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US boards a ship sailing under a Russian flag: what we know and don’t know about the legal position

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This aritlce by Andrew Serdy of the University of Southampton examines the complex legal questions raised after U.S. authorities boarded a vessel sailing under a Russian flag—allegedly to enforce sanctions related to Venezuela and illicit oil shipments.

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Relations between the US and Russia have hit a fresh bump after the US coastguard boarded a vessel sailing in the Icelandic waters, claiming it was in breach of sanctions on Venezuela. The incident immediately sparked claim and counter-claim from the US and Russia.

The US claimed it was acting correctly to execute a warrant issued by a US federal court. Russian officials, meanwhile, were reported by the country’s Tass news agency as saying this was in clear breach of the law of the sea, saying “no state has the right to use force against ships properly registered in the jurisdictions of other states”. The statement asserted that the Bella 1 – which was recently renamed as the Marinera – had received a temporary permit to sail under the Russian flag on December 24.

US Coast Guard board the Motor Tanker Bella I oil tanker in the North Atlantic Sea.
US Coast Guard board the Motor Tanker Bella I oil tanker in the North Atlantic Sea. US Secretary Kristi Noem/X

Unlike the dramatic abduction of Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, from his Caracas palace on January 3, which the United States (US) does not even appear to be trying to defend in international law terms, the interdiction of the Marinera/Bella 1 appears to raise a new point of the law of the sea which may offer at least some prospect for Washington to show itself to be on the right side of the law.

Before the change of flag, the US seemed to be selecting with some care the ships carrying Venezuelan oil that it was targeting. These were either stateless or suspected of flying a false flag, which provides no protection under Article 92 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), which is also the customary international law rule for non-parties such as the US.

Stateless ships are vulnerable

Being stateless, or acting in a way that gives warships on the high seas a valid basis for treating it as though it were stateless, is a position that any ship would be recommended to avoid if at all possible. A ship that is stateless has by definition no flag state to assert the protective exclusive jurisdiction over it on the high seas.

Unclos also provides that a ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, and swaps them depending on the circumstances, “may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any other State”. This means it can be regarded legally as stateless.

Thus, until the change of flag reported on December 31, not just the US but any State was entitled to treat the Marinera/Bella 1 as stateless. This made it vulnerable to interception on the high seas and the exercise of domestic law enforcement jurisdiction over it by the State of the interdicting warship or coastguard vessel.

So the legal position remains unclear. It may be a question of whether the US was already pursuing the Marinera/Bella 1 when it changed its flag. If so the US may be entitled to disregard the reregistration.

Unclos allows for what it refers to as “hot pursuit”. It says that: “The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own State or of a third [another] State.” Since no other circumstance in which the right ceases is mentioned, including the ship ceasing to be stateless, this leaves it open to the US to argue that it was already pursuing the Marinera/Bella 1 and was thus not required to call off its pursuit.

But this argument has limited usefulness as there’s doubt as to whether this was actually a hot pursuit at all. The term is used for pursuits that begin in one of the maritime zones of the State conducting it – not on the high seas.

Claim and counter-claim

So far the Russian Ministry of Transport has claimed that the US action is contrary to the Article 92 rule. Russia insists that the change of registry occurred as long ago as December 24. To counter this, the US could say that it wasn’t until the Russian flag was painted on the ship’s hull, which was reported on December 31, that the Article 92 rule could be invoked against the US.

Article 92 also lays down that: “A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or change of registry.” This is often misunderstood and assumed to mean that a change of flag in mid-voyage – such as appears to have occurred in this case – is not permitted at all. But a closer reading reveals that this is not the case. What it prevents is a change of flag without a corresponding change of registration.

But that is not the position here. Assuming there was a real registration to Russia, that is what counts. Painting on a flag because you don’t have a physical one is simply evidence of that.

Reflagging while under pursuit is a new point in the international law of the sea to the extent that no previous incident of it is known. In the absence of a clear answer on this, the way this incident plays out is itself going to set the precedent for the future on this issue. We’ll need to hear the competing legal narratives of the US and Russia to see which of them is the more convincing.

Andrew Serdy, Professor of the Public International Law of the Sea, University of Southampton

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Opinion

The Sahel is Burning, and West Africa Cannot Look Away

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JNIM now strikes at capitals and governs territory, and the bet that Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger placed on Russia as their sole security guarantor has failed. Analyst and researcher Joseph McCarthy writes that the fire will not stop at the Sahel’s borders, and Ghana stands directly in its path.


