In a world that too often equates formal education with destiny, Mary Wanjiku’s story shatters every excuse we tell ourselves about what is possible.

Born in rural Kenya, Mary lost nearly a decade of schooling due to poverty, family responsibilities, and the sheer absence of opportunity that still defines far too many childhoods across Africa. Most people would have accepted that as the end of the road. Mary did not.

She returned to education in her late teens, fought through every obstacle, and — against every statistical prediction — earned a PhD in a STEM field. Today she is a published scientist, mentor, and living proof that talent and determination can outrun even the harshest structural barriers.

Her journey is not just inspiring; it is a quiet indictment of the systems that continue to waste human potential. Globally, millions of girls still miss out on secondary education because of fees, child marriage, household duties, or distance to schools. In sub-Saharan Africa, the numbers are stark: UNESCO estimates that more than 30 million girls of secondary-school age are out of school. Each one is a Mary who never got the second chance.

Yet Mary’s story also proves the other side of the equation: when even one girl is given the opportunity to return, to persist, to excel — the ripple effect is enormous. She is not just a scientist; she is a role model for thousands of girls who now see a PhD as something that can belong to someone who looks like them, speaks like them, started from where they started.

The Cocoa Conundrum: Why Ghana’s Farmers are Poor Despite Making the World’s Best Chocolate

The phrase she chose to summarise her path — “Science is beautiful” — is more than a personal motto. It is a radical declaration in contexts where science has historically been presented as elite, male, urban, expensive. Mary insists that beauty lives in discovery, in problem-solving, in the quiet joy of understanding the world — and that this beauty belongs to everyone, especially those who have been told it does not.

Her achievement should force governments, donors, NGOs, and communities to ask harder questions:

• Why do we still tolerate school drop-out rates that rob entire generations?
• Why are second-chance programmes underfunded and undervalued?
• Why do we celebrate individual miracles instead of building systems that make them ordinary?

Ghana News Live Updates: Catch up on all the Breaking News Today (Feb. 14, 2026)

Mary Wanjiku did not succeed despite her circumstances. She succeeded because somewhere, somehow, a door cracked open — and she ran through it with everything she had.

That door needs to be torn wide open for millions more.

Because science truly is beautiful — and it should never again be reserved for those who were lucky enough to never lose their place at the table.

Ghana produces some of the world’s finest cocoa beans, yet the majority of its cocoa farmers remain trapped in poverty due to low farmgate prices, exploitative supply-chain structures, middlemen taking large margins, high input costs, climate change impacts, illegal mining (galamsey) destroying farms, and limited access to credit and modern farming techniques. This article by H. Aku Kwapong argues that while multinational chocolate companies earn billions from Ghanaian cocoa, farmers receive only a tiny fraction of the final retail value, calling for urgent reforms in pricing, local processing, cooperative models, and government intervention to ensure fairer wealth distribution along the cocoa value chain.

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The cocoa conundrum: Why Ghana’s farmers are poor despite making the world’s best chocolate

Every so often, you come across an economic situation so perverse, so utterly divorced from basic market logic, that you have to wonder how it has survived for so long.

The case of Ghana’s cocoa sector is a textbook example. Here we have a country that produces some of the world’s finest cocoa—the essential ingredient for a multi-billion dollar global chocolate industry. Yet the smallholder farmers who are the bedrock of this industry remain trapped in extreme poverty, many earning less than a dollar a day. How can this be?

The answer, as is so often the case, lies in a toxic mix of well-intentioned but misguided policy, institutional sclerosis, and a fundamental misunderstanding of how markets actually work. For over seven decades, Ghana has operated a state-run monopoly, the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD), that controls every aspect of the industry from farm gate to export. The result is a classic case of monopsony power, a single buyer that can dictate prices to sellers. And when a single buyer dictates prices, the sellers inevitably get a raw deal.

