In an insightful Atlantic Council report, Joseph Asunka examines Ghana’s remarkable democratic journey since the mid-1990s, pointing out the pivotal role of civil society and independent media in upholding political freedoms while underscoring persistent challenges in judicial independence and youth employment.

Drawing on three decades of data from the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, the analysis reveals Ghana’s strengths in civic vigilance and electoral integrity but warns of fragility in legal and economic freedoms amid fiscal volatility and social inequalities.

Asunka argues that addressing corruption in the judiciary, creating job opportunities for educated youth, and reforming land ownership for women are critical to preventing democratic erosion and fostering inclusive prosperity.

This piece serves as a timely blueprint for Ghana’s policymakers in 2026 and beyond, as it advocates that true democratic success hinges on equitable justice and economic empowerment.

Full Article Reproduction: Delivering justice and jobs is the real test of Ghana’s storied democracy

By Joseph Asunka | Atlantic Council | December 4, 2025

This is the first chapter in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s 2026 Atlas, which analyzes the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

Bottom lines up front

• Civil society and independent media are the backbone of Ghana’s democracy: Their roles as watchdogs, notably real-time monitoring and publication of polling-station election results, has strengthened credibility of election outcomes.
• Judicial independence remains fragile, with public trust in the judiciary dropping by 20 percentage points since 2011.
• Limited job prospects for Ghana’s growing population of educated youth present a significant threat to its democratic consolidation.

Evolution of freedom

Ghana’s signature achievement since the mid-1990s is the consolidation of civic and political freedoms and a competitive political order in which citizens, journalists, and civic organizations routinely hold leaders to account. The durability of this achievement is not a result of elite benevolence or political will but the product of a dense, independent civil society and a remarkably resilient independent media ecosystem. When governments test the boundaries of civic space, the response is often swift and organized; this social infrastructure is the primary reason Ghana’s civic and political freedoms have remained consistently strong for more than two decades. This context is reflected in the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes’ political subindex for Ghana, which sits well above the economic and legal subindices. In recent years, it sits in the low-to-mid 70s out of a maximum score of 100, a pattern that aligns with lived realities. In the most recent Afrobarometer survey, conducted in 2024, an overwhelming majority of Ghanaians (85 percent) reported that they did not fear political violence or intimidation during the last national elections, a strong testament to the electoral freedoms that Ghanaians enjoy. Moreover, a majority (52 percent) expressed trust in civil society organizations, ahead of religious leaders (who are trusted by 49 percent). Only the military (trusted by 65 percent) ranks ahead of civil society organizations in Ghana.

The historical roots of this civic vigilance matter. From the anti-colonial mobilization led by Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first post-independence president, and mass professional and student associations to later generations of advocacy groups and think tanks, Ghanaians have long treated resistance to state overreach as a civic obligation.

As formal unions of lawyers, teachers, students, and medical professionals gave way to contemporary civil society and independent media organizations and research networks—among them, the Media Foundation for West Africa, the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition, the Ghana Integrity Initiative, the Ghana Center for Democratic Development, and many others, including subnational advocacy groups—the core impulse has remained the same: to protect and defend civic space, demand procedural fairness, and insist that those in power remain answerable to the public. This explains why the social reaction to efforts to undermine political freedoms is often met with resistance and why Ghana’s political openings have not been easily reversed.

Ghanaians have long treated resistance to state overreach as a civic obligation.

Electoral integrity is a useful illustration of how these social checks operate. While the courts can usually be swayed by partisan crosscurrents when individual political actors are charged with corruption or other acts of impropriety, the dynamic is often different with election disputes. The vigilance of civil society and independent media organizations in monitoring and independently collating election results at the polling-station level often helps to provide credible evidence when electoral disputes arise. The volume and quality of that evidence strengthen adjudication, making it harder for judicial bias to gain traction and increasing the credibility of outcomes, even in contentious contests. This distinction is important: While the administration of justice in ordinary (nonpolitical) cases is broadly reliable, the politicization of corruption cases can distort judicial behavior; election cases, by contrast, have benefitted from robust, external scrutiny that fortifies the work of the courts.

This juxtaposition points to the core challenge in Ghana’s performance on legal freedom: The judiciary’s structural vulnerability to executive influence, particularly through appointments to the High Court and Supreme Court. Observers can—and do—sort judges into partisan “buckets,” a perception that inevitably erodes confidence in the system’s neutrality. Survey data clearly show a deterioration of citizens’ trust in the judicial system in the last fifteen years, falling by 20 percentage points since 2011. Yet outside of high-stakes political cases, the courts tend to function competently and deliver justice with regularity.

