This article analyzes Ghana’s Supreme Court case (No. J1/3/2026), which challenges the constitutional validity of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) operating independently from the Attorney-General, as vested by Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution. The author, Amanda Clinton, argues that the OSP is positioned to defend its institutional survival by asserting parliamentary authority and the need for anti-corruption insulation from political influence. The piece places Ghana’s legal dilemma within a global pattern, comparing it to the dissolved Scorpions in South Africa, the constrained EACC in Kenya, and the politically pressured EFCC in Nigeria. The article states that the Supreme Court’s ruling will determine whether Ghana adopts a model of centralized prosecutorial control or a rare framework of institutional balance, with significant implications for anti-corruption credibility across Africa.

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Ghana’s OSP case and the global pattern of prosecutorial control

By Amanda Clinton

Ghana’s Supreme Court case, No. J1/3/2026, is more than a technical constitutional dispute.

At its core lies a defining question for the country’s governance architecture: can the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) exist with meaningful prosecutorial independence, or must it operate strictly under the authority of the Attorney-General? That question has surfaced elsewhere—and the answers have rarely been neutral.

THE IMMEDIATE LEGAL FAULT LINE

The case challenges the constitutional validity of an independent prosecutorial body alongside the Attorney-General under Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution, which vests prosecutorial authority in the AG. This places the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) at the very center of the dispute. In such situations, the OSP is not a passive observer. It can:

• Apply to be joined as an interested party, or
• File its own statement of case if already joined

Recent signals suggest it will not stand aside. The OSP has indicated it will challenge interpretations that subordinate it entirely to the Attorney-General, pointing to earlier judicial reasoning that allowed some operational autonomy. If it proceeds, its legal arguments are predictable but significant:

• Parliamentary authority to create specialized prosecutorial institutions
• A delegation framework, where the AG’s powers can be exercised through statutory bodies
• The anti-corruption rationale, which depends on insulation from political influence
• And a practical continuity argument: the OSP has already prosecuted cases—removing that power now risks legal uncertainty

This is not a peripheral intervention. It is a direct defence of institutional survival.

Martin Amidu Wades into Constitutionality of the OSP with Riveting Article

A FAMILIAR GLOBAL PATTERN

Ghana is not navigating new terrain. The tension between central prosecutorial authority and independent anti-corruption bodies has played out in multiple jurisdictions—with strikingly similar trajectories.

SOUTH AFRICA: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SCORPIONS

The Scorpions were once a formidable anti-corruption unit with prosecutorial teeth. As their investigations moved closer to political elites, pressure mounted. Ultimately, they were dissolved and replaced with a less independent structure.

Institutional continuity was preserved in form, but operational independence was diluted. Public trust in anti-corruption enforcement took a measurable hit.

Effect: Institutional continuity was preserved in form, but operational independence was diluted. Public trust in anti-corruption enforcement took a measurable hit.

KENYA: EACC’S CONSTRAINED MANDATE

Kenya’s Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) was established with investigative powers but lacks prosecutorial independence. It must refer cases to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), who retains full discretion over whether to proceed.

Effect: High-profile investigations have stalled at the prosecution stage. The structural subordination creates a bottleneck that can be exploited politically.

NIGERIA: EFCC UNDER POLITICAL PRESSURE

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) operates with statutory prosecutorial powers, but its leadership has been subject to repeated political interference. Changes in administration have consistently led to shifts in enforcement priorities and leadership turnover.

Effect: The EFCC’s credibility fluctuates with political cycles. Its effectiveness is undermined not by constitutional constraints, but by a lack of institutional insulation.

THE PATTERN IS CLEAR

Where anti-corruption bodies have meaningful independence, they face sustained political pressure. Where they lack independence, they struggle to function effectively. The question is not whether tension will arise—it is how it will be resolved.

GHANA’S INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE

The Supreme Court’s decision will not merely interpret Article 88. It will determine whether Ghana opts for a model that prioritizes centralized prosecutorial control or one that permits institutional pluralism in the fight against corruption.