When cocoa prices quadrupled on the world market in 2023-2025, reaching nearly $12,000 per metric ton, Ghanaian farmers should have seen a windfall. They didn’t. Because of COCOBOD’s byzantine system of forward contracts and price-fixing, they were locked into prices that bore no resemblance to market reality. The very system designed to protect them from volatility ended up shielding them from prosperity. It’s an economic tragedy, and it’s long past time to end it.

This report is not an academic exercise. It is a call for a pragmatic, clear-eyed revolution in how Ghana manages its most important agricultural sector. It lays out a framework for dismantling a failed state monopoly and building a modern, competitive market in its place.

This isn’t about blind faith in laissez-faire economics—the history of commodity markets is littered with the victims of chaotic, unsupported liberalization. Instead, it’s about getting the institutions right, creating what I call a “meso-model” where a lean, effective government regulates a dynamic private sector. It’s about finally letting the market work for, not against, the people who make it possible.

1.The Economics of a Broken System
Let’s be clear about the diagnosis. Ghana’s cocoa problem isn’t a mystery; it’s a straightforward story of bad economics compounded by institutional inertia.

The current model, where COCOBOD acts as the sole buyer and seller of cocoa, is a relic of a bygone era of state-led development that most of the world has moved beyond. Its defenders will point to the premium quality of Ghanaian cocoa as justification for the system. And yes, the quality is good. But at what cost?

The Monopsony Trap
Here’s the fundamental problem: COCOBOD’s monopoly on purchasing cocoa from farmers means it faces no competition. Basic economics tells us what happens when a buyer has monopsony power – it can, and does, pay a price far below what a competitive market would deliver. Farmers in Ghana typically receive around 55% of the Free on Board (FOB) export price for their beans. Compare that to the 70-75% received by their counterparts in the more liberalized markets of Indonesia and Ecuador.

That 15-20 percentage point difference isn’t just a number on a spreadsheet. For a farming family, it’s the difference between a living income and grinding poverty. It’s the difference between being able to afford fertilizer and watching your trees succumb to disease. It’s the difference between sending your children to school and sending them to work in the fields.

And let’s be honest about what’s happening to that missing 40-45% of the export value. Some of it goes to legitimate costs – quality control, research, extension services. But a large chunk disappears into the maw of an inefficient, bloated bureaucracy that employs thousands of people and operates subsidiaries that would make a Soviet-era ministry proud.

Ghana News Live Updates: Catch up on all the Breaking News Today (Feb. 13, 2026)

The Illusion of Stability
The great promise of the COCOBOD system was price stability. By selling the crop forward on international markets, it was supposed to shield farmers from the notorious volatility of commodity prices. This sounds good in theory. In practice, it’s been a disaster.

The 2023-2025 price crisis exposed the fundamental flaw in this approach. When world cocoa prices exploded due to supply shortages in West Africa, the forward-selling system didn’t just fail to deliver the upside to farmers – it nearly bankrupted COCOBOD itself, which found itself on the wrong side of its own hedges. The institution recorded massive losses while farmers continued to receive their fixed, below-market prices.

This is the perverse logic of the current system: it privatizes the risks (which farmers bear through chronically low prices) and socializes the losses (which the state, and ultimately the taxpayer, has to cover). It’s heads the middlemen win, tails the farmers lose.

The Stagnation Effect
When you insulate an entire industry from market signals, you get stagnation. There is no incentive for innovation, no drive for efficiency, no pressure to improve. Why should a private company invest in better logistics or processing facilities if it can’t compete on price? Why should a farmer invest in higher quality beans or replant aging trees if they get paid the same as everyone else regardless of quality?

The result is an industry operating far below its potential. Production has collapsed from over 1 million tonnes in 2010/11 to just 654,000 tonnes in 2023 – a 14-year low. The tree stock is aging, with an estimated 40% of cocoa trees past their productive prime. The farming population itself is aging, with an average age over 50, as young people flee for better opportunities, including the destructive illegal gold mining (‘galamsey’) that is eating away at cocoa farmland.