Recent movement in the legal subindex has been mildly positive, driven in part by improvements in informality and, to a lesser degree, by steadier security conditions after the turbulence of the early 2000s. On informality, the government’s digitalization initiatives, including the introduction of national (and tax) identification (the Ghana Card) and a digital address system, have helped to identify and increasingly formalize informal businesses. Other initiatives, such as the institution of fee-free secondary education, opened opportunities for young Ghanaians to further their education instead of entering the informal economy. The National Youth Employment Program, although relatively less successful, helped to draw young entrepreneurs into more formalized activities. Finally, a surge of capital investments into construction, alongside an expansion in mining activities, has created demand for artisans, contractors, and allied tradespeople who transact in more formal ways than the street-level microenterprise typical in developing economies. The result is a measurable reduction in the prevalence of informality, a trend visible within the relevant component of the legal subindex.

The gradual strengthening of security owes more to internal stability than to a benign regional environment. Ghana’s northern border with Burkina Faso and proximity to Nigeria’s insurgency-affected areas create constant risks, and yet Ghana has avoided the cascade of instability that has afflicted parts of the Sahel. That relative steadiness, together with the normal functioning of everyday justice for nonpolitical cases, helps explain why legal freedom is trending slightly upward despite persistent concerns about executive sway over judicial appointments and decisions.

Ghana has avoided the cascade of instability that has afflicted parts of the Sahel.

Corruption control within the justice sector is another area to watch. Across administrations, chief justices have consistently placed anti-corruption at the center of their institutional reform agendas, and recent executive appeals to rebuild public trust in the courts suggest continued political salience. However, these public commitments have not always translated into tangible reforms or outcomes. Public perception of judicial corruption remains high: According to the 2024 Afrobarometer survey, more than 40 percent of Ghanaians believe that “most or all judges and magistrates” are corrupt. The growing trend of presidents appointing loyalists to the Supreme Court has only reinforced these perceptions, contributing to Ghana’s relatively weak performance on the legal subindex. The ongoing constitutional review presents an opportunity to reform judicial appointments and promotions, tighten avenues for corruption, and strengthen judicial independence.

Ghana’s strong performance on elections, civil liberties, and political rights within the political subindex is tempered by weaker scores on legislative constraints on the executive, highlighting concerns about the effectiveness of institutional checks in practice. However, civil society remains uncompromising in defending democratic norms, including contesting attempts to erode these checks. The resulting equilibrium is not perfect—nor is it immutable—but it has proven remarkably resilient over the past generation.

Economic freedoms have followed their own trajectory, with a notable increase from the mid-2000s into the first half of the 2010s, a period that coincided with the broader “Africa Rising” narrative. This period was characterized by strong improvements in governance and economic growth, rising incomes, and a growing middle class. Consolidation of Ghana’s return to constitutional democracy commenced in the year 2000 with the transfer of power from the ruling party to an opposition party, which further boosted optimism in the country’s political and economic outlook. The new political leadership signaled a clear focus on improving the economy, and market openness and property-rights enforcement seemed to find firmer footing. Former President John Kufuor is remembered in this context for emphasizing macroeconomic health and business-climate improvements that many citizens experienced in their daily lives. The results of committed political leadership and effective economic management are reflected in the economic subindex and the other components such as investment freedom and property rights, starting in the mid-2000s.

The subsequent downturn around 2015 is worth noting. Rising debt-service pressures, coupled with a large budget deficit and high inflation culminated in Ghana going in for an IMF program; a similar pattern occurred around 2023-24 as reflected in the downward trend of the economic subindex. These patterns signal the fragility of gains when fiscal anchors are not backed by disciplined fiscal decisions—such as politically motivated increases in public spending during election years and subsidies on utilities and petroleum products, among others—and when investment freedom and property-rights expectations face credibility questions. These observations underscore that Ghana’s enviable political freedoms do not automatically translate into disciplined fiscal management or sustained economic openness. The freedom metrics capture this: The political subindex remains high, while the economic and legal dimensions fluctuate with policy choices that either reinforce or erode market institutions and democratic norms.

Trade freedom tells a more erratic story. Ghana’s trade policy framework has generally been open by regional standards, but the component’s volatility reflects the broader health of the economy and investors’ read on the policy environment. In periods of economic stress, policy consistency suffers, and openness on paper does not translate into confidence in practice. The trends in the data thus track not only tariff schedules and non-tariff measures but also the credibility of macroeconomic management, which is often punctuated in election years.

The trajectory of women’s economic freedom stands out as a major structural improvement. Around 2004, there was a steep rise in the economic subindex driven in part by a cluster of women’s empowerment policies of the Kufuor administration: free maternal health services, including postnatal care services that reduced a key barrier to women’s labor-market participation, and explicit efforts to expand women’s access to finance and enterprise support. Those initiatives may have helped to boost women’s economic autonomy and anchor a higher plateau that persisted in the years that followed. The component’s level has stagnated since about 2008 and hence leaves some room for improvement—but the rapid change around 2004 is unmistakable. Recent Afrobarometer survey data for Ghana show strong popular support for women to have equal rights to work as men. However, more than a quarter of Ghanaians (26 percent) identify employers’ preference for hiring men as the top barrier to women’s advancement, ahead of childcare (17 percent) and skills gaps (16 percent).

