Perspectives
Regional Security at the Brink: U.S. Distributed Footprint, Security Partnerships and Sovereignty Trade-Offs in Post-Niger West Africa
This paper by academic and retired Ghana army chief, Colonel Festus Aboagye, provides a comprehensive analysis of the U.S. military’s strategic repositioning across West Africa following the forced withdrawal from Niger in August 2024. Examining the December 2025 airstrikes in Sokoto, Nigeria, it documents the emergence of a so-called distributed “light footprint” model spanning Ghana, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Chad—and assesses the sovereignty implications of this novel security architecture.
Colonel Festus Aboagye (Retired)
28 December 2025
Abstract
The December 2025 U.S. airstrikes in Sokoto, Nigeria, mark a critical inflexion point in West African security architecture. Following its expulsion from Niger, Washington has deployed a distributed “light footprint” across Ghana, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Chad—a novel operational model that reduces coup vulnerability while increasing regional dependency. This paper documents three converging dynamics: 1) the shift from advisory support to direct kinetic intervention, justified through instrumentalised religious persecution narratives that obscure multifaceted governance failures; 2) Nigeria’s acceptance of foreign strikes despite sovereignty costs, reflecting capability gaps in precision airpower; and 3) the emergence of asymmetric security dependencies that risk entrenching external military presence under a humanitarian guise. Drawing on operational analysis and threat assessment, the paper proposes five African Union institutional mechanisms—from post-strike accountability protocols to continental drone policies—designed to reassert African agency before externalised counterterrorism becomes the irreversible norm.
I. Introduction
On Christmas Day 2025, the United States (U.S.) conducted a series of significant airstrikes against Islamic State targets in Sokoto State, northwestern Nigeria, representing a marked escalation in U.S. military involvement in West Africa.
This paper aims to sound an early strategic warning by critically analysing the shift toward foreign kinetic intervention in West Africa, the instrumentalisation of religious narratives in counterterrorism, and the emergence of a distributed external military footprint, and assessing how these dynamics risk undermining sovereignty, inflaming sectarian tensions, and entrenching neocolonial security dependency.
II. Operational Overview
The strikes targeted two ISIS encampments in Sokoto State, within the Bauni forest in Tangaza local government area, specifically linked to the Islamic State-Sahel Province (ISSP), sometimes known locally as “Lakurawa”. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) characterised the strikes as “deadly”, reporting that they killed “multiple ISIS terrorists” with no confirmed civilian casualties as of December 26. Any subsequent acknowledgement of civilian fatalities will likely heighten opposition to the U.S. engagement in Nigeria.
To understand why these strikes represent a strategic escalation rather than routine counterterrorism, it is essential to examine the threat landscape that prompted direct U.S. kinetic action.
III. The ISSP/Lakurawa Threat: Strategic Context
ISSP militants, sometimes operating under the name “Lakurawa”, are part of long-established networks that have expanded from Niger’s Dosso region into northwestern Nigeria’s Sokoto and Kebbi states. Active since approximately 2017, these armed fighters—primarily from the Fulani pastoral ethnic group—were initially invited by Sokoto traditional authorities to protect communities from bandit groups, but “overstayed their welcome, clashing with community leaders and enforcing a harsh interpretation of Sharia law.
ISSP became more active in Nigeria’s border communities after Niger’s July 2023 military coup, which fractured cross-border military cooperation. Empirically, ISSP has maintained a low profile, operating covertly to infiltrate and entrench itself along the Niger-Nigeria border while expanding toward Benin. Politically motivated violence in border regions, including Dosso (Niger), Alibori (Benin), and Sokoto-Kebbi (Nigeria), has more than doubled since 2023.
This escalating violence is not confined to border security metrics—it carries profound symbolic and strategic dimensions that extend far beyond immediate counterterrorism objectives.
A critical question remains unaddressed: would Nigerian sovereignty be better served by rejecting external intervention and accepting slower, indigenous responses—even if this allows ISSP to consolidate territorial control in the interim? While the answer depends on whether one prioritises short-term operational gains or long-term strategic autonomy, the Tinubu administration’s calculus clearly favoured immediate capability supplementation over purist sovereignty principles.
IV. Strategic Significance and Regional Spillover
Sokoto’s selection as a strike target carries symbolic weight beyond counterterrorism: the historic Sokoto Caliphate, responsible for spreading Islam into Nigeria, remains revered by Nigerian Muslims, making operations here extremely sensitive. Throughout 2025, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and ISSP further entrenched their presence in the Benin-Niger-Nigeria tri-border area, transforming previously distinct Sahelian and Nigerian theatres into a single, interconnected conflict environment stretching from Mali to western Nigeria.
The security crisis is fundamentally a governance problem, with militants exploiting the near absence of state presence in conflict hotspots—areas with some of Nigeria’s highest levels of poverty, hunger, and unemployment. While Nigerian military airstrikes target militant hideouts, operations are not usually sustained, and militants easily relocate through vast forests connecting several northern states.
This context clarifies why U.S. intervention occurred: ISSP represents a transnational jihadist expansion exploiting governance vacuums and coup-induced security disruptions. However, it raises fundamental questions about whether kinetic strikes address underlying governance and development deficits, or whether such interventions risk becoming perpetual responses to symptoms rather than causes.