These are the 17 Reforms in Ghana’s Cocoa Sector Announced by the Minister Yesterday

This is what happens when you try to run an agricultural sector like a command economy. You get all the inefficiency of central planning with none of the dynamism of a market.

So the argument that we must choose between the chaos of a fully free market and the stagnation of a state monopoly is a false dichotomy. The real task is to design a system that combines the dynamism of competition with the stability of smart regulation. That’s what I mean by a “meso-model,” and that’s what the rest of this report is about.

2.Learning from Others: The Liberalization Spectrum
Before we dive into the specifics of reform, it’s worth looking at what has happened in other cocoa-producing countries that have experimented with different models. The evidence is actually quite instructive.

The Cautionary Tale of Full Liberalization
Nigeria liberalized its cocoa market in 1986, dismantling its marketing board and letting the market rip. The results were mixed at best. On the positive side, competition increased, more private traders entered the market, and farmers gained more options for selling their cocoa. Production initially increased as farmers responded to better price signals.

But there was a dark side. The abolition of the marketing board led to a collapse in quality control and extension services. Nigerian cocoa, once renowned for its quality, saw its reputation deteriorate as beans of varying quality flooded the market. Farmers lost access to credit and inputs that the marketing board had previously provided. And the market became dominated by a handful of large export firms, which used their oligopsony power to squeeze farmers.

The lesson here is clear: simply smashing the state monopoly and walking away is not a recipe for success. Markets need institutions to function properly.

The Ivorian Alternative
Côte d’Ivoire, the world’s largest cocoa producer, offers a more promising model. After its own chaotic liberalization in the 1990s, the country established a hybrid system built around the Conseil du Café-Cacao (CCC), a regulatory body that works in partnership with the private sector.

Here’s how it works: The CCC sets a guaranteed minimum price for farmers at the beginning of each season, providing a safety net against price crashes. But it also licenses private companies to compete in buying and exporting cocoa. These companies can offer bonuses above the minimum price for higher quality beans or faster payment. The result is a system that provides both stability and competition.

The Ivorian model isn’t perfect – it still involves significant state intervention, and there are concerns about corruption and the fiscal costs of the price guarantee. But it has managed to maintain quality standards while allowing for private sector dynamism. Production has grown steadily, and farmers receive a higher share of the export price than their Ghanaian counterparts.

What Ghana Can Learn
The lesson from this comparative analysis is straightforward: Ghana needs to move away from its current fully regulated model, but it should not leap to full liberalization. The optimal path is a middle ground – a “meso-model” that retains essential state functions (regulation, quality control, research) while introducing competition in commercial activities (buying, processing, exporting).

This is not a radical idea. It’s basically what most successful agricultural sectors around the world do. The government sets the rules and provides public goods; the private sector competes to deliver services and create value. It’s time Ghana joined the 21st century.

3.The Reform Framework: Eight Pillars for a New Dawn
So what does a sensible reform program look like? It rests on eight interconnected pillars, each addressing a specific dysfunction in the current system. Let me walk through them.

Pillar 1: Transforming COCOBOD from Monopolist to Regulator
The first and most critical step is to fundamentally restructure COCOBOD. The institution needs to go on a serious diet, shedding its commercial functions and focusing on the essential public goods that only government can provide.

What COCOBOD Should Keep:

•Quality Control: This is a genuine public good and a crucial national asset. Ghana’s reputation for premium cocoa is worth protecting, and a centralized quality control system is the best way to do it. The Quality Control Company (QCC) should remain under COCOBOD’s umbrella, ensuring that all exported cocoa meets high standards.

•Research and Development: The Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG) has done valuable work developing high-yielding, disease-resistant varieties. This is exactly the kind of basic research that the private sector tends to under-invest in. CRIG should continue to receive public funding and should be encouraged to partner with universities and international research institutions.

