Perspectives
Ghana collects half the blood it needs – digital approaches can improve that
Ghana collects only about half of the blood units it needs for its healthcare system, with the National Blood Service’s 2024 collection of 187,280 units falling far short of the World Health Organization’s recommended 308,000 units. This persistent shortfall affects emergency care, surgeries and maternal health, often forcing families to find donors at critical moments. This article by Michael Head, Honghui Shen and Markus Brede, highlights structural challenges such as inadequate collection infrastructure, heavy reliance on replacement donors (family and friends), and a lack of regular voluntary donors.

Michael Head, University of Southampton; Honghui Shen, University of Southampton, and Markus Brede, University of Southampton
It is late, the ward is crowded, and the clock is moving faster than everyone would like. A doctor has stabilised the patient as best they can, but one thing is missing – blood.
A relative is asked to “try somewhere else”, and within minutes, the family is on the phone, calling friends, contacting church groups, posting in WhatsApp chats, hoping that someone nearby is eligible, willing and able to reach the hospital in time.
In that moment, healthcare stops being only about medicine. It becomes about networks, trust and whether a lifesaving resource can be found quickly enough.
This is not an unusual drama in Ghana. It is a recurring reality, quietly shaping outcomes in emergencies, childbirth, surgery and severe illness. Ghana has made progress, but the gap between what is needed and what is available remains wide.
In 2024, Ghana’s National Blood Service collected 187,280 units of blood. This falls far short of the World Health Organization recommended annual stock requirement of 308,000 units. The consequences are tangible, including delays to surgery, difficult clinical decisions, and families carrying the burden of searching for blood at the worst possible time.
One way to gauge the scale is the “blood collection index”, defined as donations per 1,000 people. Ghana’s index increased from 5.9 in 2023 to 6.1 in 2024, but it remains well below the ten per 1,000 level that is often cited as a basic benchmark by the WHO.
The contrast is stark. The WHO’s global figures show an average (median) donation rate of 31.5 per 1,000 in high-income countries, compared with 6.6 per 1,000 in lower- and middle-income countries and 5.0 per 1,000 in low-income countries. Ghana is a low-income country, yet its donation level remains below average for this group of countries, underscoring a persistent gap between demand and supply.
Why does this matter so much? Because blood availability is not a niche issue. It underpins everyday healthcare and becomes decisive in emergencies.
Few examples are more urgent than childbirth. Postpartum haemorrhage (severe bleeding after delivery) can escalate rapidly, and survival often depends on timely transfusion.
In 2025, the WHO highlighted that bleeding following childbirth causes nearly 45,000 deaths globally each year. When anaemia is common, the danger increases further: women have less physiological “buffer” against blood loss.
Women who enter labour with severe anaemia have around seven times higher odds of dying or becoming critically ill from heavy bleeding after childbirth, compared to those with moderate anaemia. In plain terms, they start with less room for error, and without fast access to transfusion, things can spiral quickly.
So why is Ghana’s blood supply so difficult to secure? Part of the answer is structural. Blood services require investment in collection, testing, transport at the right temperature and distribution networks.
These systems must work reliably every day, not only during crises. Yet the demand is rising with population growth and expanding clinical services, while resources remain constrained. The result is a system that is often stretched, especially outside major urban centres.
Another part of the story is how donations are sourced. In many settings, a stable supply depends on a large base of regular voluntary donors. Ghana is still working towards that goal.
In 2024, voluntary donations nationwide decreased from 40% to 29%, even as regional blood centres saw some improvement. That matters because heavy reliance on replacement donors (family members or friends recruited at the point of need) creates unpredictability. Emergencies do not wait for someone to finish work, travel across town and pass eligibility screening.
Then there is trust. People don’t donate in a vacuum; they donate into a system they believe in.
In our ongoing national survey in Ghana on people’s blood donation experiences, trust is clearly concentrated in familiar and formal sources. Around nine in ten respondents report trust in requests coming from a family member or close friend, and similarly high trust in requests issued by an official hospital or clinic.
Trust drops as the source becomes more distant or less verifiable, with markedly higher scepticism towards non-hospital community donation groups and, most of all, unknown people.
Yet high trust in hospitals does not automatically translate into action. When people are unsure how blood is used, whether it reaches patients fairly, or whether it might be diverted or sold, willingness can stall.
Even when people want to help, uncertainty can lead to hesitation: “Will this really go where they say it will?” In a high-stakes context, doubt is costly.