Where do remaining constraints lie? First, land ownership: In Ghana, community and family lands are predominantly controlled by male heads; women’s ownership and collateralization of land remain very limited. Given the economic value of land, women remain at a significant disadvantage that dampens entrepreneurship, constrains access to credit, and restricts intergenerational wealth transfer for women. Second, intrahousehold decision-making: In many households, women’s ability to take paid work outside the home remains mediated by male authority. These social and legal frictions are the kinds of de facto constraints that keep the Women’s Economic Freedom component below its potential despite the formal policy gains that started in the mid-2000s.

Evolution of prosperity

Ghana’s prosperity trajectory since the mid-2000s mirrors, in broad outline, the “Africa Rising” era: a period of macroeconomic optimism, improved governance, favorable terms of trade, and political stability across much of the continent. Between 2005 and the mid-2010s, the Prosperity Index registered a strong and upward trend, reflecting the robust growth in incomes and steady improvements in social indicators, even as inequality widened in the classic early-development pattern. Ghana rode this wave and, for several years, significantly outpaced the sub-Saharan Africa average.

The story of the income component is familiar but still striking in its local particulars. A large discovery of offshore oil in the late 2000s added a new driver to a commodity basket already weighted toward gold and cocoa. In the mid-2000s, when global commodity prices were favorable, Ghana’s growth accelerated sharply; in 2011, Ghana recorded a double-digit real GDP growth rate (about 11 percent), up from about 8 percent the year prior. Oil windfalls amplified these gains, though they also heightened exposure to volatility and raised questions about how resource-linked revenues were managed. The income component of the Prosperity Index captures this rise and

Brazil is embarking on an ambitious cultural exchange with Rwanda, introducing its world-famous carnival traditions, music, and African-rooted expressions to the east African country.

The planned initiative holds immense potential for vibrant, cross-continental festivals to boost Rwanda’s tourism, foster international partnerships, and celebrate shared heritage.

This development offers inspiring lessons for Ghana, a nation with rich cultural rhythms and growing tourism ambitions, where a similar infusion of global flair could transform local festivals into major global attractions.

In an op-ed published in The New Times titled “Rwanda: Walking Together – Brazil and Rwanda At the Start of a Shared Journey,” Brazil’s Ambassador to Rwanda, Irene Vida Gala, outlined plans for 2026 that go beyond diplomacy.

The ambassador revealed plans to bring Brazilian music—particularly the exuberant energy of carnival—and its strong African influences to Rwanda, alongside translating Brazilian literature into Kinyarwanda, starting perhaps with a children’s book.

This cultural agenda, she noted, forms the “very essence” of shared identities, especially as Brazil’s art extends far beyond its renowned football legacy.

The exchange is timely, coinciding with the 2026 FIFA World Cup, when Ambassador Gala playfully suggested “some Rwandans also become a little Brazilian.” It builds on deepening bilateral ties, including cooperation in agriculture, environment, education, and culture, following the recent establishment of Brazil’s embassy in Kigali—the only new one opened in Africa under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s administration.

Brazilian Carnival, often hailed as the world’s greatest popular spectacle, draws millions annually with its samba parades, elaborate costumes, street parties, and rhythmic celebrations rooted in a fusion of European, Indigenous, and profoundly African traditions.

Samba itself traces back to West African rhythms brought by enslaved people, making the proposed sharing a poignant return of cultural elements to the continent.

For Ghana, this Rwanda-Brazil model paints an exciting picture. Ghana already boasts dynamic festivals like PANAFEST, which celebrates Pan-African heritage, and vibrant local carnivals such as the Ankos in the Central Region, influenced by historical transatlantic connections. Imagine infusing these with Brazilian carnival elements—samba-infused highlife beats, colorful parades through Accra or Cape Coast streets, or collaborative events blending Afrobeat, highlife, and samba.

Such initiatives could attract international visitors seeking authentic, multicultural experiences, boost hotel occupancy, create jobs in arts, hospitality, and event management, and position Ghana as a premier cultural tourism destination in West Africa.

Ghana’s tourism sector, with its pristine beaches, historic slave castles, wildlife reserves, and warm hospitality, stands ready for growth. A Brazil-inspired carnival fusion could enhance events like the Chale Wote Street Art Festival or Homowo, drawing crowds similar to Rio’s Sambadrome spectacles but with a distinctly Ghanaian twist.