•Regulation: Someone needs to set the rules for a competitive market – licensing buyers and exporters, monitoring for anti-competitive behavior, ensuring traceability and compliance with international standards. This is a core government function.

What COCOBOD Should Lose:

•Internal Marketing: The business of buying cocoa from farmers should be opened to competition among Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs), farmer cooperatives, and processing companies. Let them compete on price, payment terms, and services. The farmers will benefit.

•Input Supply: The procurement and distribution of fertilizers and pesticides should be handled by private agro-dealers. The current system of heavily subsidized inputs distributed through COCOBOD is costly, inefficient, and subject to political manipulation. A competitive market for inputs, perhaps supported by targeted vouchers for the poorest farmers, would work better.

•Export Marketing: The Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC), which currently has a monopoly on exports, should either be privatized or forced to compete with other licensed exporters. This would allow for more innovative marketing arrangements and better price discovery.

This transformation will not be easy. It will require significant downsizing and restructuring. COCOBOD currently employs thousands of people; a lean regulatory body would need far fewer. A comprehensive staff rationalization plan, including voluntary retirement schemes and retraining programs, will be essential. But the alternative is the slow-motion collapse of the entire institution, which helps no one.

Pillar 2: Creating Space for Private Enterprise
Once COCOBOD gets out of the way, private companies can step in to compete across the value chain. But they won’t do so unless the government creates an enabling environment. This means three things:

Regulatory Certainty: Investors need to know that the rules won’t change overnight. A clear, transparent, and stable regulatory framework is essential. This includes straightforward licensing procedures, well-defined quality standards, and consistent enforcement.

Infrastructure: You can’t build a competitive industry on crumbling roads and unreliable electricity. The government needs to invest in the basics – farm-to-market roads, port facilities, warehousing, and above all, reliable and affordable power. The fact that electricity costs in Ghana are nearly double those in Côte d’Ivoire is a major barrier to developing a domestic processing industry.

Targeted Incentives: To encourage investment in value addition – turning raw beans into cocoa liquor, butter, powder, and finished chocolate – the government should offer tax holidays, reduced import duties on processing equipment, and perhaps subsidized electricity for processing facilities. The goal is to move Ghana up the value chain, capturing more of the value that currently goes to processors in Europe and Asia.

The potential here is enormous. Ghana currently processes only about 23% of its cocoa production domestically, and existing facilities operate at less than 50% capacity. With the right policies, Ghana could become a major exporter of processed cocoa products and even build globally recognized chocolate brands. Companies like Fairafric are already showing what’s possible.

Pillar 3: Fixing the Price Mechanism
The current pricing system is, to put it bluntly, a joke. It’s opaque, it’s rigid, and it systematically underpays farmers. The Producer Price Review Committee (PPRC) sets a fixed price at the beginning of each season based on projections that often turn out to be wildly wrong. Farmers have no idea how the price is calculated, and they have no recourse if they think it’s unfair.

This needs to be replaced with a transparent, market-based system. There are several options:

Auction System: Cocoa could be sold through regular auctions where buyers bid competitively for lots. This ensures transparent price discovery and allows farmers to benefit directly from market prices. Ethiopia’s commodity exchange provides a successful model.

Commodity Exchange: The proposed Africa Commodity Exchange (AfCX) could provide a pan-African platform for trading cocoa, with prices determined by supply and demand.

Direct Contracts: Farmers and cooperatives could negotiate direct contracts with buyers, allowing for differentiated pricing based on quality, volume, and delivery terms.

Hybrid Model: My preferred option is a hybrid approach that combines a guaranteed minimum price (a floor) with market-based pricing above that level. This is similar to Côte d’Ivoire’s model. The floor provides security against price crashes, but farmers can earn more if they produce higher quality beans or if market conditions are favorable.