The Sahel is Burning, and West Africa Cannot Look Away

By Joseph McCarthy

At dawn on 18 June 2026, fighters stormed Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey, the most heavily guarded site in Niger’s capital. It is not merely an airport. The complex houses the air force, most of the country’s drones, the headquarters of the Alliance of Sahel States’ joint force, the Russian personnel meant to help crush the insurgency, and even uranium stocks the state hopes to sell. JNIM claimed the assault, which killed eleven soldiers and two civilians. It was the second strike on that complex this year; the Islamic State’s Sahel Province claimed a January raid. Both of the region’s jihadist franchises have now breached the defences of a capital. This was not just another attack. It was a strategic signal.

It was also no act of opportunism. Hitting a fortified installation in a capital demands months of surveillance, intelligence on shift changes, the logistics to move fighters and weapons over long distances, and the ability to slip past layered security. It implies networks operating close to, or inside, the capital itself. As the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project noted, the Sahel’s insurgents have moved from localised rural fighting to coordinated strikes on vital national infrastructure. The pattern is everywhere. In Mali, JNIM has throttled Bamako with a fuel blockade since September 2025, destroying hundreds of tankers; in April, it overran the garrison town of Kati and killed the defence minister in his own home; it has since placed a bounty of two million euros on the head of Mali’s junta leader, Assimi Goïta.

More troubling than the firepower is the governance. A Reuters investigation found that JNIM now arbitrates land disputes, collects taxes, enforces rules and imposes a rough order in territories the state has vacated. Forged from the merger of four groups, it increasingly presents itself not as a militia but as an alternative authority, building legitimacy among populations long neglected by distant governments. History is unkind here: from Afghanistan to Somalia, insurgencies that learn to govern outlast those that only fight. The contest is no longer simply about defeating armed men. It is about whether the state, rather than an armed movement, remains the most credible source of authority, justice and security.

Against all this, the juntas made a bet. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled Western forces, walked out of ECOWAS, and rebuilt their security around a single guarantor: Russia, first through the Wagner Group, then the Africa Corps. On 26 June, Burkina Faso severed diplomatic relations with France entirely, accusing Paris of backing the very terrorists it claims to fight, an allegation offered without evidence and flatly rejected. Niger’s government, for its part, blamed the Niamey attack on mercenaries funded by President Macron, again without proof. The promise was straightforward: sovereignty restored, foreign influence reduced, terrorism defeated. Judged by the junta’s own promise, the bet has failed. The violence has not receded. It has spread.

This should not be read as a uniquely Russian failure. It exposes the limits of any strategy built around a single external guarantor. No partner, whether Russia, France or the United States, can resolve a conflict rooted in governance failure, economic exclusion, local grievance and hollow institutions. Force can kill fighters. It cannot rebuild public trust, settle a quarrel between communities, open a clinic or create a job for an idle young man, and those are the very conditions the insurgents harvest for recruits. Russia carries constraints of its own: bogged down in Ukraine, its resources finite, it was outfought alongside Malian troops at Kidal even after reportedly receiving a warning of the assault. A security architecture resting on a single distracted partner does not reduce risk; it concentrates it, and when that partner underdelivers, there is no second line. The 2026 Global Terrorism Index now names the Sahel the global epicentre of terrorism, the source of more than half the world’s terrorism deaths and one in five of its attacks.

None of this stays in the Sahel. Ghana shares roughly 550 kilometres of frontier with Burkina Faso, much of it porous and threaded with informal crossings used daily by traders and herders. Southward expansion rarely begins with a spectacular attack. It begins quietly: a recruiter, a supply route, a financing cell, fighters embedding in border communities long before a shot is fired. That is precisely how the contagion crossed from Mali into Burkina Faso and Niger, and how it has already reached Benin and Togo, with Côte d’Ivoire and northern Ghana plainly exposed. Alongside the fighters’ travels, something almost as corrosive: a flood of assault rifles, explosives and military hardware that does not stop at extremist hands but arms robbers, traffickers and illegal mining syndicates, hollowing out a country’s security long before any jihadist banner appears.

The wider world has its own reasons to watch. Niger holds some of the planet’s richest uranium. A jihadist proto-state straddling West Africa would command migration routes toward the coast and the Mediterranean, strain fragile coastal economies, disrupt trade corridors and rattle investor confidence. At the same time, every successful strike on a capital broadcasts a template to armed groups from Nigeria to Mozambique. What looks today like a regional security crisis could become an international one. A region generating one in five of the world’s militant attacks is not a distant problem. It is a lit fuse.

Africa has paid before for believing that outside powers can guarantee its security. They cannot. Partners can offer intelligence, training and equipment; they cannot substitute for legitimate governance and functioning institutions. This crisis will be settled not only on the battlefield but in courtrooms, classrooms, local councils and marketplaces, where citizens decide whether the state or an armed movement better delivers justice and opportunity. For Ghana, the task is preventive, not reactive: intelligence cooperation, stronger borders, regional collaboration, community resilience and investment in local governance, all of it far cheaper than containment once the violence has taken root. And for the Sahel’s rulers, there is a harder truth.