V. Political Context: Coordination and Competing Narratives
Understanding the threat context alone, however, does not explain the most problematic dimension of the December 25 strikes: the stark divergence between how the U.S. and Nigeria framed the operation’s purpose and justification.
Joint Operations and Diplomatic Coordination
In the immediate aftermath, President Trump’s announcement emphasised unilateral resolve. However, both the Pentagon and the Nigerian Foreign Ministry quickly confirmed the strikes were a joint operation, with two direct conversations between Nigerian Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the day of the strikes to coordinate intelligence.
The “Religious Freedom” Framing and Its Contradictions
The most distinctive feature of the strikes was the conflicting U.S. vs Nigeria narrative framing:
- U.S. Perspective: Presidential rhetoric characterised the strikes as a direct response to the “slaughter of Christians”, claimed to be occurring at “levels not seen for centuries”. This followed the October 2025 redesignation of Nigeria as a “Country of Particular Concern” for religious freedom and Trump’s November ultimatum threatening to go in “guns-a-blazing” if Nigeria failed to protect Christian communities.
- Nigerian Perspective: The Nigerian government and independent analysts emphasise that violence in the North-West is multifaceted, affecting both Christians and Muslims, with Muslims often constituting the majority of victims in Muslim-majority northern regions. Table 1 shows the narrative contestation matrix: security vs religious framing by the U.S. and Nigeria.
| External Narrative (U.S.) | Local / Regional Reality |
|---|---|
| Protection of Christians: Framed as a religious persecution response | Multi-actor Insecurity: Complex violence affecting all communities |
| Moral urgency: “Slaughter at levels not seen for centuries” | Criminal–terrorist hybrid violence: Both Christians and Muslims were victimised |
| Counterterrorism: Part of the global “Peace Through Strength” | Governance failure: Security overstretch and state weakness |
| External Legitimacy: Unilateral resolve with coordinated action | Sovereignty sensitivity: Pragmatic but delicate acceptance of intervention |
The religious framing by the U.S. risks inflaming sectarian tensions and providing extremist groups with recruitment propaganda, while potentially obscuring the multifaceted nature of regional insecurity.
Nigerian Domestic Calculations
President Tinubu faces mounting pressure to demonstrate security progress, with over 10,200 deaths from armed group attacks and 12,290 abductions generating ₦13 billion (about US$9 million) in ransom demands during his first two years. The deteriorating situation—which saw the North-Central zone overtake the Northeast as Nigeria’s new epicentre of violence and prompted a sweeping military reshuffle in October 2025—has severely tested his administration’s credibility on its core “Renewed Hope” security agenda.
Nigeria’s 3-Phase Drone/UAS Acquisition
The strikes reflect pragmatic calculations about capability gaps despite modernisation efforts. Nigeria’s unmanned aerial capability has developed through three distinct phases (see Table 2 below). In Phase 1 (2014–2020), China anchored Nigeria’s entry into armed drones with the CH-3A (2014), later expanding MALE and UCAV capacity through Wing Loong II and CH-4 systems, establishing persistent ISR and strike capabilities for counter-insurgency operations. During phase 2 (2022–2023), Türkiye drove diversification with Bayraktar TB2s and tactical systems (Songar, TOGAN, BAHA), creating a layered drone mix combining long-endurance strike platforms with flexible short-range assets. Phase 3 (2018–2025) saw the emergence of indigenous development with the Tsaigumi ISR drone (2018), culminating in the public debut of a locally produced attack drone (2025); these signalled ambitions to reduce external dependence.
| Year | System/Type | Origin | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2006-07 | Aerostar (ISR) | Israel | Acquired | First operational UAV fleet; 9 units |
| 2014 | CH-3A (UCAV) | China | Delivered | Used in strike roles against insurgents |
| 2016 | Yabhon Flash-20 | UAE | Reported | Acquisition disclosed 2016 |
| 2018 | Tsaigumi (ISR) | Nigeria | Inducted | Indigenous platform (AFIT + UAVision) |
| 2020 | Wing Loong II (UCAV) | China | Disclosed | NAF confirmed acquisition Nov 2020 |
| 2020-21 | CH-4/CH-4B (UCAV) | China | Ordered | Expected delivery late 2021 |
| 2021 | Aerosonde Mk 4.7 (ISR) | USA | Contracted | DoD contract completed Sept 2021 |
| 2022 | Bayraktar TB2 (UCAV) | Türkiye | Acquired | Operational by Sept 2022 |
| 2022 | Songar (armed rotary) | Türkiye | Acquired | Fleet expansion noted |
| 2023 | Wing Loong II (additional) | China | Sighted | Multiple airframes observed at NAF facilities |
| 2023 | TOGAN/BAHA (tactical ISR) | Türkiye | Delivered | Export to security forces Aug 2023 |
| 2025 | Indigenous attack drone | Nigeria | Debuted | Publicly showcased April–Nov 2025 |
Nigeria’s UAV Capability Mix
Despite this diversified acquisition timeline, Nigeria’s operational UAV ecosystem remains constrained by strategic dependencies. Table 3 categorises Nigeria’s current unmanned capabilities by function, revealing a capability structure heavily reliant on external suppliers despite indigenous development efforts.
