Commentary
Violent aftermath of Mexico’s ‘El Mencho’ killing follows pattern of other high-profile cartel hits
The recent death of Jalisco New Generation Cartel leader Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, known as “El Mencho,” has triggered severe retaliatory violence in Mexico, resulting in at least 73 deaths. This article analyzes the event as part of a predictable and counterproductive pattern in Mexico’s security strategy. The author, Angélica Durán-Martínez, an expert on Latin American criminal groups, argues that while high-profile hits like this one serve political purposes by demonstrating action, they rarely dismantle criminal networks. Instead, they often lead to immediate violent backlash and longer-term fragmentation as factions fight for control.
Violent aftermath of Mexico’s ‘El Mencho’ killing follows pattern of other high-profile cartel hits
By Angélica Durán-Martínez, UMass Lowell
The death of a major cartel boss in Mexico has unleashed a violent backlash in which members of the criminal group have paralyzed some cities through blockades and attacks on property and security forces.
At least 73 people have died as a result of the operation to capture Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, or “El Mencho.” The head of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel was seriously wounded during a firefight with authorities on Feb. 22, 2026. He later died in custody.
As an expert in criminal groups and drug trafficking in Latin America who has been studying Mexico’s cartels for two decades, I see the violent aftermath of the operation as part of a pattern in which Mexican governments have opted for high-profile hits that often lead only to more violence without addressing the broader security problems that plague huge swaths of the country.
Who was ‘El Mencho’?
Like many other figures involved in Mexico’s drug trafficking, Oseguera Cervantes started at the bottom and made his way up the ranks. He spent some time in prison in the U.S., where he may have forged alliances with criminal gangs before being deported back to Mexico in 1997. There, he connected with the Milenio Cartel, an organization that first allied, and then fought with, the powerful Sinaloa Cartel.
Most of the information available points to the Jalisco New Generation Cartel forming under El Mencho around 2010, following the killing of Ignacio “Nacho” Coronel Villarreal, a Sinaloa Cartel leader and main link with the Milenio Cartel.
Since 2015, Jalisco New Generation Cartel has been known for its blatant attacks against security forces in Mexico – such as gunning down a helicopter in that year. And it has expanded its presence both across Mexico and internationally.
In Mexico, it is said to have a presence in all states. In some, the cartel has a direct presence and very strong local networks. In others, it has cultivated alliances with other trafficking organizations.
Besides drug trafficking, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel is also engaged in oil theft, people smuggling and extortion. As a result, it has become one of the most powerful cartels in Mexico.
What impact will his death have on the cartel?
There are a few potential scenarios, and a lot will depend on what succession plans Jalisco New Generation had in the event of Oseguera Cervantes’ capture or killing.
In general, these types of operations – in which security forces take out a cartel leader – lead to more violence, for a variety of reasons.
Mexicans have already experienced the immediate aftermath of Oseguera Cervantes’ death: retaliation attacks, blockades and official attempts to prevent civilians from going out. This is similar to what occurred after the capture of drug lord Ovidio Guzmán López in Sinaloa in 2019 and his second capture in 2023.
Violence flares in two ways following such high-profile captures and killings of cartel leaders.
In the short term, there is retaliation. At the moment, members of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel are seeking revenge against Mexico’s security forces and are also trying to assert their regional authority despite El Mencho’s death.
These retaliatory campaigns tend to be violent and flashy. They include blockades as well as attacks against security forces and civilians.
Then there is the longer-term violence associated with any succession. This can take the form of those who are below Oseguera Cervantes in rank fighting for control. But it can also result from rival groups trying to take advantage of any leadership vacuum.
The level and duration of violence depend on a few factors, such as whether there was a succession plan and what kind of alliances are in place with other cartels. But generally, operations in which a cartel boss is removed lead to more violence and fragmentation of criminal groups.
Of course, people like Oseguera Cervantes who have violated laws and engaged in violence need to be captured. But in the long run, that doesn’t do anything to dismantle networks of criminality or reduce the size of their operations.
What is the current state of security in Mexico?
The upsurge in violence after Oseguera Cervantes’ killing occurs as some indicators in Mexico’s security situation seemed to be improving.
For example, homicide rates declined in 2025 – which is an important indicator of security.
But other measures are appalling. Disappearances are still unsettlingly high. The reality that many Mexicans experience on the ground is one where criminal organizations remain powerful and embedded in the local ecosystems that connect state agents, politicians and criminals in complex networks.