If the OSP’s independence is curtailed, Ghana joins a long list of jurisdictions where anti-corruption enforcement is formally robust but operationally constrained. If the Court finds room for both the AG and the OSP to coexist with distinct mandates, it creates a rare model of institutional balance.

THE STAKES BEYOND GHANA

This case matters beyond Ghana’s borders. It will be studied across Africa as a precedent for how constitutional interpretation shapes anti-corruption architecture. The decision will influence:

How other jurisdictions structure their own anti-corruption frameworks
The credibility of specialized prosecutorial institutions continent-wide
Investor confidence in governance stability and rule of law
The global pattern suggests that independence, once conceded, is rarely restored. If the OSP loses this case, it may never regain the autonomy it once had.

WHAT COMES NEXT

The OSP has signaled it will defend its mandate. The arguments will be legal, but the implications are deeply political. The Supreme Court will not simply rule on constitutional text—it will shape the future of anti-corruption enforcement in Ghana.

And if history is any guide, the outcome will echo far beyond the courtroom.

About the author:

Amanda Akuokor Clinton, Esq. LL.B, M.Sc, BVC, Gh. Bar

Amanda is the Founding Partner of Clinton Consultancy and a dynamic lawyer who was called to the Bar in England and Wales thirteen years ago and the Ghanaian Bar ten years ago. Amanda is a litigation expert with extensive corporate law experience in the U.K and Ghana. As one of the most recognised commercial lawyers in Ghana, she is regularly instructed by international clients who require bespoke, timely and accurate Due Diligence Reports as well as Legal Opinions: corporate, banking, telecommunications, property & construction and energy & infrastructure.

In this feature article, former Special Prosecutor Martin Amidu examines the constitutional challenge brought by one Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey against the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959), currently pending before Ghana’s Supreme Court. Amidu notes that the Attorney-General has filed a Statement of Case that substantially agrees with the plaintiff’s position that Sections 3(3) and 4 of Act 959 violate Articles 88, 93(2), and 296 of the 1992 Constitution. He criticizes CDD-Ghana Executive Director H. Kwasi Prempeh for attacking the Supreme Court’s unanimous ruling that refused the OSP’s application to join the case as a second defendant, arguing that the ruling was consistent with Article 88(5), which requires all civil proceedings against the State to be instituted against the Attorney-General. Amidu, the first to be appointed Special Prosecutor, identifies defects in both the plaintiff’s writ, noting that Sections 3(3) and 4 do not actually confer the powers the plaintiff claims, and the Attorney-General’s proposed case, which he describes as lacking neutrality and balance. He concludes that the relationship between the Special Prosecutor and the Attorney-General under the current government has broken down beyond repair, and the two cannot co-exist effectively in the fight against corruption.

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The constitutionality of the Office of the Special Prosecutor 2017 (ACT 959)

By Martin Amidu (Former Special Prosecutor)

Date: Saturday, 18 April 2026

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INTRODUCTION

One Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey has succeeded in raising the question of the constitutionality of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959) for interpretation and declaratory reliefs before the Supreme Court in an action he commenced against the Attorney-General on 8 December 2025. An earlier attempt by Mr. Ken Agyei Kuranchie in 2023 challenging the constitutionality of Act 959 was discontinued in July 2024 by the Supreme Court for lack of prosecution and without liberty to bring a further action against the Attorney-General.

The Defendant in the Adamtey action, the Attorney-General, failed to timely file a defence to the action as required by the Rules of the Supreme Court, despite the fact that the Deputy Attorney-General was the source of a leak of the fact that the Plaintiff had commenced the action against the constitutionality of Act 959. Exactly four months after the commencement of the action by the Plaintiff against the Republic of Ghana, with the Attorney-General as Defendant, the Defendant filed an application on 8 April 2026 in the Supreme Court praying for leave for extension of time to file the Statement of Case for the Defendant, fixed for hearing on 16 April 2026. The Statement of Case of the Defendant, as required by the Rules of the Supreme Court, was exhibited to the application for extension of time as “Exhibit AG1” and contains the Attorney-General’s case, which substantially agrees with the Plaintiff’s case. (The Court has since granted the extension of time.)

