Perspectives
When Russia Loses, JNIM Gains: Mali’s Security Paradox
Four years after Russian forces arrived in Mali promising to defeat jihadist insurgents and restore state authority, the security situation in the Sahel nation remains deeply precarious. In this analysis, Joseph McCarthy, an analyst specializing in Sahel governance and security, examines the paradox at the heart of Russia’s military partnership with Bamako: as the Africa Corps suffers repeated battlefield losses, JNIM (al-Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate) continues to launch devastating attacks, capture equipment, and replenish its offensive capacity.
When Russia Loses, JNIM Gains: Mali’s Security Paradox
By Joseph McCarthy · Analyst, Sahel governance & security
| 100+MALIAN SOLDIERS KILLED AT DIOURA, 10 SEPT | 5AFRICA CORPS PERSONNEL KILLED, SAME ATTACK | 50+KILLED IN THE 18 JULY ANÉFIS-AREA AMBUSH |
Russia’s military presence in Mali was built on a promise: that Moscow could deliver the security assistance needed to defeat jihadist groups and restore state authority. Since the Wagner Group arrived in 2021 and transitioned to the Africa Corps, Russia has increasingly positioned itself as Bamako’s principal security partner as the junta has distanced itself from France and other Western allies.
Four years into that partnership, however, the security picture remains troubling. JNIM, al-Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate, continues to demonstrate its ability to launch major attacks against Malian security forces, while Russian-backed forces have suffered significant losses on several fronts. The question this raises is not whether Russian forces can win individual battles, but whether their involvement is producing the durable security Mali’s military government promised when it turned away from its Western partners.
The 10 September attack on the military camp at Dioura brought this contradiction into sharp focus. Malian and diplomatic sources put the death toll above 100 soldiers, alongside five members of the Africa Corps; JNIM itself claimed 150 killed and 93 captured, figures the Malian military has not confirmed, and that should be treated with appropriate caution. What is better established is that the camp fell, and that JNIM released footage of captured personnel and equipment, including motorcycles and pickup trucks. The exact scale of what was seized cannot be independently verified, but the pattern is familiar from the war’s other fronts: at Anéfis, armed groups have reportedly fielded equipment recovered from earlier fighting, and in July rebels seized the control station for a Bayraktar TB2 drone as Malian and Russian forces retreated.
The significance of Dioura extends beyond the soldiers killed or the position lost. A battlefield defeat does not necessarily end when the shooting stops. When a position is overrun, weapons, vehicles and ammunition can change hands, and equipment intended to strengthen the state can become a resource for the insurgency it was meant to defeat. Russia’s inability to prevent repeated losses of this kind may do more than leave JNIM’s offensive capacity intact; it may actively replenish it.
This is not an isolated incident. In a separate ambush near Anéfis on 18 July, a joint convoy of the Malian Armed Forces and the Africa Corps was attacked, with Al Jazeera reporting at least 50 soldiers killed. The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies and ACLED have documented comparable losses through 2026, including the destruction of Malian and Russian aerial assets. Taken together, these incidents raise an uncomfortable question for Moscow and Bamako: if Russian support has not stopped JNIM from mounting major attacks and inflicting heavy losses on the forces it reinforces, what measurable improvement has the partnership actually produced?
The consequences are not confined to the battlefield. By making Malian army and Africa Corps positions priority targets, the Russian-backed security strategy can expose nearby civilians to greater risk. Military positions become focal points for attack, turning surrounding communities into zones of confrontation. In Gao, an attack near a camp for displaced people reportedly killed six civilians, injured six others and destroyed at least ten homes. For those living near military installations, the presence of forces meant to provide security can have a paradoxical effect: offering protection in some circumstances while making the surrounding area a more likely target in others.
This points to a fundamental question about what Russia’s involvement in Mali is actually for. Security cannot be measured only by the survival of military positions or the government itself. Its ultimate test is whether ordinary civilians are safer than they were before. If the deployment of Russian-backed forces is contributing to greater vulnerability around their own positions, even as JNIM continues to strike, capture and re-equip, then the benefits of the partnership need to be weighed honestly against the costs it imposes on the population it is meant to protect. Four years on, that balance sheet does not yet favour Bamako.