This gap points to a transparency problem, where confidence depends not only on who makes the request, but also on whether the system can credibly show where the blood goes.
Finally, communication channels shape outcomes. When a hospital lacks a rapid, reliable way to reach suitable donors, it falls back on what is available: phone calls, personal networks and social media posts.
But social feeds are noisy, messages get buried, and not everyone has the same connectivity or social reach. The ability to mobilise donors becomes uneven, depending on who you know, where you live, and how quickly information travels.
None of this means Ghana lacks goodwill. In fact, the opposite is often true: communities respond generously when they understand a need and feel confident their help will make a difference. The challenge is that goodwill alone cannot compensate for gaps in infrastructure, coordination and trust.
Telling people to “donate more” is not a strategy if the system cannot consistently reach donors, support them and show them that their contribution mattered.
The solution?
What would meaningful progress look like? It starts with stronger hospital services and blood-bank capacity, so that safe collection, testing and storage can happen consistently.
Alongside that, Ghana needs a more organised digital way to mobilise donors: a channel that can reach the right people quickly, rather than relying on broad social media appeals that get buried, skimmed past, or spread too widely without finding eligible donors nearby.
A well-run system could also keep clear, traceable records for each donation and request, making it easier to show where blood goes and to coordinate fast, accountable responses when an emergency hits.
That is exactly the gap our research is tackling. We’re developing a hospital-linked digital platform designed for Ghana’s realities. Here, urgent requests can be sent quickly to nearby eligible donors through a trusted channel, with location-aware matching and follow-up rather than blanket posts. It also builds in transparent, auditable donation-to-use tracking, helping hospitals coordinate emergencies more efficiently while giving donors clearer reassurance about where their blood goes.
Because, in the end, the story of blood in Ghana is not only about shortages. It is about a simple question with life-or-death consequences: when someone is bleeding, will help arrive in time?
This article was commissioned in conjunction with Prototypes for Humanity, a global initiative that showcases and accelerates academic innovation to solve social and environmental challenges. The Conversation is the media partner of Prototypes for Humanity 2025.
Michael Head, Senior Research Fellow in Global Health, University of Southampton; Honghui Shen, PhD Candidate in Computer Science, University of Southampton, and Markus Brede, Associate Professor, Mathematical Modeling, Statistics and Data Science, University of Southampton
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Opinion
Ghana’s Moscow Moment: Sovereign Voices or a Borrowed Script?
As Ghana deepens its media ties with Moscow, questions are mounting over where legitimate frustration with Western media dominance ends and where borrowed narratives begin. In this analysis, Sahel governance and security expert Joseph McCarthy examines the fine line between reclaiming Africa’s story and merely swapping one foreign script for another, and asks what Kwame Nkrumah’s non-alignment truly demands of Ghana today. Read the full article below.
Ghana’s Moscow Moment: Sovereign Voices or a Borrowed Script?
By Joseph McCarthy · Analyst, Sahel governance & security
| 28 OctRT PUBLISHES THE WODE MAYA INTERVIEW | 200+PARTICIPANTS, 46 AFRICAN COUNTRIES | 12AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN RT COOPERATION DEALS |
A warm welcome in Moscow is not proof that media reports have misrepresented Russia. Neither is justified frustration with Western media dominance a reason to adopt Russian state narratives. Yet the line between the two is blurring, and Ghana sits closer to that line than most.
The Russia-Africa Media Forum, held alongside the third Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow, drew more than 200 participants from 46 African countries. RT organised it with Sputnik and TASS, promoting media sovereignty, professional cooperation, and greater African control over the continent’s image. These are legitimate aspirations. The question is whether Africa is reclaiming its narrative or merely changing the foreign power that shapes it.
Ghana supplied the forum’s most visible test case. In an interview RT published on 28 October, the Ghanaian YouTuber Wode Maya said he had been apprehensive about travelling to Russia, only to find a country different from the one he had imagined. RT’s headline gave his remark a sharper edge: “You won’t believe that I fell for the propaganda.”
There is nothing wrong with a visitor finding that a country differs from its portrayal. Personal experience can puncture stereotypes. But hospitality is not investigation. A pleasant trip cannot tell us whether the invasion of Ukraine squares with Moscow’s professed respect for sovereignty, whether Russian military operations in Africa have made civilians safer, or whether Russian state media cover either question fairly.