| Category | Primary Systems | Role | Operational Significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| ISR-only UAVs | Aerostar (Israel); Tsaigumi (Nigeria); BAHA (Türkiye) | Surveillance, target acquisition, border monitoring | Foundation of situational awareness; supports both air and ground operations |
| Armed Multirotor / Tactical UAVs | Songar (Türkiye) | Close-range strike, urban and counter-insurgency support | Precision effects at tactical level; suited for internal security operations |
| MALE / UCAV Platforms | CH-3A; Wing Loong II; CH-4 (China); Bayraktar TB2 (Türkiye) | Persistent ISR, precision strike, counterterrorism | Strategic enablers; substitute for manned airpower in permissive environments |
The “Targeting Circuit” Bottleneck: Why Nigeria Could Not Act Alone
NAF’s inability to neutralise the Sokoto targets independently, despite possessing an inventory of Chinese (CH-4) and Turkish Bayraktar (TB2) drones, reveals critical technological and intelligence bottlenecks. This deficit in precision airpower drives a profound asymmetric security dependency on the U.S. The “crucial question” of why Nigeria required U.S. kinetic intervention lies in three areas of efficacy:
- Sensor Resolution and “Fused” Intelligence: While Nigeria’s Turkish and Chinese platforms provide battlefield-grade electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) imagery, they often lack the Multi-Spectral Targeting System (MTS-B) found on the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper. The MTS-B offers an “ID Card” resolution standard, capable of identifying high-value targets (HVTs) by facial features or specific clothing from extreme altitudes where the drone remains invisible. Furthermore, Nigeria’s “targeting circuit” for its existing fleet is essentially a “closed loop” where pilots rely on immediate visual feeds. In contrast, the U.S. provides a “fused” intelligence architecture, where live drone data is analysed in real-time by a global network of specialists who cross-reference it with signals intelligence (SIGINT) to confirm identities in complex civilian environments.
- Munition Precision–Hellfire vs. MAM-L: The choice of munition represents a vital sovereignty trade-off. The U.S. AGM-114 Hellfire—specifically its Low Collateral Damage (LCD) variants like the R9X—is engineered for “surgical” strikes with a highly focused blast radius. Conversely, the Chinese AR-1 and Turkish MAM-L munitions in Nigeria’s arsenal are generally designed for open warfare with higher explosive yields. For the Sokoto strikes occurring near civilian clusters, the Nigerian government likely assessed that its own munitions carried an unacceptable risk of “collateral tragedies,” similar to previous accidental NAF strikes.
- The “Legal and Political” Shield: Beyond hardware, the use of U.S. platforms serves as an “Accountability Outsourcing” mechanism. By utilising U.S. targeting oversight, the Tinubu administration can claim that the operation met international “gold standards” for civilian protection, providing political insurance against the domestic fallout of a botched strike. As detailed in Table 4, this reliance is fundamentally a product of the efficacy gap between U.S. and regional systems, where the MQ-9 Reaper’s superior sensor resolution and surgical munition choices provide a level of precision currently unavailable to Nigeria’s indigenous or existing foreign fleet.
| Feature | U.S. MQ-9 Reaper | Turkish TB2 / Chinese Wing Loong |
|---|---|---|
| Primary Sensor | MTS-B (Ultra-high resolution) | Standard EO/IR (Battlefield grade) |
| Munition Choice | Hellfire (Specific LCD variants) | MAM-L / AR-1 (General-purpose explosive) |
| Intelligence Loop | Global “fused” network | Localised “pilot-in-the-loop” |
| Mission Profile | Surgical HVT elimination | Tactical battlefield support |
These competing narratives and domestic calculations reflect more profound strategic shifts in U.S.-Africa security relations that extend well beyond Nigeria’s immediate counterterrorism needs. The strategic shifts manifest most visibly in the U.S. military’s geographic repositioning across West Africa. Table 5 summarises the four critical dimensions of strategic transformation signalled by the Sokoto strikes:
| Factor | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Shift in Engagement | Marks a transition from “advise and assist” to direct kinetic action in the Nigerian theatre. |
| Regional Expansion | By striking in Sokoto (North-West) rather than the traditional Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) stronghold in the North-East (Borno), the U.S. acknowledges the spread of IS-affiliated groups toward the Sahel/Niger border. |
| Sovereignty vs. Necessity | Nigerian government approval suggests pragmatic, if delicate, acceptance of U.S. airpower to compensate for domestic security overstretch. |
| Global Context | Occurring a week after similar U.S. operations in Syria, these strikes may reflect a broader “Peace Through Strength” campaign to degrade ISIS global affiliates simultaneously. |
VI. The New U.S. Military Footprint: From Centralised to Distributed
Strategic Rationale for Redistribution
Following Niger’s July 2023 coup and the August 2024 forced withdrawal, the U.S. abandoned its centralised model—anchored by massive desert bases like Air Base 201—in favour of a distributed “light footprint” strategy across multiple coastal West African nations. This approach reduces vulnerability to single-country political upheaval, though it increases drone flight times to Sahel targets.
Current Operational Locations (Late 2025)
Personnel and heavy equipment from Niger’s former Air Base 101 and 201 were initially consolidated at U.S. facilities in Germany and Italy before redistribution. By late 2025, U.S. counterterrorism operations span four main locations:
- Ghana: Primary operational hub, with intelligence flights and strikes launched from Accra’s Kotoka International Airport and potentially Tamale Air Force Base in the north.