Joseph McCarthy is an analyst and researcher specialising in governance, security and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, development and African diplomacy. joecarthy30@gmail.com
Opinion
Governance Crisis Threatens Progress, Reputation of the University of The Gambia
The following article by Ebrima Touray examines a governance crisis at the University of The Gambia (UTG) that pits the institution’s Governing Council against Vice-Chancellor Professor Herbert Robinson. At stake is not merely one administrator’s contract, but the legal integrity, institutional reputation, and regional standing of The Gambia’s premier public university. The article raises urgent questions about due process, conflicts of interest, and the unchecked exercise of authority within a body already recommended for dissolution by an independent panel. As ECOWAS member states commit to harmonizing higher education standards under Protocol A/P3/1/03, the UTG case serves as a cautionary test of whether national institutions can uphold the transparency and accountability that regional integration demands. Read full article below.
Governance Crisis Threatens Progress, Reputation of the University of The Gambia
By Ebrima Touray
Given the importance of quality education as part of the ECOWAS integration agenda, and the role which an institution such as the University of The Gambia (UTG) plays in this regard, the Centre for Community Law has been observing with keen interest developments at the UTG.
To this end, the Centre wishes to draw the attention of relevant Authorities to Protocol A/P3/1/03 on Education and Training, which recognises “education and training as an indispensable part of the mechanism for the realisation of the objectives of ECOWAS”.
The University of The Gambia (UTG) is at a critical crossroads following an escalating and bitter standoff between its Governing Council and the Vice-Chancellor, Professor Herbert Robinson. If unresolved transparently, the conflict could tarnish the institution’s reputation irreparably.
On 10 November 2026, the Standard newspaper carried a story titled “UTG’s Vice Chancellor’s Contract Not to Be Renewed”. Similarly, the following day, Foroyaa newspaper led with “UTG Governing Council Resolves Not to Renew Vice Chancellor Herbert Robinson’s Contract.” A second article by the same newspaper said “UTG Formally Notifies Herbert Robinson of Contract Non-Renewal, Demands Comprehensive Handover.”
The Foroyaa articles referenced a letter dated 2 November 2026 from the Chairperson of the Governing Council, Professor Momodou Mustapha Fanneh, addressed directly to Professor Robinson.
Under The Gambia’s Tertiary and Higher Education Act, 2016, only the President, as Chancellor of the university, has the power to appoint, renew or withhold renewal of an appointment. Legal experts therefore consider the Governing Council’s decision not to renew the appointment of the Vice Chancellor as ultra vires.
This article examines the facts and implications of the UTG Governing Council’s decision regarding renewal or non-renewal of Professor Robinson’s contract.
Professor Herbert Robinson was appointed as the 5th Vice-Chancellor of the University of The Gambia (UTG) on 30 November 2021 by the Chancellor of the University, President Adama Barrow. His appointment took effect in January 2022.
His appointment followed an open international call for applications, which attracted international and Gambian scholars. Robinson’s application emerged as the strongest among a highly competitive field of Gambian and international professors. He was subsequently offered a five-year contract, renewable subject to satisfactory performance.
At the time of his appointment, the Governing Council was chaired by Mr. Mathew Ndure, a respected educationist with extensive international experience. The Council also included several other distinguished members who have now left the service. During that period, the relationship between the Vice-Chancellor and the Governing Council was reportedly cordial, with both parties operating within their respective mandates and responsibilities.
However, the situation changed following the appointment of a new Chair and other members to the Governing Council, with reported tensions between the Council and the Vice-Chancellor.
In March 2026, the position of Vice-Chancellor was unexpectedly advertised, despite the fact that Professor Robinson still had more than nine months on his existing contract. He was neither informed of any decision not to renew his contract nor about an extension, as prescribed under the terms of his appointment.
According to an article published by The Standard newspaper on 2 March 2026, titled “President Sets Up Panel to Probe UTG Leadership,” the Ministry of Higher Education, Research, Science and Technology (MoHERST) instructed the Governing Council to proceed with the advertisement of the position of Vice Chancellor.
The advertisement was reportedly welcomed by the President of the UTG Faculty and Staff Association, a member of the Governing Council, who, under the Tertiary and Higher Education ACT, 2016, is ineligible to serve as a Council member.