This would not only generate revenue—potentially mirroring Brazil’s economic windfall from Carnival—but also strengthen people-to-people ties, promote cultural pride, and highlight Africa’s enduring influence on global arts.

As Rwanda prepares to embrace Brazilian rhythms, Ghana could explore partnerships with Brazil or other nations to ignite its own carnival renaissance.The result? A more vibrant, inclusive, and economically thriving cultural landscape that invites the world to experience the heartbeat of Africa in new, exhilarating ways.

In this analysis, Adi Imsirovic of University of Oxford surmises that the U.S. military strike on Venezuela in early January 2026 – which included airstrikes and the capture of President Nicolás Maduro – has raised questions about its effects on global oil prices.

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The capture of former Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro by the US intelligence services and armed forces has resulted in a frenzy of speculation about its consequences. But there is no doubt that the events were closely linked to the oil riches of the country. While the political situation in Venezuela remains fluid, there is far more certainty about its position as an oil producer.

For a start, Venezuela has one of the highest proven oil reserves in the world. The number frequently thrown around is 300 billion barrels, more than any other country, including Saudi Arabia.

But it’s important to be cautious about the numbers coming from the outside of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Statistics used within the OECD clearly distinguish between proved, probable, possible and contingent reserves and require consistency over time.

Proven reserves are defined as the oil in the ground that can be extracted economically, with the prevailing technology. It is a variable, not a constant – and the Venezuelan reserves estimate goes back to 2008.

As oil prices increase, the reserves increase too. This is because higher profits can justify the higher costs of extracting additional oil that would otherwise remain in the ground.

Initial production is usually easy due to the natural gas pressure of the well. Over time, this pressure falls and additional measures such as gas and water injection may have to be used – and these are expensive.

In 2008, the international oil prices approached US$140 (£104) a barrel. Currently, most of the Venezuelan oil sells at a US$25 discount to the Brent benchmark, at around US$35 a barrel. All other things being equal, the current proven oil reserves may be well below 100 billion barrels – less than a third of the figure that’s frequently cited.

The problem with Venezuela’s oil

Most Venezuelan oil is very heavy (tar-like) and contains a lot of sulphur. This makes production and transportation very expensive. Heavy oil needs to be diluted with naphtha (a liquid hydrocarbon) or gas oil first, and sulphur must be removed during the processing with expensive hydrogen.

Only very sophisticated refineries on the US Gulf Coast and some new refineries in India, the Middle East and China can process this kind of oil. It is no coincidence that Venezuelan oil is sold at huge discounts relative to other grades.

American oil companies started their activities in Venezuela almost a century ago, and by 1960s, the US was the largest foreign investor in the country. In line with most countries in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec), the Venezuelan oil industry was nationalised in 1971 and turned into the country’s oil monopoly, Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA).

The Venezuelan oil industry then suffered from decades of political mismanagement, purges and US sanctions. Due to the lack of investment, production in the country has fallen from over three million barrels a day (mbd) in the early 2000s to below one mbd last year (see the graph below). This decline was particularly noticeable during the Maduro regime when the ruling party used PDVSA as a cash cow, investing little or nothing back into the industry.

Due to the state of the oil sector, even a relatively small increase in oil production in Venezuela would require billions of dollars of investment. A significant increase would require years of massive funding – even with a stable political environment.

It is not clear that events in Venezuela will have any significant immediate impact on the global oil market. The initial reaction was for the oil price to fall. But the global oil market is oversupplied right now and even the total loss of Venezuelan exports (which is unlikely) would have only a minor impact on the prices.

The decline of Venezuelan oil production:

In the long term, the state of the industry can only improve (barring wars and civil strife). Additional barrels from Venezuela would only make life harder for Opec and other producers by making the oversupply worse. Indeed, oil prices tumbled again after US President Donald Trump vowed to seize up to 50 million barrels of Venezuelan oil.

Claims that the events would hurt China seem overblown. China (together with India) has been a major buyer of Venezuelan oil, but it represented no more than 5% of the volume of Chinese imports. Canada is another producer of heavy oil, and it has been shifting its exports from the US to China for some time. This trend is likely to continue.

Overall, there is little economic rationale for a “takeover” of the Venezuelan oil industry. If the US wanted Venezuelan oil, it could simply have lifted the sanctions imposed by Trump in 2019 and let their oil companies buy it, like everyone else.

It is the long-term political consequences of this legally dubious US action that are worrying the oil market. President Trump appears to have a growing appetite for military adventure which may include further attacks on Iran, a major oil-producing nation and a member of Opec.

Nobody is quite sure what Trump may do next, and the US action may also be used to legitimise Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This had already rattled energy markets. The last thing the oil market needs right now is more uncertainty.

Adi Imsirovic, Lecturer in Energy Systems, University of Oxford

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.