- Benin: Forward surveillance site, where Washington invested $4 million to upgrade a northern airfield (near Parakou or Karimama) for reconnaissance missions, helicopter operations, and Special Forces border security training.
- Côte d’Ivoire: Strategic pivot point, with ongoing 2025 negotiations to establish drone deployments from existing military infrastructure in Abidjan and northwestern sites near Odienné, close to the Mali and Guinea borders.
- Chad: Maintains northern surveillance capabilities through special operations forces who returned to N’Djamena in late 2024, following a brief earlier withdrawal.
While this distributed model offers tactical flexibility, it introduces systemic risks that extend beyond immediate operational concerns. To contextualise this emerging architecture, Table 6 situates the U.S. distributed footprint within the broader spectrum of contemporary security partnership models operating across Africa, highlighting the distinctive sovereignty trade-offs inherent in each approach.
| Security Partnership Model | Example | Sovereignty Trade-off |
|---|---|---|
| Full Basing Rights | Djibouti (U.S./China/France) | High presence, long-term commitment |
| Distributed Light Footprint | West Africa 2025 | Lower visibility, uncertain commitment |
| Equipment/Training Only | U.S.-Tunisia | Minimal presence, capacity gaps remain |
| Regional Force (African-led) | AMISOM/ATMIS/AUSSOM | Higher ownership, chronic underfunding |
VII. Risks and Implications
While this distributed architecture offers operational advantages in a politically unstable region, it generates four categories of risk that African policymakers and continental institutions must urgently address.
Extremist Recruitment and Propaganda
Foreign intervention, particularly when framed in religious terms, provides extremist groups with recruitment material to portray conflicts as a “Crusade” against Islam. ISSP and other terrorist networks in Nigeria, coastal Guinea countries, and the MENA region may escalate operations in response.
Sectarian Tensions
The U.S. emphasis on “protecting Christians” within the broader “global war on terror” narrative risks inflaming existing religious tensions within Nigeria’s diverse population and beyond, absent balanced local diplomacy.
Uncertain Long-Term Commitment
Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth’s “more to come” comment suggests sustained operations in Nigeria, coastal Guinea areas, and the Sahel. However, a critical dilemma persists: counterterrorism in a region that may not be a top U.S. strategic priority offers no guarantee of long-term engagement, potentially leaving African partners vulnerable to abandonment.
Asymmetric Security Dependencies
Recent West African developments carry a long-term risk of creating asymmetric security dependencies that erode strategic autonomy by outsourcing regional security to competing global powers pursuing strategic containment policies that may not align with African sovereignty and stability. It is permissible to conclude that, without a genuine partnership that respects African agency, these dynamics could lead to a long-term erosion of sovereignty. The danger is that the “regional security” narrative becomes a convenient vehicle for external powers to maintain a military presence that serves their geopolitical interests under the guise of collaborative security and humanitarian protection.
These risks—ranging from extremist recruitment to sovereignty erosion—are not hypothetical future scenarios. They are already materialising in the immediate aftermath of the Sokoto strikes, demanding urgent strategic reflection on the path forward.
VIII. Conclusion
The Christmas Day 2025 airstrikes in Sokoto State mark a pivotal moment in U.S.-Africa security relations, signalling Washington’s transition from advisory support to direct kinetic intervention in Nigeria’s counterterrorism landscape. While operationally coordinated between both governments, the strikes reveal a troubling divergence in narrative framing: the U.S. administration’s emphasis on religious persecution conflicts with Nigeria’s understanding of the violence as a complex, multifaceted security crisis affecting communities across religious lines.
The shift to a distributed military footprint across Ghana, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Chad demonstrates strategic adaptation following the Niger withdrawal. Yet it also represents a broader recalibration of Western engagement in the region. This decentralised approach, while reducing vulnerability to single-country political instability, raises fundamental questions about sovereignty, sustained commitment, and the risk of inadvertently fuelling the very extremism it seeks to combat through religiously charged rhetoric that terrorist groups can exploit for recruitment.
Most critically, these developments risk establishing a troubling precedent: the gradual outsourcing of regional security to external powers pursuing containment strategies that may not align with Africa’s long-term stability interests. Without careful diplomatic management, balanced local engagement, and genuine partnership that respects African agency, current counterterrorism efforts could inadvertently serve neocolonial dynamics rather than sustainable peace. The international community must remain vigilant that the “regional security” narrative does not become a vehicle for undermining African sovereignty under the guise of protecting lives. This is the challenge for the African Union and African regional organisations.
Meeting this challenge requires moving beyond declaratory statements to concrete institutional mechanisms. The following policy recommendations provide an actionable framework for the AU Peace and Security Council to reassert continental agency in the face of externalised security interventions.
IX. Recommendations
To address the concerns of sovereignty, neocolonial dependency, and narrative imposition following the U.S. airstrikes in Nigeria, the AU must transition from reactive diplomacy to proactive institutional oversight. The strategic landscape in late 2025 makes it imperative that the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) consider the following policy recommendations.