Criminal organizations are engaged in what we academics call “criminal governance.” They engage in a wide range of activities and regulate life in communities – sometimes coercively, but sometimes also with some degree of legitimacy from the population.
In some states like Sinaloa, despite the operations to take out cartel’s leaders, the illicit economies are still extensive and profitable. But what’s more important is that levels of violence remain high and the population is still suffering deeply.
The day-to-day reality for people in some of these regions is still one of fear.
And in the greater scheme of things, criminal networks are still very powerful – they are embedded in the country’s economy and politics, and connect to communities in complex ways.
How does the El Mencho operation fit Mexico’s strategy on cartels?
The past two governments vowed to reduce the militarization of security forces. But the power of the military in Mexico has actually expanded.
The government of President Claudia Sheinbaum wanted a big, visible hit at a time when the U.S. is pushing for more militarized policies to counter Mexico’s trafficking organizations.
But this dynamic is not new. Most U.S. and Mexican policy regarding drug trafficking organizations has historically emphasized these high-profile captures – even if it is just for short-term gains.
It’s easier to say “we captured a drug lord” than address broader issues of corruption or impunity. Most of the time when these cartel leaders are captured or killed, there is generally no broader justice. It isn’t accompanied with authorities investigating disappearances, murders, corruption or even necessarily halting the flow of drugs.
Captures and killings of cartel leaders serve a strategic purpose of showing that something is being done, but the effectiveness of such policies in the long run is very limited.
Of course, taking out a drug lord is not a bad thing. But if it does not come with a broader dismantling of criminal networks and an accompanying focus on justice, then the main crimes that these groups commit – homicides, disappearances and extortion – will continue to affect the daily life of people. And the effect on illicit flows is, at best, meager.
Angélica Durán-Martínez, Associate Professor of Political Science, UMass Lowell
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
ACCRA, Ghana — A major legal battle is unfolding in Ghana that could reshape how the country fights corruption. At the center is the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), an independent body created to investigate and prosecute corruption cases.
A recent High Court ruling has cast doubt on the OSP’s ability to independently prosecute cases—prompting the agency to mount a swift legal challenge. For observers unfamiliar with Ghana’s legal system, the dispute raises fundamental questions about who has the authority to prosecute crimes and how anti-corruption institutions should operate.
What Triggered the Dispute?
The controversy stems from a ruling by the General Jurisdiction Division of the High Court in Accra. The court held that while the OSP can investigate corruption, it does not have constitutional authority to prosecute cases on its own.
Instead, the court said prosecutorial power lies exclusively with the Attorney-General’s Department, based on Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.
The case originated from a quo warranto application, a legal action questioning whether a public office is lawfully exercising its powers, filed by private citizen Peter Achibold Hyde.
What Is the OSP and Why Does It Matter?
The OSP was established under the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017, as part of Ghana’s efforts to strengthen its anti-corruption framework.
Its mandate includes:
- Investigating corruption and corruption-related offenses
- Prosecuting such cases
- Recovering proceeds of corruption
The agency was designed to operate independently of political influence, addressing long-standing concerns that corruption prosecutions could be hindered by executive control.
The Core Legal Question
At the heart of the dispute is a constitutional tension:
- The Constitution (Article 88) gives prosecutorial authority to the Attorney-General.
- The OSP Act (2017) appears to grant the OSP its own prosecutorial powers.
The High Court ruling effectively says: Parliament cannot override the Constitution through ordinary legislation.
This interpretation would mean the OSP can only prosecute cases if authorized by the Attorney-General.
How Did the OSP Respond?
The OSP has strongly rejected the ruling and announced plans to overturn it.
In its official response, the agency argued:
- The High Court lacks jurisdiction to declare parts of an Act of Parliament unconstitutional
- Only the Supreme Court of Ghana has the authority to make such determinations
- Its enabling law clearly provides for both investigative and prosecutorial powers
The OSP warned that allowing the ruling to stand could undermine ongoing corruption cases and weaken Ghana’s accountability systems.
The Attorney-General’s Position
Complicating matters, the Attorney-General’s office has taken a position that aligns—at least partly—with the High Court’s reasoning.
Government lawyers argue:
- Prosecutorial power belongs solely to the Attorney-General
- Parliament cannot transfer or dilute that power through legislation
- The OSP may require explicit authorization before prosecuting cases
They also contend that prosecutorial authority cannot be delegated to a “juridical person” (an institution like the OSP), only to individuals.
Why This Case Is Bigger Than One Agency
This dispute has far-reaching implications for Ghana’s governance and rule of law.