Having previously made statements critical of the Vice-Chancellor in the media, his reaction to the advert reported in the Foroyaa article of March 2026 titled “UTGFSA President Welcomes Advertisement of Vice-Chancellor Position as UTG, Seeks New Direction,” was unsurprising, but still raises questions about his credibility and impartiality in the UTG Vice-Chancellor’s case.
The decision to advertise the position before the completion of the contractual appraisal process was perceived by many, including Professor Robinson, as a violation of standard procedures and the terms of Professor Robinson’s contract. The result is an escalation of tensions between the Vice-Chancellor and the Governing Council.
President Barrow reportedly instructed that an independent Investigation Panel be established. Chaired by former Permanent Secretary of MoHERST, Yaya Sirreh Jallow, the Panel was tasked with examining the root causes of the leadership dispute at the UTG.. In carrying out its mandate, the Panel investigated the University’s governance structures and the sources of operational friction.
The Panel completed its work and submitted its report after nearly four months of investigation. To date, the report has not been made public. However, according to reliable sources, the Panel’s conclusions were unequivocal. It recommended the immediate removal of the Chair and Vice-Chair of the Governing Council, as well as the dissolution of the Governing Council, citing systemic governance failures.
The Panel also called for an objective assessment of the Vice-Chancellor’s performance by an independent body, the sources said.
A Cabinet Mediation Subcommittee was subsequently established on the Panel’s findings. However, according to the sources, the recommendations of the independent Panel have yet to be officially implemented.
Professor Robinson’s contract contains a clause providing for an extension, subject to a satisfactory performance appraisal. A contract is a legally binding agreement, and its provisions take precedence over general institutional rules. Consequently, the justification for advertising the position of the Vice-Chancellor, as reported in the Foroyaa article of 18 March 2026, citing Section 4.3.5 of the University’s Conditions of Service, appears unsustainable.
Also, a body that has been formally recommended for dissolution due to governance failures arguably lacks both the moral credibility and legal authority to evaluate the performance of the Vice Chancellor.
According to informed sources, Professor Robinson objected to being appraised by a Governing Council whose impartiality he considered compromised. Instead, he agreed to take part in an appraisal by an independent Panel.
Despite his objections, the Council proceeded with the appraisal, reportedly marred by procedural irregularities. For instance, the President of the UTG Faculty and Staff Association (UTGFSA), who is not a statutory member of the Governing Council, actively participated in the appraisal. His participation not only raised questions about the legality of the process but also contravened the confidentiality standards that should govern the assessment of a university’s principal officer.
The appraisal report has reportedly not been shared with Professor Robinson, raising further concerns about transparency and due process.
According to reliable sources, the call for applications for the position of Vice-Chancellor was, at one stage, placed on hold. It was later resumed, purportedly under a presidential directive. However, the legal basis for this directive was reportedly never provided to Professor Robinson, raising further questions about due process, transparency, and the legal basis for the decision.
Meanwhile, an investigation has revealed that the Chairperson of the Governing Council currently serves as the Vice-Chancellor of Euclid University, a private institution operating in direct commercial and academic competition with the UTG. Prior to his appointment, he unsuccessfully sought the position of Deputy Vice-Chancellor at UTG under Professor Robinson. This raises serious questions about the nature of the relationship and power dynamics between the two individuals, amid suspicion of personal grievances or perceived bias.
More importantly, can the Chair of the Governing Council be expected to act exclusively in UTG’s best interests in a situation where competing institutional interests are at stake, particularly regarding access to funding, strategic opportunities, resources, and confidential information?
The UTG is one of The Gambia’s most important institutions, entrusted with educating and shaping future generations of leaders, professionals, and public servants. As the nation’s premier public university, it should serve as a model of integrity, accountability, and good governance. Its credibility, reputation, and institutional independence must therefore be safeguarded at all times.
In the interest of fairness, transparency, and due process, the Government Subcommittee should move expeditiously to implement the recommendations of the Independent Investigation Panel. Professor Robinson should be afforded a fair and impartial appraisal conducted by an independent Panel, as recommended by the Investigation Panel.
The appraisal should also critically examine the operating environment during his tenure, including the over one hundred and twenty million Dalasis reportedly owed to the UTG by the MoHERST in unpaid student scholarship fees. (74 Dalassis-1USD).
If Professor Robinson’s appraisal confirms satisfactory performance, he should be allowed to continue implementing his vision and strategic agenda for the University, with the full support of the government and a competent, independent, and impartial Governing Council free from conflicts of interest.