Sovereignty that trades several partners for total dependence on one distant and overstretched power is not sovereignty; it is a fresh vulnerability dressed in the language of liberation. The question is no longer whether the crisis will spread beyond Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It already has. The only question left is whether West Africa acts before the Sahel becomes the world’s next strategic emergency.

Joseph McCarthy is an analyst and researcher specialising in governance, security, and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, development, and African diplomacy. Email: joecarthy30@gmail.com

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Perspectives

From Crossroads to Counter‑Offensive | Colonel Festus Aboagye (Retired) Discusses Ghana’s Anti-Narcotics Posture

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Ghana’s 2026 World Drug Day commemoration marks a decisive turning point in the nation’s long struggle against narcotics trafficking, signaling a shift from reactive interdiction to an assertive, intelligence‑led posture that is already yielding tangible results. Yet, as a new policy brief by Colonel Festus Aboagye (Retired) makes clear, the strategic contest over governance integrity remains unresolved.

Twelve months after the Crossroads Republic paper rated Ghana’s narco‑state risk at 2.7 out of 5 — moderate but escalating — the country has made measurable progress. The Narcotics Control Commission (NACOC) has expanded from fewer than 10 district commands to 77 across all 16 regions; arrests, prosecutions and seizures are up sharply; and a special narcotics court and enhanced prosecutorial powers — both recommendations from 2025 — are now in place. But the threat has evolved in parallel: methamphetamine concealed in charcoal shipments, synthetic and new psychoactive substances, cyber‑enabled trafficking, a 7% drug‑test failure rate among security‑service applicants, and localised consumption hotspots (73.5% lifetime use in Madina) all point to a challenge that is far from contained.

The reform most central to averting state capture — political‑party‑campaign‑finance transparency — has gone unaddressed. Though Ghana may be winning tactical battles, the strategic contest over the integrity of governance remains open.


Read the full 20‑page policy brief, “From Crossroads to Counter‑Offensive”, by Colonel Festus Aboagye (Retired):

➡️https://ulinziafrica.wordpress.com/2026/06/28/from-crossroads-to-counter-offensive-ghanas-anti-narcotics-posture-at-the-2026-world-drug-day-measured-against-the-2025-outlook/

Share, discuss, and join the conversation on sustaining Ghana’s resilience against the evolving narcotics threat.

#WorldDrugDay #PolicyBrief #Governance #Resilience #Ghana #NarcoTrafficking #StateCapture

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Commentary

Reflections on Ghana And the Future it Deserves | By Simone Giger, Swiss Ambassador to Ghana

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As her diplomatic tenure in West Africa draws to a close, Swiss Ambassador Simone Giger pens a reflective and heartfelt tribute to Ghana’s enduring national character. Having traveled extensively across the country—from Paga to Keta and Wa to Goaso—she offers an intimate, human-centered assessment of a nation defined by its resilient democratic culture, youthful ambition, and an infectious “vibe” that fosters cohesion. In this candid farewell, Ambassador Giger explores the complex challenges threatening Ghana’s ecological treasures and argues that sustained institutional reform, rather than outside invention, is the key to unlocking the prosperous future the country so clearly deserves.


Travelling through northern Ghana, this author once stopped in a small community after a long journey. Despite the day’s heat and the demands of daily life, residents welcomed visitors with warm smiles, easy laughter and an eagerness to share stories about their hopes for the future.

It was a simple encounter, yet it captured something profoundly Ghanaian: an enduring optimism that persists even in difficult circumstances.

In diplomacy, countries are often assessed through official meetings, economic indicators and policy documents. Yet to truly understand a nation, one must travel through it, listen to its people, appreciate its strengths, observe its contradictions and understand the aspirations that shape everyday life.

As the end of a diplomatic assignment in Ghana approaches, this author finds reason to reflect deeply on a country that has left a lasting impression, not only professionally but personally.

Over the past four years, extensive travels across Ghana—from Paga to Keta, Damongo to Donkokrom, and Wa to Goaso—have revealed a country of extraordinary diversity, complexity, creativity and resilience.

Every journey has unveiled a different dimension of Ghana. Yet one common thread consistently emerges: a nation brimming with potential.

There is something profoundly remarkable about Ghana and its national character, what many Ghanaians simply describe as the country’s “vibe”.

It is evident in the warmth extended to strangers, the humour with which difficulties are confronted and the optimism that endures even during periods of uncertainty.

Even in challenging moments, there is often a joke, a proverb or a story that helps place events in perspective.

In this author’s view, that national character has become one of the essential ingredients behind Ghana’s democratic success.

