion piece by Victoria Hamah (PhD) argues that President John Dramani Mahama’s foreign-policy direction reflects a renewed commitment to Kwame Nkrumah’s ideas of sovereignty, non-alignment, and economic independence. It points to symbolic actions—such as renaming Kotoka International Airport back to Accra International Airport—as part of a broader effort to correct historical narratives, strengthen national autonomy, and revive a modern, constitutional form of Nkrumahism 60 years after the 1966 coup.
Resetting Sovereignty: Mahama’s Foreign Policy and the Constitutional Revival of NKRUMAHISM 60 years after the 1966 Coup
After 60 years, the most shameful blot on the page of national dignity has finally been erased. The Kotoka International Airport has been reverted to its rightful name, Accra International Airport.
This decision by President John Mahama represents more than just an administrative rebranding. It signals an effort to interrogate the historical foundations upon which the postcolonial Ghanaian state was constructed.
The airport was named after Lieutenant General Emmanuel Kwasi Kotoka, a central figure in the 1966 coup which overthrew Kwame Nkrumah. That coup marked a decisive interruption of Ghana’s early post-independence developmental trajectory and inaugurated a period of political instability, throwing Ghana, then the lodestar of Africa, into the decadence of neocolonial subjugation.
Recently declassified records from the Central Intelligence Agency have confirmed that the United States, Britain and France were actively involved in the planning of the coup. While debates persist regarding the precise degree of foreign involvement, the broader historical consensus recognises that the overthrow of Nkrumah occurred within a broader context of Western imperialist efforts to derail the independent developmental model in particular and the pan-African vision in general.
Within this frame, the renaming of the airport functions as an act of narrative correction. It does not merely revisit the legacy of one military officer who was nothing more than a soldier of fortune; it symbolically re-centres Ghana’s identity around civilian constitutional sovereignty rather than military intervention.
In doing so, it aligns with the broader philosophical thrust of President Mahama: that political and economic independence must be reclaimed not only through fiscal and industrial policy, but through the stories nations tell about their own past.
This symbolic gesture addresses an earlier rupture in Ghana’s sovereign development. Together, they articulate a consistent thesis: that independence is neither a completed event nor a ceremonial inheritance, but an ongoing political project requiring institutional, economic, and historical recalibration.
The symbolic timing is equally significant. Sixty years after the infamous 24th February 1966 coup d’état, the renaming signals more than historical reconsideration; it suggests an ideological repositioning.
It indicates an aspiration by the National Democratic Congress (NDC) government toward a consciously pro-Nkrumahist orientation, one grounded in non-alignment, strategic autonomy, and policy independence amid an increasingly turbulent global order.
For John Dramani Mahama’s administration, this does not imply a retreat into isolationism nor a rejection of global engagement. Rather, it reflects a recalibration of Ghana’s external posture: cooperation without subordination, partnership without policy capture.
In a period marked by intensifying geopolitical rivalry and assertive economic diplomacy from powerful states in the Global North, particularly Western nations. The gesture evokes the earlier doctrine of Kwame Nkrumah, who situated Ghana within the Non-Aligned Movement as a sovereign actor rather than a peripheral client.
Read in this light, the act is not revisionist symbolism for its own sake. It articulates a continuity between the Accra Reset and Ghana’s unfinished post-independence project. The 1966 coup interrupted an ambitious experiment in autonomous development and continental leadership.
To revisit that rupture six decades later is to suggest that the questions posed in the 1960s -abhorrent alignment, dependency, and the boundaries of sovereignty – should define the character of political debate.
Economic Sovereignty as a Foreign Policy: The Reset in Practice:
President John Dramani Mahama’s unprecedented post-Rawlings era electoral victory carries significance beyond partisan transition. It represents, symbolically, a renaissance of Nkrumahism within Ghana’s contemporary democratic framework.