Between 8 December 2025, when the Plaintiff filed his action, and 8 April 2026, when the Defendant filed his application for extension of time, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) sought, by an application filed in the Supreme Court on 15 December 2025 and disposed of on 27 January 2026, to join the action as Second Defendant. The Supreme Court refused the joinder in a unanimous ruling, stating that:

“…We are of the view that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not a necessary party to the action and that this suit may be properly adjudicated upon without their presence as parties. This application for joinder is therefore refused.”

Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey’s action against the Attorney-General was known and available to the public and to anti-corruption civil society organisations since the case was filed in the Supreme Court on 8 December 2025. The Rules of the Supreme Court allow Interested Parties, who take the view that a constitutional action raises issues impacting them, to apply to join such action. There is no evidence that since the Plaintiff filed his action on 8 December 2025, any person or civil society organisation has applied to join the action as an Interested Party to make submissions contesting the Plaintiff’s case.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE REACTION TO DEFENDANT’S CASE

Nonetheless, immediately after the Defendant, the Attorney-General’s application for extension of time became public, the Executive Director of a civil society organisation called CDD-Ghana took to social media to attack the ruling of the Supreme Court delivered on 27 January 2026 for refusing to allow the OSP to join the action as Second Defendant.

The anti-corruption civil society organisations, which are organised under the umbrella of CDD-Ghana, have a stake in the existence of the OSP, as it impacts their ability to source donations from donors for their anti-corruption campaigns.

Mr. H. Kwasi Prempeh, the Executive Director of the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), who played a central role with President Akufo-Addo and his Attorney-General, Ms. Gloria Akuffo, in the drafting and submission of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Bill, 2017 to Parliament for enactment into law as Act 959, now blames the Supreme Court for complying with the mandatory terms of Article 88(5) of the Constitution in refusing the joinder application by the OSP. Article 88(5) of the 1992 Constitution states that “all civil proceedings against the State shall be instituted against the Attorney-General as defendant.” The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court dated 27 January 2026 refusing the OSP’s application for joinder is consistent with Article 88(5) of the Constitution.

In any case, the post facto condemnation of the ruling of the Supreme Court is premised on the false assumption that, despite the wording of Article 88(5) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s ruling endorsed any conduct of the Attorney-General that colludes with the substance of the Plaintiff’s action in the Statement of Case. Nothing under adversarial justice prevents a Defendant from admitting the case of the Plaintiff or part thereof, as the Attorney-General’s draft Statement of Case proposes, however unethical it may seem.

Mr. H. Kwasi Prempeh is not qualified to hold himself out as a person qualified to practise law in Ghana, let alone qualify for appointment to any court in Ghana, and should not behave as though he understands the constitutional law of Ghana and the rules of practice of the Supreme Court better than the Chief Justice and the four other Justices of the Supreme Court who refused the joinder application of the OSP. The fact that the Akufo-Addo Government, with whom he was associated, appointed him to the Law Reform Commission does not qualify him to speak as though he is a properly qualified legal practitioner in Ghana.

The proper course for any person or body of persons who disagree with the position taken by the Attorney-General on the action filed by the Plaintiff on 8 December 2025 challenging the constitutionality of Act 959 is to apply to the Supreme Court as Interested Parties and submit arguments as to why the provisions of Act 959 being challenged are constitutional.

DEFECTS OF THE PLAINTIFF’S WRIT AND CAUSE OF ACTION

On 8 December 2025, one Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey commenced an action in the Supreme Court of Ghana against the Attorney-General challenging the constitutionality of portions of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959). The Plaintiff sought eight reliefs. The main contention of the Plaintiff, discernible from the first five reliefs, is that Sections 3(3) and 4 of Act 959 are inconsistent with and contravene Articles 88, 93(2) and 296 of the 1992 Constitution and are accordingly void.