The key principle is simple: farmers should receive at least 70% of the FOB export price. This isn’t charity; it’s basic market efficiency. Farmers who are paid a fair price will invest in their farms, leading to higher production and better quality. Everyone wins.

Of course, a market-based system means price volatility. But there are sensible ways to manage this risk. A price stabilization fund can smooth out fluctuations by saving money in good years to support prices in bad years. Crop insurance can protect farmers from severe price drops. And over time, as farmers and cooperatives gain experience, they can use financial instruments like futures contracts to hedge their own risk.

Pillar 4: Building a Real Processing Industry
Here’s a shocking fact: Ghana captures only about 6.6% of the total value of its cocoa production. The rest – the vast majority—is captured by processors and manufacturers in

Europe, North America, and Asia. This is economic madness. Ghana is exporting raw materials and importing finished products, exactly the colonial pattern that developing countries are supposed to have moved beyond.

The solution is to dramatically expand domestic processing capacity. Ghana already has several major processing facilities, but they operate at less than 50% capacity because they can’t get enough beans. In the current system, COCOBOD’s forward sales contracts commit most of the crop to international buyers, leaving domestic processors scrambling for supply.

In a liberalized market, processors would be able to source beans directly from farmers. But during the transition, the government should guarantee that a certain percentage of production, say, 30-40%, is reserved for domestic processors at competitive prices. This would ensure that processors can operate at full capacity.

The barriers to processing are well-known: high energy costs, limited access to finance, and a shortage of skilled workers. Each of these can be addressed with targeted policies:

•Energy subsidies for processing facilities to offset Ghana’s high electricity costs.
•Tax incentives, including corporate tax holidays and duty-free imports of processing equipment.
•Dedicated financing facilities, perhaps through a Cocoa Development Bank, to provide long-term, affordable credit.
•Skills development programs in partnership with technical universities and international training institutions.

Beyond semi-processed products, Ghana should aim to build its own chocolate manufacturing industry and develop globally recognized Ghanaian chocolate brands. The market for premium, single-origin, ethically sourced chocolate is growing rapidly. Ghanaian brands can capitalize on the country’s reputation for quality, its sustainability credentials, and its unique cultural heritage. With the right support, “Made in Ghana” chocolate could become a premium product on the world market.

Pillar 5: Empowering Farmers Through Cooperatives and Land Reform
Individual smallholder farmers have essentially no bargaining power when facing large buyers. This is why strong, well-organized farmer cooperatives are essential. Cooperatives can negotiate collectively, secure better prices, access credit, and provide services to their members.

Ghana has a history of farmer cooperatives, including the well-known Kuapa Kokoo, a Fairtrade cooperative with over 100,000 members. But many cooperatives suffer from weak governance, poor financial management, and limited capacity. They need support, training in governance and financial management, access to credit, and a clear legal framework that protects their rights.

In a liberalized market, cooperatives should be able to negotiate directly with buyers and processors on behalf of their members. This collective bargaining power is the best defense against exploitation.

But there’s an even more fundamental issue: land tenure. Many cocoa farmers in Ghana don’t have secure title to the land they farm. Under the traditional Customary Land Tenure System, they have only usufruct rights – the right to use the land but not to own it. This creates a massive disincentive to long-term investment.

Why would you cut down old, unproductive trees and replant if you’re not sure you’ll still have the land in five years when the new trees start producing? Why would you invest in soil improvement or irrigation if you could lose the land at any time? And without formal title, you can’t use your land as collateral for a loan.

This is a politically sensitive issue, involving traditional authorities and complex customary law. But it must be addressed. Options include formalizing long-term leases, providing legal protections for farmers who replant, and gradually introducing formal land titling in cocoa- growing regions. Women farmers, who often have even more insecure land rights than men, need special attention.

Pillar 6: Leveraging Technology
We live in the 21st century, but much of Ghana’s cocoa sector operates as if it’s still the 20th. Technology can change this, and it doesn’t require massive investments in fancy equipment. Simple, accessible technologies can make a huge difference.