For the first time since the revolutionary and post-revolutionary dominance of Jerry Rawlings, a renewed mandate has been secured on a platform explicitly invoking structural transformation, strategic autonomy, and continental alignment rather than mere macroeconomic stabilisation.
This moment also clarifies an older historical debate. Prior to the 24 February 1966 coup that overthrew Kwame Nkrumah, there were persistent allegations, advanced by Nkrumah himself, that Western powers, uneasy with Ghana’s non-aligned posture and pan-African activism, exerted economic pressure by manipulating global cocoa markets.
As cocoa was Ghana’s principal export and foreign exchange earner, its price volatility had profound fiscal implications. Some historical interpretations further suggest tacit alignment by neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire, which is also a major cocoa producer within broader Western-aligned commodity structures, thereby compounding Ghana’s vulnerability and creating the mood for violent regime change.
Whether interpreted as deliberate sabotage or structural dependency within a commodity-based global economy, the episode reinforced a central Nkrumahist lesson: political sovereignty without economic autonomy is fragile.
Mahama’s present mandate appears framed as an effort to transcend that vulnerability without repudiating constitutional democracy or global engagement.
A key example is the decision to move away from syndicated external financing arrangements in the cocoa sector and to prioritise domestic value addition by processing up to half of Ghana’s cocoa output locally. This signals a deliberate shift from dependence on raw commodities toward industrial upgrading.
If implemented effectively, this approach aligns closely with classical Nkrumahist economic thought: retaining greater value within the domestic economy, reducing exposure to external price shocks, and building industrial capacity anchored in existing comparative advantage. It is not autarky but strategic repositioning within global markets.
Describing this moment as a renaissance of Nkrumahism, therefore, does not imply a return to one-party statism or Cold War binaries. Rather, it signals the re-emergence of core principles of economic self-determination, continental integration, and calibrated non-alignment within a competitive multiparty order.
Taken together, the symbolic reconsideration of colonial-era commemorations, the Nkrumahist articulation of foreign policy by Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, reforms within the cocoa financing architecture, and Mahama’s renewed electoral mandate, the moment can be read as deliberate ideological consolidation. It suggests that the questions suspended in 1966 have re-entered Ghana’s political centre, not as nostalgia, but as a strategy: a constitutionalised revival of the unfinished project of autonomous development.
Thus, the Reset Agenda operates on three registers simultaneously: economic restructuring, institutional reform, and historical re-anchoring. Together, they imply that sovereignty is not merely territorial integrity nor formal democratic procedure, but the sustained capacity to determine national priorities without external veto.
If the coup marked the suspension of that ambition, the present moment is framed as its cautious revival.
In this opinion piece, experienced journalist Kizito Cudjoe urges Ghanaian media to uphold ethical standards amid rising misinformation and AI tools. While technology aids reporting, rushed event-driven coverage and lack of verification erode public trust. He advocates reaffirming verification, balance, and integrity—using AI as an assistant, not a replacement—for journalism to maintain relevance and credibility.
Staying the Course of Ethical Journalism in an Era of Misinformation and AI
By Kizito Cudjoe
Journalism, at its best, is anchored in professionalism, a passion to inform and educate, and an unrelenting commitment to the public good. These principles have guided the craft for generations. Yet today, amid the rapid rise of digital technology and artificial intelligence, the profession faces a new and serious test.
Technology was meant to strengthen journalism. Properly used, it allows reporters to gather data faster, verify facts more thoroughly, and reach wider audiences.
But tools can also be misused.
In recent years, the ease with which content can be generated, especially with AI systems, has lowered the barrier to entry in ways that sometimes erode standards. Anyone can now produce something that looks like a news story, but not everyone practices journalism.
After more than 14 years working both locally and beyond our borders, one pattern continues to concern me. Here in Ghana, much of our reporting remains heavily event-driven, and too often facts are reproduced without rigorous questioning or verification. The pressure to be first has replaced the duty to be right. This culture risks weakening public trust in the media.
