Connect with us

Perspectives

When Russia Loses, JNIM Gains: Mali’s Security Paradox

Published

on

Four years after Russian forces arrived in Mali promising to defeat jihadist insurgents and restore state authority, the security situation in the Sahel nation remains deeply precarious. In this analysis, Joseph McCarthy, an analyst specializing in Sahel governance and security, examines the paradox at the heart of Russia’s military partnership with Bamako: as the Africa Corps suffers repeated battlefield losses, JNIM (al-Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate) continues to launch devastating attacks, capture equipment, and replenish its offensive capacity.

When Russia Loses, JNIM Gains: Mali’s Security Paradox

By Joseph McCarthy · Analyst, Sahel governance & security

100+MALIAN SOLDIERS KILLED AT DIOURA, 10 SEPT5AFRICA CORPS PERSONNEL KILLED, SAME ATTACK50+KILLED IN THE 18 JULY ANÉFIS-AREA AMBUSH

Russia’s military presence in Mali was built on a promise: that Moscow could deliver the security assistance needed to defeat jihadist groups and restore state authority. Since the Wagner Group arrived in 2021 and transitioned to the Africa Corps, Russia has increasingly positioned itself as Bamako’s principal security partner as the junta has distanced itself from France and other Western allies.

Four years into that partnership, however, the security picture remains troubling. JNIM, al-Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate, continues to demonstrate its ability to launch major attacks against Malian security forces, while Russian-backed forces have suffered significant losses on several fronts. The question this raises is not whether Russian forces can win individual battles, but whether their involvement is producing the durable security Mali’s military government promised when it turned away from its Western partners.

The 10 September attack on the military camp at Dioura brought this contradiction into sharp focus. Malian and diplomatic sources put the death toll above 100 soldiers, alongside five members of the Africa Corps; JNIM itself claimed 150 killed and 93 captured, figures the Malian military has not confirmed, and that should be treated with appropriate caution. What is better established is that the camp fell, and that JNIM released footage of captured personnel and equipment, including motorcycles and pickup trucks. The exact scale of what was seized cannot be independently verified, but the pattern is familiar from the war’s other fronts: at Anéfis, armed groups have reportedly fielded equipment recovered from earlier fighting, and in July rebels seized the control station for a Bayraktar TB2 drone as Malian and Russian forces retreated.

The significance of Dioura extends beyond the soldiers killed or the position lost. A battlefield defeat does not necessarily end when the shooting stops. When a position is overrun, weapons, vehicles and ammunition can change hands, and equipment intended to strengthen the state can become a resource for the insurgency it was meant to defeat. Russia’s inability to prevent repeated losses of this kind may do more than leave JNIM’s offensive capacity intact; it may actively replenish it.

This is not an isolated incident. In a separate ambush near Anéfis on 18 July, a joint convoy of the Malian Armed Forces and the Africa Corps was attacked, with Al Jazeera reporting at least 50 soldiers killed. The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies and ACLED have documented comparable losses through 2026, including the destruction of Malian and Russian aerial assets. Taken together, these incidents raise an uncomfortable question for Moscow and Bamako: if Russian support has not stopped JNIM from mounting major attacks and inflicting heavy losses on the forces it reinforces, what measurable improvement has the partnership actually produced?

The consequences are not confined to the battlefield. By making Malian army and Africa Corps positions priority targets, the Russian-backed security strategy can expose nearby civilians to greater risk. Military positions become focal points for attack, turning surrounding communities into zones of confrontation. In Gao, an attack near a camp for displaced people reportedly killed six civilians, injured six others and destroyed at least ten homes. For those living near military installations, the presence of forces meant to provide security can have a paradoxical effect: offering protection in some circumstances while making the surrounding area a more likely target in others.

This points to a fundamental question about what Russia’s involvement in Mali is actually for. Security cannot be measured only by the survival of military positions or the government itself. Its ultimate test is whether ordinary civilians are safer than they were before. If the deployment of Russian-backed forces is contributing to greater vulnerability around their own positions, even as JNIM continues to strike, capture and re-equip, then the benefits of the partnership need to be weighed honestly against the costs it imposes on the population it is meant to protect. Four years on, that balance sheet does not yet favour Bamako.

Joseph McCarthy is an analyst and researcher specialising in governance, security and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, development and African diplomacy. joecarthy30@gmail.com

Opinion

Ghana’s Moscow Moment: Sovereign Voices or a Borrowed Script?

Published

on

As Ghana deepens its media ties with Moscow, questions are mounting over where legitimate frustration with Western media dominance ends and where borrowed narratives begin. In this analysis, Sahel governance and security expert Joseph McCarthy examines the fine line between reclaiming Africa’s story and merely swapping one foreign script for another, and asks what Kwame Nkrumah’s non-alignment truly demands of Ghana today. Read the full article below.