1. Anti-Corruption Efforts at Risk
If the OSP loses prosecutorial authority:
- Ongoing cases could be delayed or reassigned
- Investigations may lose momentum
- Public confidence in anti-corruption efforts could weaken
2. Constitutional Interpretation
The case raises a key legal question:
Can Parliament create independent prosecutorial bodies, or is that power constitutionally restricted?
3. Separation of Powers
The outcome will clarify the balance between:
- The executive branch (through the Attorney-General)
- Independent statutory bodies like the OSP
What Happens Next?
The legal battle is far from over.
There are now two parallel tracks:
- OSP’s challenge to the High Court ruling
- A separate case already before the Supreme Court, filed by Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey, seeking a definitive constitutional interpretation
Legal analysts expect the Supreme Court to ultimately deliver the final word.
Why Global Audiences Should Pay Attention
Ghana is often seen as one of West Africa’s more stable democracies, and its anti-corruption framework has been closely watched by international partners.
The outcome of this case could:
- Influence how other countries design independent anti-corruption bodies
- Shape international perceptions of Ghana’s governance
- Affect investor confidence tied to transparency and rule of law
The Bottom Line
The clash between the OSP and the Attorney-General is more than a legal technicality—it’s a defining moment for Ghana’s anti-corruption system.
At stake is a fundamental question:
Should an independent anti-corruption body have the power to prosecute on its own, or must that authority remain centralized under the state’s chief legal officer?
The answer, likely to come from the Supreme Court, will determine not just the future of the OSP—but the direction of Ghana’s fight against corruption.
In this opinion piece, Isaac Ofori argues that Ghana’s prolonged indecision on the proposed anti-LGBTQ legislation is damaging the nation’s credibility. He critiques the politicization of the issue—from campaign promises by President Mahama to the current administration’s claim that it is not a priority—and warns that this policy vacuum fuels social tension and misinformation. Ofori calls for leadership that provides constitutional clarity rather than ambiguity, balancing majority values with human rights obligations to preserve Ghana’s reputation as a stable democracy.
Ghana’s credibility at stake in LGBTQ policy debate
By Isaac Ofori (Tutor at Winneba Senior High School)
The ongoing national debate over the proposed anti-LGBTQ legislation has uncovered a deeper challenge within Ghana’s governance system: the difficulty of balancing constitutional principles, political convenience, and societal values during times of intense public pressure.
What should have been a structured legislative process has turned into a prolonged cycle of political battles, judicial actions, and shifting signals from the executive branch.
This pattern raises an important question for public policy: can Ghana sustain credibility both at home and abroad without a clear, principled, and consistent stance on such a critical issue?
At the heart of the controversy is the procedural deadlock that arose before the bill could be signed into law by former President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo. The referral of the issue to the Supreme Court of Ghana added a constitutional layer that, although necessary, effectively delayed executive action.
In a constitutional democracy, such caution is neither a sign of weakness nor avoidance; it reflects fidelity to the rule of law. However, Ghana’s Parliament’s failure to navigate this situation decisively has created a policy vacuum, which continues to fuel public frustration.
What followed was the politicization of the issue, arguably undermining both policy integrity and public discourse. The opposition at the time, led by the National Democratic Congress (NDC), made the matter a central campaign theme.
Statements and rhetoric from key figures, including then-candidate and now-President John Dramani Mahama, heightened public expectations that a clear legal position would be established. Religious institutions, reflecting prevailing societal values, reinforced this momentum, turning a legislative proposal into a moral referendum.
However, governance, unlike campaigning, requires coherence, consistency, and accountability. The apparent shift in urgency by the current administration, particularly the claim that the LGBTQ issue is not a national priority, indicates a disconnect between campaign promises and actual leadership.
Such ambiguity risks damaging public trust. More importantly, it leaves all stakeholders, religious organizations, civil society, and the LGBTQ community in a state of uncertainty.
From a policy perspective, ambiguity is costly. For supporters of the bill, the lack of clear action indicates hesitation or political caution. For critics, including international human rights groups, it reinforces perceptions of inconsistency and a selective commitment to rights-based governance.
Ghana’s long-standing reputation as a stable democracy rooted in the rule of law is best preserved not through silence but through clarity grounded in constitutional principles.
Recognizing how the framing of this debate has sometimes contributed to increased social tensions is also crucial. Political messaging during elections arguably heightened fears and solidified public opinion, making responsible policymaking more difficult. When political leaders use sensitive social issues for electoral advantage, they have a duty to handle the consequences with equal seriousness once in office.