Fairness also matters here. Nothing in the material I have seen shows that Maya was paid to promote Russia or misrepresented what he felt, and suggesting otherwise would be wrong. The concern is what happens to a sincere impression once a state-backed broadcaster selects, edits, headlines and distributes it. A travel experience becomes a testimonial, a testimonial becomes a geopolitical narrative, and an influencer’s credibility with African audiences becomes an instrument of international communication.
He was not the only Ghanaian voice. President John Mahama, in his own RT interview, said members of his delegation had expected a sanctions-hit economy in ruins and found instead “a cultural shock”. He also said he hoped the war would end quickly, and he pressed the case for Russian investment in agro-processing, fertiliser and pharmaceuticals, which is the substance Ghanaians should care about. Samia Nkrumah, daughter of Ghana’s first president, appeared on an RT panel about the founders of African independence. Each contribution was individually defensible. Together, curated by one broadcaster, they became a Ghanaian chorus.
That history deserves a Ghanaian reading. Kwame Nkrumah’s non-alignment was never an instruction to love one bloc. It was a refusal to be owned by any. A Ghana that honours his legacy engages Moscow, Washington, Beijing and Paris on its own terms and asks hard questions of all four.
“Nkrumah’s non-alignment was never an instruction to love one bloc. It was a refusal to be owned by any.”
Content creators have transformed African storytelling, reaching audiences that traditional newsrooms struggle to attract, and that deserves recognition. But influence is not journalism. Reporting involves verification, context, editorial accountability and a willingness to confront uncomfortable facts. The sensible response is not to discredit creators but to ask for transparency: who sponsored the visit, who paid for travel and accommodation, whether any content was commissioned, and whether the creator retained full editorial control. These are not accusations. They are basic safeguards whenever governments or corporations cultivate influential voices, and they apply to every capital.
The stakes rise when institutional agreements accompany personal testimonials. RT says it has signed cooperation agreements with media organisations in a dozen African countries, including Ghana, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, covering content exchange, training and broadcasting. Ghana Broadcasting Corporation’s agreement with Rossiya Segodnya provides for reciprocal access to English-language news, help for journalists and joint events. GBC’s Director-General, Professor Amin Alhassan, has said it would bring balance to the corporation’s coverage of Russia.
Balance is the right goal, and international news cooperation can widen access and build skills. But a public broadcaster owes viewers clear labelling of foreign state material, independent fact-checking, and the freedom to investigate Russian policy, including the war in Ukraine and Africa Corps operations in the Sahel. The agreement does not by itself establish Russian editorial control. It does demand visible safeguards.
Those safeguards matter more to Ghana than to most other countries. Russia’s media push accompanies its security role in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and Burkina Faso borders Ghana’s northern neighbour. Jihadist violence in the Sahel has already pressed towards coastal states. Ghanaian audiences need reporting on whether Russian-backed security operations are protecting civilians, and that reporting cannot be outsourced to the partners being assessed.
None of this excuses the other side. France’s colonial-era relationships deserve scrutiny, and so do Western interventions and the stereotypes in international coverage. Nor is Russia alone in courting African audiences: the BBC, France 24, Deutsche Welle and China’s CGTN all run training and content partnerships, and they deserve the same transparency. When allegations against Russian personnel are dismissed as Western propaganda by reflex, journalism gives way to loyalty. When criticism of Moscow is read as service to NATO, the same failure runs in reverse.
A May 2026 report by the Centre for a New American Security says Russia pays journalists and outlets for stories, and that networks of local influencers and journalists amplify Kremlin narratives. CNAS is a Washington think tank; its findings need independent corroboration, and it says nothing about Maya. They do explain why disclosure is not an insult.
The remedy is consistent standards. Broadcasters should disclose content-sharing deals and label supplied material. Journalists and creators should declare sponsored travel and commissioned work. Press associations should sharpen their ethical codes, and governments should protect independent reporting rather than invoking sovereignty to silence it. Above all, Ghana’s newsrooms need investment in investigative capacity and distribution so that no foreign partner becomes necessary.
A warm welcome is not evidence. A foreign partnership is not liberation. Changing the nationality of those who shape Africa’s narrative is not the same as reclaiming it. Media sovereignty is not about choosing whose script to believe. It is about keeping the freedom to question everyone.
Joseph McCarthy is an analyst and researcher specialising in governance, security and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, development and African diplomacy. joecarthy30@gmail.com
Opinion
Yandex Strikes: Can Moscow Host Africa Under Drone Threat?