Ghana’s Moscow Moment: Sovereign Voices or a Borrowed Script?

By Joseph McCarthy   ·   Analyst, Sahel governance & security

28 OctRT PUBLISHES THE WODE MAYA INTERVIEW200+PARTICIPANTS, 46 AFRICAN COUNTRIES12AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN RT COOPERATION DEALS

A warm welcome in Moscow is not proof that media reports have misrepresented Russia. Neither is justified frustration with Western media dominance a reason to adopt Russian state narratives. Yet the line between the two is blurring, and Ghana sits closer to that line than most.

The Russia-Africa Media Forum, held alongside the third Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow, drew more than 200 participants from 46 African countries. RT organised it with Sputnik and TASS, promoting media sovereignty, professional cooperation, and greater African control over the continent’s image. These are legitimate aspirations. The question is whether Africa is reclaiming its narrative or merely changing the foreign power that shapes it.

Ghana supplied the forum’s most visible test case. In an interview RT published on 28 October, the Ghanaian YouTuber Wode Maya said he had been apprehensive about travelling to Russia, only to find a country different from the one he had imagined. RT’s headline gave his remark a sharper edge: “You won’t believe that I fell for the propaganda.”

There is nothing wrong with a visitor finding that a country differs from its portrayal. Personal experience can puncture stereotypes. But hospitality is not investigation. A pleasant trip cannot tell us whether the invasion of Ukraine squares with Moscow’s professed respect for sovereignty, whether Russian military operations in Africa have made civilians safer, or whether Russian state media cover either question fairly.

Fairness also matters here. Nothing in the material I have seen shows that Maya was paid to promote Russia or misrepresented what he felt, and suggesting otherwise would be wrong. The concern is what happens to a sincere impression once a state-backed broadcaster selects, edits, headlines and distributes it. A travel experience becomes a testimonial, a testimonial becomes a geopolitical narrative, and an influencer’s credibility with African audiences becomes an instrument of international communication.

He was not the only Ghanaian voice. President John Mahama, in his own RT interview, said members of his delegation had expected a sanctions-hit economy in ruins and found instead “a cultural shock”. He also said he hoped the war would end quickly, and he pressed the case for Russian investment in agro-processing, fertiliser and pharmaceuticals, which is the substance Ghanaians should care about. Samia Nkrumah, daughter of Ghana’s first president, appeared on an RT panel about the founders of African independence. Each contribution was individually defensible. Together, curated by one broadcaster, they became a Ghanaian chorus.

That history deserves a Ghanaian reading. Kwame Nkrumah’s non-alignment was never an instruction to love one bloc. It was a refusal to be owned by any. A Ghana that honours his legacy engages Moscow, Washington, Beijing and Paris on its own terms and asks hard questions of all four.

“Nkrumah’s non-alignment was never an instruction to love one bloc. It was a refusal to be owned by any.”

Content creators have transformed African storytelling, reaching audiences that traditional newsrooms struggle to attract, and that deserves recognition. But influence is not journalism. Reporting involves verification, context, editorial accountability and a willingness to confront uncomfortable facts. The sensible response is not to discredit creators but to ask for transparency: who sponsored the visit, who paid for travel and accommodation, whether any content was commissioned, and whether the creator retained full editorial control. These are not accusations. They are basic safeguards whenever governments or corporations cultivate influential voices, and they apply to every capital.

The stakes rise when institutional agreements accompany personal testimonials. RT says it has signed cooperation agreements with media organisations in a dozen African countries, including Ghana, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, covering content exchange, training and broadcasting. Ghana Broadcasting Corporation’s agreement with Rossiya Segodnya provides for reciprocal access to English-language news, help for journalists and joint events. GBC’s Director-General, Professor Amin Alhassan, has said it would bring balance to the corporation’s coverage of Russia.

Balance is the right goal, and international news cooperation can widen access and build skills. But a public broadcaster owes viewers clear labelling of foreign state material, independent fact-checking, and the freedom to investigate Russian policy, including the war in Ukraine and Africa Corps operations in the Sahel. The agreement does not by itself establish Russian editorial control. It does demand visible safeguards.

Those safeguards matter more to Ghana than to most other countries. Russia’s media push accompanies its security role in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and Burkina Faso borders Ghana’s northern neighbour. Jihadist violence in the Sahel has already pressed towards coastal states. Ghanaian audiences need reporting on whether Russian-backed security operations are protecting civilians, and that reporting cannot be outsourced to the partners being assessed.