Conversely, if the appraisal identifies significant shortcomings, he should be treated with respect, fairness, and dignity, and given his dues in recognition of his service to the University.
Ultimately, the resolution of this matter should be guided not by personal interests or institutional rivalries, but by the principles of justice, good governance, and the long-term interests of the University of The Gambia and the nation.
Ebrima Touray wrote from Banjul, The Gambia
Commentary
After Trump’s Midterm Defeat, Russia and China will Encounter a Cooler US
As the dust settles on America’s historic midterm elections, the full scope of the political shift in Washington is becoming clear. In this incisive commentary, Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House, analyzes the international implications of the Democratic victory. She argues that while the President retains significant foreign policy power, a newly emboldened Congress will impose critical constraints, particularly on issues ranging from the conflict with Iran and support for Ukraine to the complex dynamics with China and Russia. This analysis explores how the election results signal a potential “cooling” of US relations with its key rivals and what this means for global stability. Read the full commentary below.
After Trump’s Midterm Defeat, Russia and China will Encounter a Cooler US
By Bronwen Maddox
The comprehensive rebuff American voters gave President Donald Trump and Republican candidates in the midterm elections will likely impose a small but important constraint on how the US behaves abroad. But it will also change how other countries treat it – allies, trading partners and rivals alike.
Even with the Democrats in control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, the president retains much power over foreign policy, but not all. Congress is now likely to challenge any sustained deployment of forces in the Gulf. And it will reassert its authority over trade and tariffs, even if it does not amend the latter.
The most immediate change is likely to be on the conflict with Iran. Voters put the cost of living, ‘affordability,’ at the top of their concerns. Yet, as they went to the polls, gasoline prices at the pump hit a high. Rising costs are largely a result of the continued conflict in and around the Strait of Hormuz, which Americans know Trump initiated alongside Israel and has failed to end. Trump could now indeed ‘lash out’, as some have predicted, with more strikes, in an attempt to secure concessions from Tehran. But there is no reason to believe that a military solution will fare any better than before.
The Republican Party has been among the biggest losers from the war. The race for the presidency in 2028 started the moment the midterm results became clear. And GOP candidates are likely to be vehemently against continuing the conflict. Pressure within the US for a resolution will rise even if Benjamin Netanyahu, now Israel’s caretaker prime minister after his own electoral setback, urges a new assault.
The change in Congress will probably not mean more arms or money for Ukraine. There is deep, rare consensus among both Democrats and Republicans that Europe should now pay its way on its own defence – and that supporting Ukraine is part of that. Trump has won that longstanding argument, they feel, and they have no desire to undermine that victory.
However, the new Congress does not share Trump’s apparent warmth towards Russian President Vladimir Putin. Traditional hostility or wariness towards Moscow prevails.
Trump, his son-in-law Jared Kushner and envoy Steve Witkoff might still dangle business deals before the Kremlin, hoping for peace in return. But they will be constrained by a tougher mood and even formal opposition in Congress. No wonder that Putin’s spokesperson said, as the results became clear, that he hoped peace-making efforts would continue.
The same congressional wariness may well extend to China. One of the biggest disruptions that Trump could cause in his remaining two years would be to try to strike a deal with Beijing that included explicit acknowledgement of Taiwan as the sovereign territory of China.
Trump’s recent decision to pause a US$14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, to avoid aggravating trade relations with China, could be interpreted by Beijing as support for its views. Congress has, again across the political divide, been much warier of China. It now seems that some tech companies are leaning that way too.
The fate of Trump’s tariffs is unclear. For the moment, they will stay, although Congress has been challenging the president’s right to impose them without its consent through the Supreme Court.
Politicians of all stripes find tariffs attractive for the revenue they bring. But others will look at the disruption to trade they cause (US car manufacturing was until last year interwoven with Canada’s) and their impact on inflation. That last point is hotly debated among economists given that inflation did not rise as much as expected when the tariffs were first imposed. But politicians in search of securing a lower cost of living may look again at arguments for repealing the tariffs.