Article 88(3) and (4) delegates the executive authority and responsibility of the President under Article 58 of the Constitution to the Attorney-General for the initiation and conduct of all prosecutions of criminal offences. All criminal offences are to be prosecuted in the name of the Republic of Ghana at the suit of the Attorney-General or any other person authorised by him in accordance with any law.

The substance of the Plaintiff’s first five reliefs anchored on Section 3(3) of Act 959 states that:

“A declaration that Sections 3(3) and 4 of Act 959, in purporting to make the Office of the Special Prosecutor independent of the Attorney-General in the initiation, conduct, and termination of prosecutions, violates the Constitution.”

Ghana’s Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Faces Legal Challenge Over Power to Prosecute

The problem which any experienced and erudite constitutional advocate in the Supreme Court will immediately recognise is that Sections 3(3) and 4 of Act 959 do not confer upon the Special Prosecutor the powers the Plaintiff claims they do. Section 3 of Act 959 deals with the functions of the OSP and not the powers of the Special Prosecutor.

Section 4 of Act 959 deals with the mandate of the Office, and subsection (2) thereof subjects the powers of the Special Prosecutor to Article 88(4) of the Constitution and therefore cannot be said to be void. The Plaintiff also attempts in reliefs (a) and (b) to rely on Article 296 of the Constitution on discretionary power, as though it applies to prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney-General. However, experienced legal representation by an Interested Party may argue that prosecutorial discretion derives from the common law as part of the existing law under Article 11 of the Constitution, which restricts judicial interference in prosecutorial discretion.

The sixth relief appears contradictory, or at best alternative, when it seeks:

“A declaration that any statutory delegation of prosecutorial authority made pursuant to Act 959 does not bind subsequent Attorneys-General and lapses upon the assumption of office of a new Attorney-General unless re-authorised by that Attorney-General.”

This relief cannot co-exist with the first five reliefs and cannot properly constitute part of the same cause of action. The Plaintiff appears to concede that Act 959 is intra vires Article 88, except in relation to its effect on succeeding Attorneys-General.

DEFECTS OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S PROPOSED CASE

The draft Statement of Case of the Defendant exhibited to the application for extension of time filed on 8 April 2026 also contains contradictory submissions, misrepresentations of fact and law, which any experienced practitioner of constitutional law appearing as an Interested Party may bring to the attention of the Court.

The Attorney-General is at all times an officer of the Court, expected to assist in the administration of justice without fear or favour. One would therefore expect the Defendant’s Statement of Case to objectively and impartially address the implications of the nomination of the Special Prosecutor by the Attorney-General for appointment by the President, and its effect on prosecutorial powers under Act 959.

The Supreme Court may also be assisted by comparative reasoning, including the US Supreme Court decision in Morrison v Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), which upheld independent counsel provisions under the Ethics in Government Act.

CONCLUSION

This discourse should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the constitutionality of Act 959. I have previously indicated that I anticipated challenges to Act 959 during my tenure as Special Prosecutor, and I was not surprised when such challenges eventually arose.

The Attorney-General’s Statement of Case, as proposed, does not appear to present a neutral or balanced response capable of assisting the Supreme Court in resolving the constitutional issues fairly. Rather, it appears to substantially align with the Plaintiff’s case.

At the end of the day, the relationship between the Special Prosecutor and the Attorney-General under this Government appears to have broken down beyond repair. The Special Prosecutor and the Attorney-General, as presently constituted, cannot co-exist effectively in the fight against corruption.

ACCRA, Ghana — A major legal battle is unfolding in Ghana that could reshape how the country fights corruption. At the center is the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), an independent body created to investigate and prosecute corruption cases.

A recent High Court ruling has cast doubt on the OSP’s ability to independently prosecute cases—prompting the agency to mount a swift legal challenge. For observers unfamiliar with Ghana’s legal system, the dispute raises fundamental questions about who has the authority to prosecute crimes and how anti-corruption institutions should operate.