The path forward needs leadership that rises above partisan interests. If the current administration takes a firm stance, it should communicate it openly and act within the constraints of the Constitution.
However, if the issue remains contested within the executive branch, a broader national conversation grounded in law, human rights commitments, and Ghanaian cultural values becomes crucial. What cannot continue is a policy void that allows speculation, misinformation, and social hostility to flourish.
Ultimately, leadership’s role is not just to mirror public opinion but to guide it responsibly. Issues related to rights, identity, and law require a careful balance between majority values and constitutional safeguards.
Ghana cannot afford prolonged indecision on a matter that lies at the intersection of domestic unity and international oversight. This moment demands clarity, not as a political tactic but as a constitutional duty.
This article was first published on GhanaWeb on April 1, 2026
Conventional wisdom dictates that rising prices should lead to falling demand. However, this article challenges that notion by delving into the complex and often counterintuitive relationship between global oil prices and petrol consumption in Ghana. Drawing on recent research analyzing market data from 2016 to 2024, Rafael Adjpong Amankwah reveals that higher crude oil prices do not automatically suppress demand. Instead, factors like consumer hoarding behavior in anticipation of future hikes and the essential nature of petrol for transport and logistics can keep consumption stable or even cause it to spike temporarily.
Rising oil prices could trigger unexpected petrol demand in Ghana
Fuel prices may rise again soon, but what if higher prices don’t actually reduce petrol consumption in Ghana?
Discussions about rising global crude oil prices are once again dominating energy market conversations, raising concerns about higher petrol prices and increased transport costs across Ghana.
Yet the relationship between oil prices and petrol consumption may not be as straightforward as many assume. Conventional economic theory suggests that when fuel prices rise, consumers should reduce consumption. However, recent research analyzing Ghana’s petrol market reveals a more complex pattern of behavior.
The study finds that crude oil prices exhibit a positive relationship with petrol consumption, indicating that higher prices do not necessarily suppress demand as standard models predict.
This pattern reflects several structural characteristics of Ghana’s economy.
First, alleged BDC’s stockpiling increases the potential for increased purchases(demand) vis a vis consumption as consumers often engage in anticipatory or hoarding behavior when price increases are expected.
Second, global crude oil price increases do not necessarily reduce petrol consumption in Ghana in the short run. Petrol is an essential input for transport, logistics, and small business operations, meaning substitution possibilities are limited. As a result, consumption may remain stable or even increase due to inventory adjustments and expectations of further price hikes
These findings also carry an important methodological implication that Traditional symmetric demand models, which assume that price increases and decreases produce equal but opposite responses in consumption, appear to misrepresent the dynamics of Ghana’s petrol market.
When asymmetric price behavior such as the Rock-and-Feathers effect interacts with structural demand constraints, consumption responses become more complex than standard theory predicts.
Using monthly national data from 2016 to 2024 and applying a nonlinear econometric approach, the study examined how crude oil prices, exchange rates, inflation, and domestic fuel taxes affect petrol consumption.
The findings show that petrol consumption in Ghana responds asymmetrically to price changes. In practical terms, this means that price increases and price decreases do not affect consumption in the same way.
The research also highlights the importance of exchange rate movements. Because Ghana imports most of its refined petroleum products, a depreciation of the cedi significantly increases the local cost of fuel and tends to reduce consumption.
Perhaps the most influential factor identified in the study is domestic fuel taxation. Changes in taxes, levies and margins have a stronger effect on petrol consumption than movements in global crude oil prices. In particular, reductions in fuel taxes tend to stimulate consumption much more strongly than tax increases suppress it.
These findings suggest that policymakers seeking to manage fuel demand, inflation, and fiscal stability should pay close attention to domestic fuel pricing structures rather than focusing solely on international oil price movements.
As global oil markets face renewed volatility, understanding how Ghanaian consumers and businesses respond to fuel price changes will become increasingly important for economic planning and energy policy
Understanding the behavioral responses behind fuel consumption is critical for managing energy affordability, fiscal stability, and economic resilience.
The next time fuel prices rise in Ghana, the assumption that “higher prices reduce consumption” may need to be reconsidered.
In reality, the dynamics of petrol demand are shaped by behavioral responses, policy decisions, and exchange rate pressures, not just global crude oil prices. Understanding these asymmetries could be the difference between reacting to fuel price shocks and actually managing them.
Rafael Amankwah is a professional in Ghana’s downstream energy sector with a background in energy economics and investment strategy. He is passionate about advancing sustainable energy solutions and applies research, behavioral insights, and innovation to support smarter energy policies and business models.
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