When stories are rushed without scrutiny, misinformation spreads easily. Worse, it reinforces the perception among professionals in other fields that journalists are merely conduits for press releases or talking points. That perception is unfair to many hardworking reporters, but it grows each time unverified information reaches the public.
The answer is not to reject technology or fear AI. It is to reaffirm the discipline that defines our craft. Verification, balance, context, and accountability must remain non-negotiable. Every newsroom, regardless of size or editorial style, should insist on basic checks and balances before publication, not only to protect the public from falsehoods, but also to protect journalists themselves from reputational and legal harm.
Artificial intelligence can assist with research, transcription, and analysis. It cannot replace judgement, integrity, or experience. Those qualities still define professional journalism. Tools may evolve, but ethics must endure.
If journalism in this country is to retain its relevance and respect, we must recommit to those principles.
The future of the profession will not be decided by technology alone, but by the standards we choose to uphold.
As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its fifth year, Peter Rutland and Elizaveta Gaufman, surmise in this article that public support for President Vladimir Putin and the “special military operation” remains high in polls (over 80% approval for Putin, 60-70% for the war). However, the authors argue that this “Putin consensus” is fragile.
Peter Rutland, Wesleyan University and Elizaveta Gaufman, University of Groningen
Perceived wisdom has it that the longer a war goes on, the less enthusiastic a public becomes for continuing the conflict. After all, it is ordinary citizens who tend to bear the economic and human costs.
And yet, as the war following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 enters its fifth year, the attitude of the Russian public remains difficult to gauge: Just over half of Russians, according to one recent poll, expect the war to end in 2026; yet a majority say that should negotiations fail, Moscow needs to “escalate” with greater use of force.
As observers of Russian society, we believe this ambiguity in Russian public opinion gives President Vladimir Putin the cover to continue pushing hard for his goals in Ukraine. Yet at the same time, a deeper dive into the Russian public’s apparent support for the war suggests that it is more fragile than the Russian president would like to believe.
Putin’s social contract
From Day 1 of the conflict, Western strategy has been predicated on the belief that economic sanctions would eventually cause either the Russian elite or its society to persuade Putin to abandon the war.
This, in turn, is based on the assumption that the legitimacy of Putinism rests on a social contract of sorts: The Russian people will be loyal to the Kremlin if they enjoy a stable standard of living and are allowed to pursue their private lives without interference from the state.
The Russian economy has been struggling since 2014, so many analysts believed that this social contract was coming under strain even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, after four years of war, the combination of exclusion from European markets and a tripling of military spending has led to economic stagnation and mounting pressure on living standards.
One problem with the social contract approach is that it tends to downplay the role of ideology.
It is possible that Putin’s “Make Russia Great Again” propaganda resonates with a significant part of the Russian public. Polling has consistently placed Putin’s approval rating above 80% since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict.
Of course, the validity of the results of polls in an authoritarian society at war cannot be taken at face value. Yet, one shouldn’t rule out that some of that support is genuine and rests not just on a stable economy but also on popular endorsement of Putin’s pledge to restore Russia’s power and influence on the world stage.
Rallying Russians
Some scholars point to a “rally around the flag” effect. There was an apparent surge in Putin’s approval rating after the use of military force against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.
It is hard to tell whether the surge in support for Putin reflects a genuine shift in opinion or just a response to media coverage and what people perceive as the acceptable response.
The Kremlin has tried to hide the costs of the war from the public: concealing the true death toll and avoiding full-scale mobilization of conscripts by recruiting highly paid volunteers. It is also trying to keep the economy stable by drawing down the country’s reserve funds.
That leaves open the question of whether the “Putin consensus” will break down at some point in the future if the costs of the war start to hit home for a majority of Russians.
The problem with polls
The consensus view among observers is that a small minority of Russians oppose the war, a slightly larger minority enthusiastically support the war, and the majority passively go along with what the state is doing.