Most of all, the elections may change how the world looks at America. They go some way to answering the big questions raised by Trump’s second presidency: Have Americans changed? Are his actions what they really want, given they have voted for him twice? And is US democracy robust and capable of securing peaceful changes of power? To that extent, some will find the results reassuring. For US allies in Europe, Japan and South Korea, they may feel more confident in asserting their interests and values – although they will still be nervous of losing US support. Trump’s sudden apparent removal of arms support to Israel in the days before the election shows how whimsical that can be.
For the US’s enemies and rivals, this result will inject uncertainty into their calculations. But it will also give them reason to probe for weakness, even if only by exploiting the repeated policy changes inherent in the democratic system. Both Russia and China will brace themselves for a cooling of relations. But they will also explore the implications of the US being unable to hold consistently to its key positions for more than a few years.
Given Trump’s personality and desire for attention, nothing can rule out impetuous and dramatic action, for instance on Iran or Taiwan. But he has lost any aura of being a winner that he retained. Politicians seeking to run in two years will begin to distance themselves from him and try to constrain him from actions that could tarnish their chances. They may hope that he restricts his attention to the memorials in his name he is so keen to create.
The author, Bronwen Maddox, is Director & Chief Executive Officer, Chatham House, London
Opinion
Ghana’s Moscow Moment: Sovereign Voices or a Borrowed Script?
As Ghana deepens its media ties with Moscow, questions are mounting over where legitimate frustration with Western media dominance ends and where borrowed narratives begin. In this analysis, Sahel governance and security expert Joseph McCarthy examines the fine line between reclaiming Africa’s story and merely swapping one foreign script for another, and asks what Kwame Nkrumah’s non-alignment truly demands of Ghana today. Read the full article below.
Ghana’s Moscow Moment: Sovereign Voices or a Borrowed Script?
By Joseph McCarthy · Analyst, Sahel governance & security
| 28 OctRT PUBLISHES THE WODE MAYA INTERVIEW | 200+PARTICIPANTS, 46 AFRICAN COUNTRIES | 12AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN RT COOPERATION DEALS |
A warm welcome in Moscow is not proof that media reports have misrepresented Russia. Neither is justified frustration with Western media dominance a reason to adopt Russian state narratives. Yet the line between the two is blurring, and Ghana sits closer to that line than most.
The Russia-Africa Media Forum, held alongside the third Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow, drew more than 200 participants from 46 African countries. RT organised it with Sputnik and TASS, promoting media sovereignty, professional cooperation, and greater African control over the continent’s image. These are legitimate aspirations. The question is whether Africa is reclaiming its narrative or merely changing the foreign power that shapes it.
Ghana supplied the forum’s most visible test case. In an interview RT published on 28 October, the Ghanaian YouTuber Wode Maya said he had been apprehensive about travelling to Russia, only to find a country different from the one he had imagined. RT’s headline gave his remark a sharper edge: “You won’t believe that I fell for the propaganda.”
There is nothing wrong with a visitor finding that a country differs from its portrayal. Personal experience can puncture stereotypes. But hospitality is not investigation. A pleasant trip cannot tell us whether the invasion of Ukraine squares with Moscow’s professed respect for sovereignty, whether Russian military operations in Africa have made civilians safer, or whether Russian state media cover either question fairly.
Fairness also matters here. Nothing in the material I have seen shows that Maya was paid to promote Russia or misrepresented what he felt, and suggesting otherwise would be wrong. The concern is what happens to a sincere impression once a state-backed broadcaster selects, edits, headlines and distributes it. A travel experience becomes a testimonial, a testimonial becomes a geopolitical narrative, and an influencer’s credibility with African audiences becomes an instrument of international communication.
He was not the only Ghanaian voice. President John Mahama, in his own RT interview, said members of his delegation had expected a sanctions-hit economy in ruins and found instead “a cultural shock”. He also said he hoped the war would end quickly, and he pressed the case for Russian investment in agro-processing, fertiliser and pharmaceuticals, which is the substance Ghanaians should care about. Samia Nkrumah, daughter of Ghana’s first president, appeared on an RT panel about the founders of African independence. Each contribution was individually defensible. Together, curated by one broadcaster, they became a Ghanaian chorus.
That history deserves a Ghanaian reading. Kwame Nkrumah’s non-alignment was never an instruction to love one bloc. It was a refusal to be owned by any. A Ghana that honours his legacy engages Moscow, Washington, Beijing and Paris on its own terms and asks hard questions of all four.