None of this excuses the other side. France’s colonial-era relationships deserve scrutiny, and so do Western interventions and the stereotypes in international coverage. Nor is Russia alone in courting African audiences: the BBC, France 24, Deutsche Welle and China’s CGTN all run training and content partnerships, and they deserve the same transparency. When allegations against Russian personnel are dismissed as Western propaganda by reflex, journalism gives way to loyalty. When criticism of Moscow is read as service to NATO, the same failure runs in reverse.

A May 2026 report by the Centre for a New American Security says Russia pays journalists and outlets for stories, and that networks of local influencers and journalists amplify Kremlin narratives. CNAS is a Washington think tank; its findings need independent corroboration, and it says nothing about Maya. They do explain why disclosure is not an insult.

The remedy is consistent standards. Broadcasters should disclose content-sharing deals and label supplied material. Journalists and creators should declare sponsored travel and commissioned work. Press associations should sharpen their ethical codes, and governments should protect independent reporting rather than invoking sovereignty to silence it. Above all, Ghana’s newsrooms need investment in investigative capacity and distribution so that no foreign partner becomes necessary.

A warm welcome is not evidence. A foreign partnership is not liberation. Changing the nationality of those who shape Africa’s narrative is not the same as reclaiming it. Media sovereignty is not about choosing whose script to believe. It is about keeping the freedom to question everyone.

Joseph McCarthy is an analyst and researcher specialising in governance, security and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, development and African diplomacy. joecarthy30@gmail.com

Continue Reading

Opinion

Yandex Strikes: Can Moscow Host Africa Under Drone Threat?

Published

on

Can Moscow host Africa under drone threat? As Moscow prepares to welcome African leaders to the third Russia-Africa Summit on October 28 to 29, Ukrainian drone strikes have reportedly hit Yandex data centres and targeted the capital region, exposing a delicate contradiction at the heart of the gathering. Russia pitches itself as Africa’s security partner while its own infrastructure proves vulnerable. In this opinion piece, analyst Joseph McCarthy examines the security dilemma facing both Moscow and African governments, arguing that leaders weighing the trip must confront a deeper question: what does it mean to tie your nation’s safety to a partner that is itself under sustained attack? Read the full article below.

Yandex Strikes: Can Moscow Host Africa Under Drone Threat?

Moscow pitches itself as Africa’s security partner while its own infrastructure is exposed

By Joseph McCarthy   ·   Analyst, Sahel governance & security

3YANDEX DATA CENTRES REPORTEDLY STRUCK, 8–11 OCT650DRONES STRUCK MOSCOW REGION, 6 OCT28–29 OctTHIRD RUSSIA-AFRICA SUMMIT, MOSCOW

Every summit is a performance of strength. The third Russia-Africa Summit, due in Moscow on 28 and 29 October, is meant to show African leaders that Russia remains a confident, well-connected partner despite sanctions, isolation and a costly war. Between 8 and 11 October, Ukrainian drones complicated that script. Three data centres operated by Yandex, the technology giant behind much of Russia’s digital economy, were reportedly struck in the Ryazan, Kaluga and Vladimir regions. For Moscow and for its African guests, the episode poses a security dilemma that no communiqué will resolve.

The first attack, on the night of 7 to 8 October, reportedly set fire to a facility in Sasovo, in Ryazan region, and suspended operations. A second strike hit a site in Kaluga; a third, in Vladimir region, followed on 11 October. Yandex runs payments, email, navigation, ride-hailing, delivery and cloud computing, so the effects spread quickly. Meduza reported disruptions to Yandex Pay, Mail, Disk and Go, while businesses that depend on Yandex Cloud described outages of their own. One user told the outlet: “All my money is on Yandex, so I have no money for food.” The company says customers’ funds are safe, but the episode shows how one point of failure can become hardship for ordinary people within hours.

Recovery may be slow. Reports suggest that replacing specialised equipment could take months, and Russian officials have reportedly acknowledged the difficulty. That matters beyond one company. Moscow has spent years encouraging reliance on domestic platforms as Western technology withdrew. The Yandex strikes show that domestic ownership is not the same as security. Technological sovereignty also means being able to protect, maintain and restore systems under attack.

Moscow will call such strikes aggression against civilian targets. Yet they come after years of Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure, so the exposure Russia now faces cannot be separated from the war it chose to launch. That context does not make the risk to visitors any smaller; it explains why it is unlikely to disappear before the summit.

Here lies the first half of the dilemma, and it is Moscow’s. Hosting African leaders in the capital is a statement of confidence, but it also puts that confidence on display. Russia must keep airspace open, transport moving and digital systems running while the war reaches ever deeper into its territory. On 20 September, roughly 450 drones were reportedly aimed at the capital; on 6 October, around 650 struck the Moscow region. Every intercept shows that defences work. Every strike that lands, and every airport closure, suggests the opposite. The summit cannot merely proceed; it must avoid becoming a showcase for exposure. Moscow will almost certainly respond with heavy security, restricted airspace and tightly managed movement. That may protect delegates, but it also turns the gathering into a fortress, held in spite of the war rather than in a country at ease with itself.