- Establish Continental Oversight of Foreign Kinetic Action: The AU should require that any foreign military strike on member-state territory—regardless of host-state consent—be formally notified to the AU PSC within 24-72 hours, supported by a standardised Post-Strike Accountability Brief covering civilian impact, intelligence justification, and legal basis under AU norms. The purpose is to prevent bilateral security arrangements from bypassing and undermining continental transparency and non-indifference principles. However, the AU will have no enforcement mechanism against major powers that ignore this requirement.
- Counter-Narrative Weaponisation through African Analysis: Mandate the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) to issue an independent Threat Context Report following any major external intervention in Africa. This will anchor counterterrorism narratives in African-led analysis and prevent the reduction of complex conflicts into sectarian or ideological propaganda.
- Regulate Distributed Foreign Military Footprints: Develop an AU Continental Drone and Surveillance Policy setting clear limits on the scope, duration, basing, and authorisation of foreign unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations on African soil. The purpose is to prevent the gradual entrenchment of coastal states as permanent launch platforms for external military operations outside a collective AU strategy.
- Reinvigorate the ASF for Sahelian Security: Fast-track the reconceptualisation of the African Standby Force (ASF) to incorporate a counterterrorism capability, to close critical regional capability gaps and reduce reliance on foreign airpower. After more than 20 years of chronic underfunding and lack of full operationalisation, why would the ASF change now?
- Mediate the AU–Sahel Divide: Convene a high-level AU-led Sahel Reconciliation Dialogue to re-engage the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) members within the continental security framework, decoupling security reintegration from immediate political conditionalities. The purpose is to close the geopolitical vacuum that enables external powers to exploit regional fragmentation. Given that AES states have explicitly rejected AU mediation, it remains to be seen what leverage the AU has.
All said and done, it is worth acknowledging that while these obstacles are pertinent, they do not negate the recommendations’ validity.
References
Official Government & Military Statements
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U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). (2025, November 3). Naming of Nigeria as a Country of Particular Concern is an important step to advance religious freedom. [Press Release]. https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/releases-statements/naming-nigeria-country-particular-concern-important-step-advance
U.S. Department of Defence & Ministry of National Defence of Niger. (2024, August 5). Joint statement on the completion of withdrawal of U.S. forces and assets from Air Base 201 in Agadez. https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3861097/joint-statement-from-the-us-department-of-defense-and-the-department-of-nationa/
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Opinion
Ghana’s OSP case and the global pattern of prosecutorial control
This article analyzes Ghana’s Supreme Court case (No. J1/3/2026), which challenges the constitutional validity of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) operating independently from the Attorney-General, as vested by Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution. The author, Amanda Clinton, argues that the OSP is positioned to defend its institutional survival by asserting parliamentary authority and the need for anti-corruption insulation from political influence. The piece places Ghana’s legal dilemma within a global pattern, comparing it to the dissolved Scorpions in South Africa, the constrained EACC in Kenya, and the politically pressured EFCC in Nigeria. The article states that the Supreme Court’s ruling will determine whether Ghana adopts a model of centralized prosecutorial control or a rare framework of institutional balance, with significant implications for anti-corruption credibility across Africa.
Ghana’s OSP case and the global pattern of prosecutorial control
By Amanda Clinton
Ghana’s Supreme Court case, No. J1/3/2026, is more than a technical constitutional dispute.
At its core lies a defining question for the country’s governance architecture: can the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) exist with meaningful prosecutorial independence, or must it operate strictly under the authority of the Attorney-General? That question has surfaced elsewhere—and the answers have rarely been neutral.
THE IMMEDIATE LEGAL FAULT LINE
The case challenges the constitutional validity of an independent prosecutorial body alongside the Attorney-General under Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution, which vests prosecutorial authority in the AG. This places the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) at the very center of the dispute. In such situations, the OSP is not a passive observer. It can:
- Apply to be joined as an interested party, or
- File its own statement of case if already joined
Recent signals suggest it will not stand aside. The OSP has indicated it will challenge interpretations that subordinate it entirely to the Attorney-General, pointing to earlier judicial reasoning that allowed some operational autonomy. If it proceeds, its legal arguments are predictable but significant:
- Parliamentary authority to create specialized prosecutorial institutions
- A delegation framework, where the AG’s powers can be exercised through statutory bodies
- The anti-corruption rationale, which depends on insulation from political influence
- And a practical continuity argument: the OSP has already prosecuted cases—removing that power now risks legal uncertainty
This is not a peripheral intervention. It is a direct defence of institutional survival.
A FAMILIAR GLOBAL PATTERN
Ghana is not navigating new terrain. The tension between central prosecutorial authority and independent anti-corruption bodies has played out in multiple jurisdictions—with strikingly similar trajectories.
SOUTH AFRICA: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SCORPIONS
The Scorpions were once a formidable anti-corruption unit with prosecutorial teeth. As their investigations moved closer to political elites, pressure mounted. Ultimately, they were dissolved and replaced with a less independent structure.
Institutional continuity was preserved in form, but operational independence was diluted. Public trust in anti-corruption enforcement took a measurable hit.
Effect: Institutional continuity was preserved in form, but operational independence was diluted. Public trust in anti-corruption enforcement took a measurable hit.
KENYA: EACC’S CONSTRAINED MANDATE
Kenya’s Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) was established with investigative powers but lacks prosecutorial independence. It must refer cases to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), who retains full discretion over whether to proceed.