Can Moscow host Africa under drone threat? As Moscow prepares to welcome African leaders to the third Russia-Africa Summit on October 28 to 29, Ukrainian drone strikes have reportedly hit Yandex data centres and targeted the capital region, exposing a delicate contradiction at the heart of the gathering. Russia pitches itself as Africa’s security partner while its own infrastructure proves vulnerable. In this opinion piece, analyst Joseph McCarthy examines the security dilemma facing both Moscow and African governments, arguing that leaders weighing the trip must confront a deeper question: what does it mean to tie your nation’s safety to a partner that is itself under sustained attack? Read the full article below.
Yandex Strikes: Can Moscow Host Africa Under Drone Threat?
Moscow pitches itself as Africa’s security partner while its own infrastructure is exposed
By Joseph McCarthy · Analyst, Sahel governance & security
| 3YANDEX DATA CENTRES REPORTEDLY STRUCK, 8–11 OCT | 650DRONES STRUCK MOSCOW REGION, 6 OCT | 28–29 OctTHIRD RUSSIA-AFRICA SUMMIT, MOSCOW |
Every summit is a performance of strength. The third Russia-Africa Summit, due in Moscow on 28 and 29 October, is meant to show African leaders that Russia remains a confident, well-connected partner despite sanctions, isolation and a costly war. Between 8 and 11 October, Ukrainian drones complicated that script. Three data centres operated by Yandex, the technology giant behind much of Russia’s digital economy, were reportedly struck in the Ryazan, Kaluga and Vladimir regions. For Moscow and for its African guests, the episode poses a security dilemma that no communiqué will resolve.
The first attack, on the night of 7 to 8 October, reportedly set fire to a facility in Sasovo, in Ryazan region, and suspended operations. A second strike hit a site in Kaluga; a third, in Vladimir region, followed on 11 October. Yandex runs payments, email, navigation, ride-hailing, delivery and cloud computing, so the effects spread quickly. Meduza reported disruptions to Yandex Pay, Mail, Disk and Go, while businesses that depend on Yandex Cloud described outages of their own. One user told the outlet: “All my money is on Yandex, so I have no money for food.” The company says customers’ funds are safe, but the episode shows how one point of failure can become hardship for ordinary people within hours.
Recovery may be slow. Reports suggest that replacing specialised equipment could take months, and Russian officials have reportedly acknowledged the difficulty. That matters beyond one company. Moscow has spent years encouraging reliance on domestic platforms as Western technology withdrew. The Yandex strikes show that domestic ownership is not the same as security. Technological sovereignty also means being able to protect, maintain and restore systems under attack.
Moscow will call such strikes aggression against civilian targets. Yet they come after years of Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure, so the exposure Russia now faces cannot be separated from the war it chose to launch. That context does not make the risk to visitors any smaller; it explains why it is unlikely to disappear before the summit.
Here lies the first half of the dilemma, and it is Moscow’s. Hosting African leaders in the capital is a statement of confidence, but it also puts that confidence on display. Russia must keep airspace open, transport moving and digital systems running while the war reaches ever deeper into its territory. On 20 September, roughly 450 drones were reportedly aimed at the capital; on 6 October, around 650 struck the Moscow region. Every intercept shows that defences work. Every strike that lands, and every airport closure, suggests the opposite. The summit cannot merely proceed; it must avoid becoming a showcase for exposure. Moscow will almost certainly respond with heavy security, restricted airspace and tightly managed movement. That may protect delegates, but it also turns the gathering into a fortress, held in spite of the war rather than in a country at ease with itself.
None of this proves that Russia cannot protect the summit. Vulnerability to long-range drones is not the same as losing the ability to defend territory, and the more widely a country’s civilian and commercial infrastructure is distributed, the harder it is to shield. Delegations may well land, meet and leave without incident. But that is a probability, not a guarantee, and guarantees are precisely what Russia is selling.
That brings us to the second half of the dilemma, which belongs to African governments. The immediate question is personal safety. In early September, Air Tanzania suspended its Dar es Salaam to Moscow route after a risk assessment, then resumed it days later. Further attacks could prompt airspace restrictions, diversions and tighter security that complicate movement between airports, hotels and venues. These are scenarios, not confirmed disruptions, yet every government weighing the trip must price them in, including the level at which it chooses to be represented.