Mobile Payments: Ghana already has widespread mobile money platforms like MTN Mobile Money. Extending these to cocoa payments would mean farmers get paid immediately upon delivery, with a digital record that reduces disputes and fraud. It would also give farmers access to savings and credit products linked to their mobile wallets.

Digital Extension Services: Mobile apps and SMS platforms can deliver timely advice on weather, pest control, best practices, and market prices. The Cocoa Link program has already demonstrated the potential of this approach.

Traceability Systems: The EU Deforestation Regulation now requires full traceability of cocoa imports. Digital systems using GPS mapping and mobile data collection can help Ghanaian farmers comply with these requirements and access premium markets. This isn’t optional anymore; it’s a necessity.

And here’s the thing: attracting young people back to cocoa farming requires making it less of a backbreaking, low-tech drudgery and more of a modern, tech-enabled business. Higher incomes are part of the answer, but so is modernization.

Pillar 7: Building the Regulatory Architecture
A liberalized market needs a strong regulatory framework. The current system, where COCOBOD is both player and referee, is fundamentally flawed. Ghana needs an independent Cocoa Regulatory Authority (CRA) that is separate from COCOBOD and reports to Parliament rather than to a government ministry.

The CRA’s job would be to:

•License buyers, processors, and exporters.
•Set and enforce quality standards.
•Monitor the market for anti-competitive behavior.
•Resolve disputes between farmers and buyers.
•Oversee traceability and compliance with international regulations.

Ghana also needs to strengthen its competition law and apply it rigorously to the cocoa sector to prevent price-fixing and market manipulation. And it needs a clear legal framework for contracts, with fast-track arbitration and mediation services for disputes.

The goal is to create a level playing field where companies compete on efficiency and service, not on political connections or market manipulation.

Pillar 8: Financing the Transition
For decades, Ghana’s cocoa sector has been financed through an annual syndicated loan arranged by COCOBOD, typically in the range of $1.5-2 billion. This model is no longer sustainable. The cost of the loan has risen sharply, and COCOBOD has struggled to service its debt.

A liberalized sector needs a diversified financing ecosystem:

•Commercial bank lending to LBCs, processors, and farmer cooperatives.
•Warehouse receipt financing, which allows farmers to use stored cocoa as collateral for loans.
•Supply chain finance, where buyers provide advance payments to farmers in exchange for guaranteed supply.
•Microfinance and impact investing for small farmers and businesses.
•A Cocoa Development Bank to provide long-term, affordable credit for the sector.

The Ghana Stock Exchange could also play a role, with large processors and LBCs listing to raise equity capital, and cocoa-backed bonds to finance infrastructure.

The key is to move away from the current model where the entire sector depends on a single, increasingly expensive loan, and toward a system where financing flows from multiple sources based on commercial viability.

4.The Politics of Reform: Why This Is Hard (But Necessary)
Let me be blunt: the economics of cocoa reform are straightforward. The path to a more prosperous and competitive sector is clear. The real challenge, as always, is politics.

Any serious reform will threaten entrenched interests that benefit from the current system. COCOBOD employs thousands of people, many of whom will resist downsizing. The current system creates opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption that will be harder to maintain in a competitive market. And there’s a genuine, if misguided, ideological attachment to the idea of state control among some policymakers.

There will be resistance. There will be scare stories about how liberalization will lead to chaos and exploitation. There will be warnings that Ghana will lose its quality premium. These arguments need to be confronted head-on with evidence and clear communication.

This is why the transition must be carefully managed, with a clear roadmap, strong governance, and constant engagement with all stakeholders. A “big bang” approach is likely to fail, as Nigeria’s experience shows. A phased, 5-10 year transition, with clear milestones and measurable targets, is the only realistic way forward.

Phase 1 (Years 1-2): Establish the legal framework, launch pilot programs in selected regions, begin COCOBOD restructuring.