Effect: High-profile investigations have stalled at the prosecution stage. The structural subordination creates a bottleneck that can be exploited politically.
NIGERIA: EFCC UNDER POLITICAL PRESSURE
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) operates with statutory prosecutorial powers, but its leadership has been subject to repeated political interference. Changes in administration have consistently led to shifts in enforcement priorities and leadership turnover.
Effect: The EFCC’s credibility fluctuates with political cycles. Its effectiveness is undermined not by constitutional constraints, but by a lack of institutional insulation.
THE PATTERN IS CLEAR
Where anti-corruption bodies have meaningful independence, they face sustained political pressure. Where they lack independence, they struggle to function effectively. The question is not whether tension will arise—it is how it will be resolved.
GHANA’S INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
The Supreme Court’s decision will not merely interpret Article 88. It will determine whether Ghana opts for a model that prioritizes centralized prosecutorial control or one that permits institutional pluralism in the fight against corruption.
If the OSP’s independence is curtailed, Ghana joins a long list of jurisdictions where anti-corruption enforcement is formally robust but operationally constrained. If the Court finds room for both the AG and the OSP to coexist with distinct mandates, it creates a rare model of institutional balance.
THE STAKES BEYOND GHANA
This case matters beyond Ghana’s borders. It will be studied across Africa as a precedent for how constitutional interpretation shapes anti-corruption architecture. The decision will influence:
How other jurisdictions structure their own anti-corruption frameworks
The credibility of specialized prosecutorial institutions continent-wide
Investor confidence in governance stability and rule of law
The global pattern suggests that independence, once conceded, is rarely restored. If the OSP loses this case, it may never regain the autonomy it once had.
WHAT COMES NEXT
The OSP has signaled it will defend its mandate. The arguments will be legal, but the implications are deeply political. The Supreme Court will not simply rule on constitutional text—it will shape the future of anti-corruption enforcement in Ghana.
And if history is any guide, the outcome will echo far beyond the courtroom.
About the author:
Amanda Akuokor Clinton, Esq. LL.B, M.Sc, BVC, Gh. Bar

Amanda is the Founding Partner of Clinton Consultancy and a dynamic lawyer who was called to the Bar in England and Wales thirteen years ago and the Ghanaian Bar ten years ago. Amanda is a litigation expert with extensive corporate law experience in the U.K and Ghana. As one of the most recognised commercial lawyers in Ghana, she is regularly instructed by international clients who require bespoke, timely and accurate Due Diligence Reports as well as Legal Opinions: corporate, banking, telecommunications, property & construction and energy & infrastructure.
Commentary
Martin Amidu Wades into Constitutionality of the OSP with Riveting Article
In this feature article, former Special Prosecutor Martin Amidu examines the constitutional challenge brought by one Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey against the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959), currently pending before Ghana’s Supreme Court. Amidu notes that the Attorney-General has filed a Statement of Case that substantially agrees with the plaintiff’s position that Sections 3(3) and 4 of Act 959 violate Articles 88, 93(2), and 296 of the 1992 Constitution. He criticizes CDD-Ghana Executive Director H. Kwasi Prempeh for attacking the Supreme Court’s unanimous ruling that refused the OSP’s application to join the case as a second defendant, arguing that the ruling was consistent with Article 88(5), which requires all civil proceedings against the State to be instituted against the Attorney-General. Amidu, the first to be appointed Special Prosecutor, identifies defects in both the plaintiff’s writ, noting that Sections 3(3) and 4 do not actually confer the powers the plaintiff claims, and the Attorney-General’s proposed case, which he describes as lacking neutrality and balance. He concludes that the relationship between the Special Prosecutor and the Attorney-General under the current government has broken down beyond repair, and the two cannot co-exist effectively in the fight against corruption.
The constitutionality of the Office of the Special Prosecutor 2017 (ACT 959)
By Martin Amidu (Former Special Prosecutor)
Date: Saturday, 18 April 2026
INTRODUCTION
One Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey has succeeded in raising the question of the constitutionality of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959) for interpretation and declaratory reliefs before the Supreme Court in an action he commenced against the Attorney-General on 8 December 2025. An earlier attempt by Mr. Ken Agyei Kuranchie in 2023 challenging the constitutionality of Act 959 was discontinued in July 2024 by the Supreme Court for lack of prosecution and without liberty to bring a further action against the Attorney-General.
The Defendant in the Adamtey action, the Attorney-General, failed to timely file a defence to the action as required by the Rules of the Supreme Court, despite the fact that the Deputy Attorney-General was the source of a leak of the fact that the Plaintiff had commenced the action against the constitutionality of Act 959. Exactly four months after the commencement of the action by the Plaintiff against the Republic of Ghana, with the Attorney-General as Defendant, the Defendant filed an application on 8 April 2026 in the Supreme Court praying for leave for extension of time to file the Statement of Case for the Defendant, fixed for hearing on 16 April 2026. The Statement of Case of the Defendant, as required by the Rules of the Supreme Court, was exhibited to the application for extension of time as “Exhibit AG1” and contains the Attorney-General’s case, which substantially agrees with the Plaintiff’s case. (The Court has since granted the extension of time.)