There are still some independent pollsters conducting surveys in Russia that report a high level of support among respondents for the “special military operation” against Ukraine, with figures ranging between 60% and 70%.
A number of researchers have pointed out the difficulty in getting an accurate snapshot of Russian public opinion, given that the polling questions might make the respondent fearful of being accused of breaking laws that penalize “spreading fake news” and “discrediting the army” with a lengthy prison sentence.
The Levada Center, which is still regarded as an independent and relatively reliable pollster, conducts its interviews face to face in people’s homes but has a very low response rate. Polls conducted online, in return for monetary rewards, can try to find demographically balanced respondents, but the problem of wariness about giving answers that are critical of the regime remains. In Russia’s current political environment, refusing to answer or giving a socially acceptable response is a rational strategy.
Some scholars, such as those associated with the Public Sociology Laboratory, which looks at public sentiment in post-Soviet states, still conduct fieldwork inside Russia, sending researchers to live incognito in provincial towns and observe social practices involving support for the war.
Their ethnographic research finds little evidence for a “rally around the flag” effect in provincial Russian society. Other analysts have turned to digital ethnography of social media as an alternative source of insight. But analysts unfamiliar with the local and digital context risk mistaking performative loyalty for genuine belief.
‘Internal emigration’
Most Russian citizens try to avoid political discussion altogether and retreat into what is often described as “internal emigration” – living their own lives while keeping interactions with the authorities to a minimum.
This practice dates back to the Soviet period but resurfaced as political repression increased after Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012.
There is no doubt that there are many fervent war supporters in Russia. They are quite vocal and visible because the state allows them to be – such as the military bloggers reporting from the front lines.
Apart from looking at opinion polls and social media, one can also probe the level of genuine support for the war by looking at everyday practices. If popular support for the war were enthusiastic, recruitment offices would be overwhelmed. They are not.
Instead, Russia has relied heavily on financial incentives, aggressive advertising, prison recruitment and coercive mobilization. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of men have sought to avoid conscription by leaving the country, hiding from authorities or exploiting legal exemptions.
Symbolic participation follows a similar pattern. State-sponsored Z symbols continue to dominate public space – the letter Z is used as a symbol of support for the war, in slogans such as “Za pobedu,” which translates to “for victory.” But privately displayed signs of support have largely disappeared.
Humanitarian aid to be sent to soldiers on the front lines or occupied Ukraine is often collected through schools and churches, where participation is shaped by social or administrative pressure. But many participants frame their involvement as helping individuals rather than supporting the war itself.
Reality vs. lived experience
High-profile propaganda products frequently fail to resonate. Music charts and streaming platforms in Russia are dominated not by patriotic anthems but by an eclectic mix of songs about personal relationships, such as Jakone’s moody ballad “Eyes As Wet As Asphalt,” songs in praise of “Hoodies” and even a catchy Bashkir folk song.
Book sales show strong demand for works such as George Orwell’s “1984” and Viktor Frankl’s Holocaust memoir “Man’s Search for Meaning,” suggesting that readers are searching for ways to understand authoritarianism, trauma and moral responsibility rather than celebrating militarism.
And instead of watching the state-backed film “Tolerance,” a dystopian tale of moral decay in the West, Russians are streaming the “Heated Rivalry” gay hockey romance.
Putin’s campaign to promote what he sees as traditional values appears not to be cutting through. Divorce rates are among the highest in the world – and birth rates continue to fall.
Heading into the Ukraine war’s fifth year, the gulf between the Kremlin version of reality and the lived experience of ordinary Russians remains. It echoes a pattern we have seen before: In the final decade of the Soviet Union the Kremlin became increasingly out of touch with the views of its people.
History will not necessarily repeat itself – but the masters of the Kremlin should be conscious of the parallels.
Peter Rutland, Professor of Government, Wesleyan University and Elizaveta Gaufman, Assistant Professor of Russian Discourse and Politics, University of Groningen
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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