At a time when democratic systems around the world are facing increasing pressure, polarisation and distrust, Ghana continues to distinguish itself through its commitment to dialogue, constitutional order and peaceful coexistence.

Democracy here is not perfect. No democracy truly is, including Switzerland’s.

What matters is that it remains alive, active and deeply valued by citizens.

Over the years, Ghana has established itself as an important democratic reference point in West Africa.

The country has repeatedly demonstrated that political competition can coexist with stability, that transfers of power can occur peacefully and that national debates can take place within institutional frameworks rather than outside them.

Such achievements should never be taken for granted.

Democracy is not sustained by elections alone.

It requires strong institutions, active citizens, credible public discourse and a continuous willingness to negotiate consensus across political, ethnic, religious and generational lines.

One can observe that Ghana’s diversity presents both opportunities and challenges. Yet this author has often admired the manner in which the country continues to navigate these varied interests while preserving national cohesion.

In many respects, this is where Ghana’s democratic future becomes particularly important.

The country possesses extraordinary human capital.

Wherever this author travelled, young people displayed ambition, intelligence, creativity and determination.

Ghana’s greatest resource is not found beneath the ground.

It resides in its people, their ideas and their aspirations.

Ideas and aspirations, however, require systems that function effectively if they are to translate into meaningful and productive outcomes.

When institutions are transparent, responsive, accountable and trusted, they unlock innovation, investment and opportunity.

When they are weak or inconsistent, they risk frustrating the very energy capable of propelling a nation forward.

This is why governance reforms remain so important to Ghana’s long-term trajectory.

One development that particularly impressed this author during the diplomatic assignment has been Ghana’s constitutional review process.

What stands out is not only the process itself, but also the spirit behind it – a willingness to reflect critically on how democratic governance can evolve to meet contemporary realities and future expectations.

This demonstrates political maturity.

Constitutions should never be viewed as static documents frozen in time.

Strong democracies periodically examine whether their systems remain responsive, inclusive and effective.

Ghana’s consultative approach reflects a country seeking not merely to preserve democracy, but to improve it.

Switzerland is proud to support these home-grown efforts and remains committed to supporting the constitutional reform process until its hoped-for successful conclusion.

History demonstrates that democratic stability does not emerge automatically.

It requires deliberate investment in participation, inclusion and dialogue.

Swiss democracy itself evolved gradually through compromise, negotiation and the understanding that national cohesion is strengthened when citizens feel ownership over public decisions.

One can observe important similarities between Ghana and Switzerland.

Both countries are diverse societies that have chosen coexistence over division.

Both understand that stability is strongest when different voices are heard and accommodated.

Both appreciate the importance of consensus-building in national life.

This shared philosophy has shaped bilateral cooperation over many decades.

Today, the partnership continues to evolve in both breadth and depth.

Switzerland currently supports initiatives focused on democratic governance, parliamentary cooperation, decentralisation, peace and security, cultural exchange, environmental integrity, climate adaptation and economic development.

Switzerland and Ghana may differ in geography, history and scale, yet both countries share a belief in dialogue and cooperation as foundations for national progress.

Despite Ghana’s bright prospects, one cannot ignore the challenges confronting the country.

No nation can fully realise its potential without confronting difficult issues directly.

During the years spent in Ghana, citizens from various walks of life spoke openly about concerns surrounding institutional effectiveness, economic opportunity, environmental degradation and governance accountability.

Such conversations reflected not pessimism, but a desire to see the country fulfil its promise.

Particularly concerning is the destruction caused by illegal mining activities.

Ghana’s rivers, forests and landscapes are among its greatest treasures.

Environmental degradation is not merely an ecological issue.

It is fundamentally a matter of intergenerational responsibility.

Future prosperity depends on preserving the natural foundation upon which communities, livelihoods and national identity are built.

Yet despite these challenges, this author remains deeply optimistic about Ghana’s future.

That optimism stems not from idealism but from observation.

The future of democracy globally will not be shaped only by geopolitical actors or large states.

Medium-sized countries such as Switzerland and Ghana also have important roles to play.

They can demonstrate that democratic resilience, peaceful coexistence and institutional reform remain both possible and necessary.

As this diplomatic assignment draws to a close, there is profound gratitude for the opportunity to have lived and worked in Ghana.

Over the years, this author has come to admire the country not only for its democratic achievements, but also for its humanity – its warmth, creativity, humour and enduring sense of possibility.

The task ahead is not to invent Ghana’s future.

Rather, it is to create the institutional conditions necessary for that future to emerge fully.

From all that has been observed across the country, there is every reason to believe that Ghana can achieve precisely that.

The author, Simone Giger, is the Swiss Ambassador to Ghana, Togo and Benin

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