Between 8 December 2025, when the Plaintiff filed his action, and 8 April 2026, when the Defendant filed his application for extension of time, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) sought, by an application filed in the Supreme Court on 15 December 2025 and disposed of on 27 January 2026, to join the action as Second Defendant. The Supreme Court refused the joinder in a unanimous ruling, stating that:
“…We are of the view that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not a necessary party to the action and that this suit may be properly adjudicated upon without their presence as parties. This application for joinder is therefore refused.”
Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey’s action against the Attorney-General was known and available to the public and to anti-corruption civil society organisations since the case was filed in the Supreme Court on 8 December 2025. The Rules of the Supreme Court allow Interested Parties, who take the view that a constitutional action raises issues impacting them, to apply to join such action. There is no evidence that since the Plaintiff filed his action on 8 December 2025, any person or civil society organisation has applied to join the action as an Interested Party to make submissions contesting the Plaintiff’s case.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE REACTION TO DEFENDANT’S CASE
Nonetheless, immediately after the Defendant, the Attorney-General’s application for extension of time became public, the Executive Director of a civil society organisation called CDD-Ghana took to social media to attack the ruling of the Supreme Court delivered on 27 January 2026 for refusing to allow the OSP to join the action as Second Defendant.
The anti-corruption civil society organisations, which are organised under the umbrella of CDD-Ghana, have a stake in the existence of the OSP, as it impacts their ability to source donations from donors for their anti-corruption campaigns.
Mr. H. Kwasi Prempeh, the Executive Director of the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), who played a central role with President Akufo-Addo and his Attorney-General, Ms. Gloria Akuffo, in the drafting and submission of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Bill, 2017 to Parliament for enactment into law as Act 959, now blames the Supreme Court for complying with the mandatory terms of Article 88(5) of the Constitution in refusing the joinder application by the OSP. Article 88(5) of the 1992 Constitution states that “all civil proceedings against the State shall be instituted against the Attorney-General as defendant.” The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court dated 27 January 2026 refusing the OSP’s application for joinder is consistent with Article 88(5) of the Constitution.
In any case, the post facto condemnation of the ruling of the Supreme Court is premised on the false assumption that, despite the wording of Article 88(5) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s ruling endorsed any conduct of the Attorney-General that colludes with the substance of the Plaintiff’s action in the Statement of Case. Nothing under adversarial justice prevents a Defendant from admitting the case of the Plaintiff or part thereof, as the Attorney-General’s draft Statement of Case proposes, however unethical it may seem.
Mr. H. Kwasi Prempeh is not qualified to hold himself out as a person qualified to practise law in Ghana, let alone qualify for appointment to any court in Ghana, and should not behave as though he understands the constitutional law of Ghana and the rules of practice of the Supreme Court better than the Chief Justice and the four other Justices of the Supreme Court who refused the joinder application of the OSP. The fact that the Akufo-Addo Government, with whom he was associated, appointed him to the Law Reform Commission does not qualify him to speak as though he is a properly qualified legal practitioner in Ghana.
The proper course for any person or body of persons who disagree with the position taken by the Attorney-General on the action filed by the Plaintiff on 8 December 2025 challenging the constitutionality of Act 959 is to apply to the Supreme Court as Interested Parties and submit arguments as to why the provisions of Act 959 being challenged are constitutional.
DEFECTS OF THE PLAINTIFF’S WRIT AND CAUSE OF ACTION
On 8 December 2025, one Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey commenced an action in the Supreme Court of Ghana against the Attorney-General challenging the constitutionality of portions of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959). The Plaintiff sought eight reliefs. The main contention of the Plaintiff, discernible from the first five reliefs, is that Sections 3(3) and 4 of Act 959 are inconsistent with and contravene Articles 88, 93(2) and 296 of the 1992 Constitution and are accordingly void.
Article 88(3) and (4) delegates the executive authority and responsibility of the President under Article 58 of the Constitution to the Attorney-General for the initiation and conduct of all prosecutions of criminal offences. All criminal offences are to be prosecuted in the name of the Republic of Ghana at the suit of the Attorney-General or any other person authorised by him in accordance with any law.
The substance of the Plaintiff’s first five reliefs anchored on Section 3(3) of Act 959 states that:
“A declaration that Sections 3(3) and 4 of Act 959, in purporting to make the Office of the Special Prosecutor independent of the Attorney-General in the initiation, conduct, and termination of prosecutions, violates the Constitution.”
The problem which any experienced and erudite constitutional advocate in the Supreme Court will immediately recognise is that Sections 3(3) and 4 of Act 959 do not confer upon the Special Prosecutor the powers the Plaintiff claims they do. Section 3 of Act 959 deals with the functions of the OSP and not the powers of the Special Prosecutor.
Section 4 of Act 959 deals with the mandate of the Office, and subsection (2) thereof subjects the powers of the Special Prosecutor to Article 88(4) of the Constitution and therefore cannot be said to be void. The Plaintiff also attempts in reliefs (a) and (b) to rely on Article 296 of the Constitution on discretionary power, as though it applies to prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney-General. However, experienced legal representation by an Interested Party may argue that prosecutorial discretion derives from the common law as part of the existing law under Article 11 of the Constitution, which restricts judicial interference in prosecutorial discretion.