What Triggered the Dispute?

The controversy stems from a ruling by the General Jurisdiction Division of the High Court in Accra. The court held that while the OSP can investigate corruption, it does not have constitutional authority to prosecute cases on its own.

Instead, the court said prosecutorial power lies exclusively with the Attorney-General’s Department, based on Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

The case originated from a quo warranto application, a legal action questioning whether a public office is lawfully exercising its powers, filed by private citizen Peter Achibold Hyde.

What Is the OSP and Why Does It Matter?

The OSP was established under the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017, as part of Ghana’s efforts to strengthen its anti-corruption framework.

Its mandate includes:

• Investigating corruption and corruption-related offenses
• Prosecuting such cases
• Recovering proceeds of corruption

The agency was designed to operate independently of political influence, addressing long-standing concerns that corruption prosecutions could be hindered by executive control.

The Core Legal Question

At the heart of the dispute is a constitutional tension:

• The Constitution (Article 88) gives prosecutorial authority to the Attorney-General.
• The OSP Act (2017) appears to grant the OSP its own prosecutorial powers.

The High Court ruling effectively says: Parliament cannot override the Constitution through ordinary legislation.

This interpretation would mean the OSP can only prosecute cases if authorized by the Attorney-General.

How Did the OSP Respond?

The OSP has strongly rejected the ruling and announced plans to overturn it.

In its official response, the agency argued:

• The High Court lacks jurisdiction to declare parts of an Act of Parliament unconstitutional
• Only the Supreme Court of Ghana has the authority to make such determinations
• Its enabling law clearly provides for both investigative and prosecutorial powers

The OSP warned that allowing the ruling to stand could undermine ongoing corruption cases and weaken Ghana’s accountability systems.

The Attorney-General’s Position

Complicating matters, the Attorney-General’s office has taken a position that aligns—at least partly—with the High Court’s reasoning.

Government lawyers argue:

• Prosecutorial power belongs solely to the Attorney-General
• Parliament cannot transfer or dilute that power through legislation
• The OSP may require explicit authorization before prosecuting cases

They also contend that prosecutorial authority cannot be delegated to a “juridical person” (an institution like the OSP), only to individuals.

Why This Case Is Bigger Than One Agency

This dispute has far-reaching implications for Ghana’s governance and rule of law.

1. Anti-Corruption Efforts at Risk

If the OSP loses prosecutorial authority:

• Ongoing cases could be delayed or reassigned
• Investigations may lose momentum
• Public confidence in anti-corruption efforts could weaken

2. Constitutional Interpretation

The case raises a key legal question:
Can Parliament create independent prosecutorial bodies, or is that power constitutionally restricted?

3. Separation of Powers

The outcome will clarify the balance between:

• The executive branch (through the Attorney-General)
• Independent statutory bodies like the OSP

What Happens Next?

The legal battle is far from over.

There are now two parallel tracks:

1. OSP’s challenge to the High Court ruling
2. A separate case already before the Supreme Court, filed by Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey, seeking a definitive constitutional interpretation

Legal analysts expect the Supreme Court to ultimately deliver the final word.

Why Global Audiences Should Pay Attention

Ghana is often seen as one of West Africa’s more stable democracies, and its anti-corruption framework has been closely watched by international partners.

The outcome of this case could:

• Influence how other countries design independent anti-corruption bodies
• Shape international perceptions of Ghana’s governance
• Affect investor confidence tied to transparency and rule of law

The Bottom Line

The clash between the OSP and the Attorney-General is more than a legal technicality—it’s a defining moment for Ghana’s anti-corruption system.

At stake is a fundamental question:
Should an independent anti-corruption body have the power to prosecute on its own, or must that authority remain centralized under the state’s chief legal officer?

The answer, likely to come from the Supreme Court, will determine not just the future of the OSP—but the direction of Ghana’s fight against corruption.