“Nkrumah’s non-alignment was never an instruction to love one bloc. It was a refusal to be owned by any.”
Content creators have transformed African storytelling, reaching audiences that traditional newsrooms struggle to attract, and that deserves recognition. But influence is not journalism. Reporting involves verification, context, editorial accountability and a willingness to confront uncomfortable facts. The sensible response is not to discredit creators but to ask for transparency: who sponsored the visit, who paid for travel and accommodation, whether any content was commissioned, and whether the creator retained full editorial control. These are not accusations. They are basic safeguards whenever governments or corporations cultivate influential voices, and they apply to every capital.
The stakes rise when institutional agreements accompany personal testimonials. RT says it has signed cooperation agreements with media organisations in a dozen African countries, including Ghana, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, covering content exchange, training and broadcasting. Ghana Broadcasting Corporation’s agreement with Rossiya Segodnya provides for reciprocal access to English-language news, help for journalists and joint events. GBC’s Director-General, Professor Amin Alhassan, has said it would bring balance to the corporation’s coverage of Russia.
Balance is the right goal, and international news cooperation can widen access and build skills. But a public broadcaster owes viewers clear labelling of foreign state material, independent fact-checking, and the freedom to investigate Russian policy, including the war in Ukraine and Africa Corps operations in the Sahel. The agreement does not by itself establish Russian editorial control. It does demand visible safeguards.
Those safeguards matter more to Ghana than to most other countries. Russia’s media push accompanies its security role in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and Burkina Faso borders Ghana’s northern neighbour. Jihadist violence in the Sahel has already pressed towards coastal states. Ghanaian audiences need reporting on whether Russian-backed security operations are protecting civilians, and that reporting cannot be outsourced to the partners being assessed.
None of this excuses the other side. France’s colonial-era relationships deserve scrutiny, and so do Western interventions and the stereotypes in international coverage. Nor is Russia alone in courting African audiences: the BBC, France 24, Deutsche Welle and China’s CGTN all run training and content partnerships, and they deserve the same transparency. When allegations against Russian personnel are dismissed as Western propaganda by reflex, journalism gives way to loyalty. When criticism of Moscow is read as service to NATO, the same failure runs in reverse.
A May 2026 report by the Centre for a New American Security says Russia pays journalists and outlets for stories, and that networks of local influencers and journalists amplify Kremlin narratives. CNAS is a Washington think tank; its findings need independent corroboration, and it says nothing about Maya. They do explain why disclosure is not an insult.
The remedy is consistent standards. Broadcasters should disclose content-sharing deals and label supplied material. Journalists and creators should declare sponsored travel and commissioned work. Press associations should sharpen their ethical codes, and governments should protect independent reporting rather than invoking sovereignty to silence it. Above all, Ghana’s newsrooms need investment in investigative capacity and distribution so that no foreign partner becomes necessary.
A warm welcome is not evidence. A foreign partnership is not liberation. Changing the nationality of those who shape Africa’s narrative is not the same as reclaiming it. Media sovereignty is not about choosing whose script to believe. It is about keeping the freedom to question everyone.
Joseph McCarthy is an analyst and researcher specialising in governance, security and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, development and African diplomacy. joecarthy30@gmail.com
-
Ghana News16 hours agoTop Ghanaian School Wins 26 Awards at 2026 Pearson Learner Awards
-
Ghana News2 days agoHow a Helicopter Crash Sparked Ghana’s New Forensic DNA Lab
-
Ghana News2 days agoGhana Joins Elite Group of Five African Nations Using mRNA Tech After Commissioning of Groundbreaking Lab
-
Business20 hours agoInvest Ghana Summit: NVI Pitches Vaccine Manufacturing Opportunities to Investors
-
Reels & Social Media Highlights2 days agoGhana’s Timeline Had One Question Thursday: “What Has Changed?”
-
Ghana News2 days ago“Don’t Be Afraid”: Mahama Urges Ghanaians to Accept Clinical Trials at Commissioning of Ghana’s Groundbreaking Forensic mRNA Lab
-
Festivals & Events2 days agoKingston to Accra Block Party Brings Jamaican Dancehall Culture to Accra
-
Ghana News14 hours ago‘Stop Taking Our Money to Hide in Switzerland’: Dangote Challenges Wealthy Africans to Invest at Home