Phase 2 (Years 3-5): Roll out liberalized internal marketing nationwide, operationalize the CRA, introduce market-linked pricing, implement processing incentives.

Phase 3 (Years 6-10): Complete export liberalization, finish COCOBOD transformation, achieve 70% farmer share target, reach 40% domestic processing target.

Success will require political courage and long-term vision. It will require resisting the temptation to backslide when things get difficult. And it will require constant monitoring and adjustment, because no reform plan survives first contact with reality unchanged.

But the alternative is to continue presiding over a system that is failing its farmers, failing the nation, and slowly collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions. The choice is stark, but it is also clear.

5.Conclusion: The Case for Optimism
I am, by temperament and training, a skeptic. I’ve seen too many grand reform plans fail, too many well-intentioned policies produce perverse outcomes. But I’m also an economist, and I believe that when you get the incentives right, when you build the right institutions, good things can happen.

Ghana’s cocoa sector is broken, but it’s not beyond repair. The country has enormous advantages: a reputation for quality, a large and experienced farming population, existing

processing infrastructure, and a strategic location. What it lacks is a sensible institutional framework that allows these advantages to be fully realized.

The reform framework laid out in this report is not utopian. It’s pragmatic, evidence-based, and grounded in the real-world experiences of other countries. It doesn’t require Ghana to become something it’s not; it requires Ghana to become a better version of itself.

If implemented with determination and skill, these reforms could transform Ghana’s cocoa sector from a struggling commodity exporter into a globally competitive industrial powerhouse. Farmers could earn a decent living. Young people could see a future in agriculture. Ghana could capture more of the value from its most important export crop.

This is not just about cocoa. It’s about whether Ghana can build the kind of modern, market- based institutions that are essential for sustained economic development. It’s about whether the country can move beyond the legacy of colonialism and state-led development to create a system that works for its people.

The time for a new dawn for Ghana’s cocoa is now. The question is whether Ghana’s leaders are ready to seize it.

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By: H. Aku Kwapong Hene Aku Kwapong can be reached on oak@songhai.com.  He is a founder of The Songhai Group and NBOSI (National Blue Ocean Strategy Institute). He formerly worked with GE Capital, Deutsche Bank and Royal Bank of Scotland and had been a Senior Vice President at the New York City Economic Development Corporation.

Activists in Ghana are increasingly holding extractive companies accountable for environmental damage, human rights abuses, and community harm through grassroots campaigns, legal challenges, and public pressure. A new study published in The Conversation highlights how these efforts—often led by local communities, NGOs, and affected residents—are compelling mining, oil, and gas firms to address corporate misconduct, pay compensation, remediate polluted sites, and improve practices, despite weak enforcement of existing laws and limited state oversight.

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Activists in Ghana are Forcing Extractive Firms to Account for the Harm They Cause – Corporate Abuse Study

Cynthia Kwakyewah, York University, Canada

Ghana has a long history of resource extraction that has caused socioeconomic and ecological harm. The mining of gold, stones, sand and salt has displaced people, polluted the environment and destroyed livelihoods. It’s commonly believed that this continues to happen, with impunity.

But recent developments reveal a more complex reality.

As a global sociologist who specialises in human rights, corporate social responsibility and sustainable development, I mapped out the patterns of corporate abuse in Ghana’s mining, oil and gas sectors. I also looked at the strategies that local actors are using to push the state to act against firms violating their rights.

My findings show that a subtle shift is taking place in Ghana. Civil society organisations, administrative bodies and courts are changing the accountability landscape. Between 2000 and 2020, 27 human rights-related lawsuits and complaints were filed against extractive sector companies in Ghana.

The Ghanaian experience offers insights for other African countries:

• there are remedies even in environments that have weak regulations
• social activism that combines accountability with moral persuasion and legal enforcement can yield results
• African actors are producers of innovative accountability practices.