The deeper question is strategic. Security cooperation is the core of Russia’s offer to Africa: Moscow says it has military agreements with more than 40 African states, and Russian security personnel are embedded in countries such as Mali and the Central African Republic. Governments that rely on that protection are tying their own security to a partner that is itself under sustained attack. A security provider at war is also a provider that is stretched, distracted and targeted. The more a government leans on Russia to guarantee its safety, the more it imports the risks of Russia’s war.
“The more a government leans on Russia to guarantee its safety, the more it imports the risks of Russia’s war.”
Call it a dilemma of dependence. The relationship meant to be a source of protection can become a channel for exposure, and the closer the embrace, the harder it is to step back.
What should African governments do? Engage, but with open eyes. They can ask for written security and contingency arrangements for their delegations, diversify their security partnerships so that no single patron’s vulnerability becomes their own, and insist that cooperation strengthens national institutions rather than simply protecting incumbent governments. Strategic autonomy means having choices. It does not mean choosing between Moscow and everyone else, or accepting one patron’s risks as the price of its protection.
The Kremlin wants the summit to show that sanctions have not isolated Russia. The Yandex strikes complicate that message without defeating it. They pose a simple test for any partner who offers security: can it secure itself? The answer will not come from speeches in Moscow. It will come from whether the summit runs smoothly, and from what follows. Until then, African leaders have every reason to listen politely, travel carefully and commit slowly.
■
Joseph McCarthy is an analyst and researcher specialising in governance, security and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, development and African diplomacy. joecarthy30@gmail.com
Perspectives
Policy Brief: ‘A Test of Agency: Ghana’s BRICS Application and the Future of Strategic Diversification’ | By Col Festus Aboagye (rtd)
Ghana’s proposed BRICS membership has generated considerable debate. Yet the issue is often presented as a binary choice between traditional Western partnerships and emerging powers.
In ‘A Test of Agency: Ghana’s BRICS Application and the Future of Strategic Diversification’, Colonel Festus Aboagye (Retired) argues that a more useful lens is strategic agency: Ghana’s capacity to choose, manage, and, where necessary, disengage from external partnerships to pursue its national interests.
The brief explores the potential benefits, risks, and policy choices surrounding BRICS engagement. It offers a framework for evaluating future commitments through the lenses of accountability, transparency, sovereignty, and strategic flexibility.
‘A Test of Agency: Ghana’s BRICS Application and the Future of Strategic Diversification’ | By Col. Festus Aboagye (rtd)
Ghana’s decision to seek BRICS membership is a significant foreign-policy initiative. Public discussion has tended to fall into two camps. One sees BRICS as an escape from excessive dependence on Western institutions and markets.
The other sees a step towards alignment with China, Russia and other emerging powers. Both could be oversimplifications. The more important question is whether participation would strengthen Ghana’s strategic agency: its ability to choose, scrutinise, alter and, where necessary, exit external partnerships in pursuit of national interests.
This brief argues that the application is best understood as a test of agency rather than alignment.
- An announcement, not yet an application. On 6 October 2026, Ghana announced a Cabinet decision to apply. On the available evidence, no formal application had been submitted by 10 October 2026.
A forum, not an alliance or a common market. BRICS confers no automatic trade preferences, finance or security guarantees. Most gains would depend on agreements with individual members and institutions.
The benefits lie in diversification, not replacement. Membership could broaden Ghana’s partners, strengthen its bargaining position, and provide a platform to push for global governance reform.
The risks are real but conditional. They include new dependency, fiscal exposure, technology lock-in, diplomatic pressure, and reactions from Western partners, including a United States tariff threat.
Outcomes, not symbolism. Membership should be judged by whether it broadens options, strengthens leverage and preserves accountability.
Click here to read the full article.
-
Arts and GH Heritage4 hours agoBetween The Oceans: How Two Hip-Hop Dancers Carry Ancestral Histories In Their Bodies
-
Arts and GH Heritage2 days ago1935 Photograph Of Mozambican Boy Reignites Debate Over African Origins Of Fades And Gold Teeth
-
Global Update2 days agoContent Creation Is Now a College Degree: Universities Turn Influencing Into a Professional Career Path
-
Ghana News16 hours ago‘We Need Justice’: Families Demand Accountability After Best Friends from Ghana Die in Wrong-Way Crash in Canada
-
Fashion & Style4 hours agoAccra Fashion Week Plans Buyer-Distribution System To Turn African Designers Into Commercial Success Stories