None of this proves that Russia cannot protect the summit. Vulnerability to long-range drones is not the same as losing the ability to defend territory, and the more widely a country’s civilian and commercial infrastructure is distributed, the harder it is to shield. Delegations may well land, meet and leave without incident. But that is a probability, not a guarantee, and guarantees are precisely what Russia is selling.

That brings us to the second half of the dilemma, which belongs to African governments. The immediate question is personal safety. In early September, Air Tanzania suspended its Dar es Salaam to Moscow route after a risk assessment, then resumed it days later. Further attacks could prompt airspace restrictions, diversions and tighter security that complicate movement between airports, hotels and venues. These are scenarios, not confirmed disruptions, yet every government weighing the trip must price them in, including the level at which it chooses to be represented.

The deeper question is strategic. Security cooperation is the core of Russia’s offer to Africa: Moscow says it has military agreements with more than 40 African states, and Russian security personnel are embedded in countries such as Mali and the Central African Republic. Governments that rely on that protection are tying their own security to a partner that is itself under sustained attack. A security provider at war is also a provider that is stretched, distracted and targeted. The more a government leans on Russia to guarantee its safety, the more it imports the risks of Russia’s war.

“The more a government leans on Russia to guarantee its safety, the more it imports the risks of Russia’s war.”

Call it a dilemma of dependence. The relationship meant to be a source of protection can become a channel for exposure, and the closer the embrace, the harder it is to step back.

What should African governments do? Engage, but with open eyes. They can ask for written security and contingency arrangements for their delegations, diversify their security partnerships so that no single patron’s vulnerability becomes their own, and insist that cooperation strengthens national institutions rather than simply protecting incumbent governments. Strategic autonomy means having choices. It does not mean choosing between Moscow and everyone else, or accepting one patron’s risks as the price of its protection.

The Kremlin wants the summit to show that sanctions have not isolated Russia. The Yandex strikes complicate that message without defeating it. They pose a simple test for any partner who offers security: can it secure itself? The answer will not come from speeches in Moscow. It will come from whether the summit runs smoothly, and from what follows. Until then, African leaders have every reason to listen politely, travel carefully and commit slowly.

■

Joseph McCarthy is an analyst and researcher specialising in governance, security and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, development and African diplomacy. joecarthy30@gmail.com

Continue Reading

Perspectives

Policy Brief: ‘A Test of Agency: Ghana’s BRICS Application and the Future of Strategic Diversification’ | By Col Festus Aboagye (rtd)

Published

on

Ghana’s proposed BRICS membership has generated considerable debate. Yet the issue is often presented as a binary choice between traditional Western partnerships and emerging powers.

In ‘A Test of Agency: Ghana’s BRICS Application and the Future of Strategic Diversification’, Colonel Festus Aboagye (Retired) argues that a more useful lens is strategic agency: Ghana’s capacity to choose, manage, and, where necessary, disengage from external partnerships to pursue its national interests.

The brief explores the potential benefits, risks, and policy choices surrounding BRICS engagement. It offers a framework for evaluating future commitments through the lenses of accountability, transparency, sovereignty, and strategic flexibility.

‘A Test of Agency: Ghana’s BRICS Application and the Future of Strategic Diversification’ | By Col. Festus Aboagye (rtd)

Ghana’s decision to seek BRICS membership is a significant foreign-policy initiative. Public discussion has tended to fall into two camps. One sees BRICS as an escape from excessive dependence on Western institutions and markets.

The other sees a step towards alignment with China, Russia and other emerging powers. Both could be oversimplifications. The more important question is whether participation would strengthen Ghana’s strategic agency: its ability to choose, scrutinise, alter and, where necessary, exit external partnerships in pursuit of national interests.

This brief argues that the application is best understood as a test of agency rather than alignment.

  • An announcement, not yet an application. On 6 October 2026, Ghana announced a Cabinet decision to apply. On the available evidence, no formal application had been submitted by 10 October 2026.

A forum, not an alliance or a common market. BRICS confers no automatic trade preferences, finance or security guarantees. Most gains would depend on agreements with individual members and institutions.

The benefits lie in diversification, not replacement. Membership could broaden Ghana’s partners, strengthen its bargaining position, and provide a platform to push for global governance reform.

The risks are real but conditional. They include new dependency, fiscal exposure, technology lock-in, diplomatic pressure, and reactions from Western partners, including a United States tariff threat.

Outcomes, not symbolism. Membership should be judged by whether it broadens options, strengthens leverage and preserves accountability.

Click here to read the full article.

Continue Reading

Trending