Ways to address corporate impunity and give victims access to remedies don’t have to come from the global north alone.

Violations

The study involved creating a new database of recorded allegations of corporate abuses, where the victims were in mining, oil and gas communities. The material came from the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre digital archive, a repository of complaints reported by NGOs and government institutions globally, primarily through media coverage. I then added material drawn from reputable local organisations that process complaints, petitions or lawsuits about corporate violations. I also interviewed representatives of civil society organisations and public officials.

I found that 83% of the allegations of corporate abuses were the result of the (in)actions of extractive sector firms. This contradicts the perception that most corporate human rights violations, in terms of numbers and severity, involve multinationals enabling a host government to carry out abuses.

Global reports often emphasise corruption, lack of transparency, intimidation and labour abuse. But the Ghanaian data point to a different corporate abuse pattern. Many allegations (50%) in Ghana’s natural resource sectors pertain to economic, social, cultural and solidarity rights violations. Many involve inadequate compensation to subsistence farmers for the loss of land or crops. These losses tend to mean erosion of livelihoods. Members of mining-affected communities have also reported experiences of forceful displacement.

Physical abuse allegations made up 28% of the cases; environment-related allegations comprised 15%. Health (5%) and labour (3%) related allegations were the smallest share.

Social activism

My analysis showed that Ghanaian civil society organisations have taken on roles almost like regulators. Examples include the Centre for Public Interest Law (Cepil), a human rights and environmental mining advocacy NGO called Wacam, the Centre for Environmental Impact Analysis and Third World Network-Africa.

In the absence of robust state regulations, these organisations have stepped in to fill a governance void. They document corporate misbehaviour, mobilise communities, and pursue redress through administrative and judicial channels.

Through “naming and shaming”, coalition-building, and selective litigation, they push corporations and regulatory institutions to act. For instance, following cyanide spill incidents, Wacam and Cepil combined community mobilisations with legal petitions that prompted sanctions.

Tangible outcomes

The strategic combination of activism and institutional engagement has produced tangible outcomes. Community petitions have led to company-funded remediation and fines for environmental damage. Successful court cases have compelled companies to compensate households for pollution. These outcomes illustrate how local actors are carrying out the state duty to protect and the corporate responsibility to respect human rights in pragmatic, context-driven ways.

Administrative mechanisms

Courts remain crucial in settling disputes. But administrative bodies are becoming more important. The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, which has the power to investigate human-rights violations and recommend remedies, has emerged as a trusted intermediary between communities and corporations. Its inquiries into mining-related abuses have resulted in negotiated settlements. Companies have also agreed to restore contaminated lands or water sources. These mechanisms provide redress without long legal battles.

The Environmental Protection Agency enforcement role has also expanded. In several cases, it imposed monetary penalties and temporary suspensions on companies that breached environmental permits. Such administrative measures show what can be done without going through the courts.

Judicial recognition of rights

When administrative engagement fails, civil society organisations escalate cases to the judiciary. Ghanaian courts have begun to recognise socioeconomic and environmental rights claims. These are grounded in the constitution and the Environmental Protection Agency Act.

In a notable case, a citizen urged Cepil to take legal action against a state-owned refinery for its oil spillage in a lake called Chemu Lagoon. Because environmental damage affects the public, Cepil had enough legal grounds to file a lawsuit. The ruling was in the organisation’s favour, preventing the company from legally causing further environmental pollution. Cases like this help victims and strengthen the foundations for future claims.

Strategic alliances

Grassroots activism, civil society alliances and state responsiveness can together achieve “accountability from below”. Even less powerful people can create and sustain accountability by engaging with both formal and informal institutions.

In Ghana, alliances across sectors force corporations and regulators to act, even where there isn’t strong top-down enforcement. These alliances demonstrate that local agency, not merely external pressure, can influence corporate behaviour.

Cynthia Kwakyewah, Course Director in Social Science, York University, Canada

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.