The sixth relief appears contradictory, or at best alternative, when it seeks:
“A declaration that any statutory delegation of prosecutorial authority made pursuant to Act 959 does not bind subsequent Attorneys-General and lapses upon the assumption of office of a new Attorney-General unless re-authorised by that Attorney-General.”
This relief cannot co-exist with the first five reliefs and cannot properly constitute part of the same cause of action. The Plaintiff appears to concede that Act 959 is intra vires Article 88, except in relation to its effect on succeeding Attorneys-General.
DEFECTS OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S PROPOSED CASE
The draft Statement of Case of the Defendant exhibited to the application for extension of time filed on 8 April 2026 also contains contradictory submissions, misrepresentations of fact and law, which any experienced practitioner of constitutional law appearing as an Interested Party may bring to the attention of the Court.
The Attorney-General is at all times an officer of the Court, expected to assist in the administration of justice without fear or favour. One would therefore expect the Defendant’s Statement of Case to objectively and impartially address the implications of the nomination of the Special Prosecutor by the Attorney-General for appointment by the President, and its effect on prosecutorial powers under Act 959.
The Supreme Court may also be assisted by comparative reasoning, including the US Supreme Court decision in Morrison v Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), which upheld independent counsel provisions under the Ethics in Government Act.
CONCLUSION
This discourse should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the constitutionality of Act 959. I have previously indicated that I anticipated challenges to Act 959 during my tenure as Special Prosecutor, and I was not surprised when such challenges eventually arose.
The Attorney-General’s Statement of Case, as proposed, does not appear to present a neutral or balanced response capable of assisting the Supreme Court in resolving the constitutional issues fairly. Rather, it appears to substantially align with the Plaintiff’s case.
At the end of the day, the relationship between the Special Prosecutor and the Attorney-General under this Government appears to have broken down beyond repair. The Special Prosecutor and the Attorney-General, as presently constituted, cannot co-exist effectively in the fight against corruption.
Commentary
Ghana’s Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Faces Legal Challenge Over Power to Prosecute
ACCRA, Ghana — A major legal battle is unfolding in Ghana that could reshape how the country fights corruption. At the center is the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), an independent body created to investigate and prosecute corruption cases.
A recent High Court ruling has cast doubt on the OSP’s ability to independently prosecute cases—prompting the agency to mount a swift legal challenge. For observers unfamiliar with Ghana’s legal system, the dispute raises fundamental questions about who has the authority to prosecute crimes and how anti-corruption institutions should operate.
What Triggered the Dispute?
The controversy stems from a ruling by the General Jurisdiction Division of the High Court in Accra. The court held that while the OSP can investigate corruption, it does not have constitutional authority to prosecute cases on its own.
Instead, the court said prosecutorial power lies exclusively with the Attorney-General’s Department, based on Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.
The case originated from a quo warranto application, a legal action questioning whether a public office is lawfully exercising its powers, filed by private citizen Peter Achibold Hyde.
What Is the OSP and Why Does It Matter?
The OSP was established under the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017, as part of Ghana’s efforts to strengthen its anti-corruption framework.
Its mandate includes:
- Investigating corruption and corruption-related offenses
- Prosecuting such cases
- Recovering proceeds of corruption
The agency was designed to operate independently of political influence, addressing long-standing concerns that corruption prosecutions could be hindered by executive control.
The Core Legal Question
At the heart of the dispute is a constitutional tension:
- The Constitution (Article 88) gives prosecutorial authority to the Attorney-General.
- The OSP Act (2017) appears to grant the OSP its own prosecutorial powers.
The High Court ruling effectively says: Parliament cannot override the Constitution through ordinary legislation.
This interpretation would mean the OSP can only prosecute cases if authorized by the Attorney-General.
How Did the OSP Respond?
The OSP has strongly rejected the ruling and announced plans to overturn it.
In its official response, the agency argued:
- The High Court lacks jurisdiction to declare parts of an Act of Parliament unconstitutional
- Only the Supreme Court of Ghana has the authority to make such determinations
- Its enabling law clearly provides for both investigative and prosecutorial powers
The OSP warned that allowing the ruling to stand could undermine ongoing corruption cases and weaken Ghana’s accountability systems.
The Attorney-General’s Position
Complicating matters, the Attorney-General’s office has taken a position that aligns—at least partly—with the High Court’s reasoning.
Government lawyers argue:
- Prosecutorial power belongs solely to the Attorney-General
- Parliament cannot transfer or dilute that power through legislation
- The OSP may require explicit authorization before prosecuting cases
They also contend that prosecutorial authority cannot be delegated to a “juridical person” (an institution like the OSP), only to individuals.
Why This Case Is Bigger Than One Agency
This dispute has far-reaching implications for Ghana’s governance and rule of law.
1. Anti-Corruption Efforts at Risk
If the OSP loses prosecutorial authority:
- Ongoing cases could be delayed or reassigned
- Investigations may lose momentum
- Public confidence in anti-corruption efforts could weaken
2. Constitutional Interpretation
The case raises a key legal question:
Can Parliament create independent prosecutorial bodies, or is that power constitutionally restricted?
3. Separation of Powers
The outcome will clarify the balance between:
- The executive branch (through the Attorney-General)
- Independent statutory bodies like the OSP
What Happens Next?
The legal battle is far from over.
There are now two parallel tracks:
- OSP’s challenge to the High Court ruling
- A separate case already before the Supreme Court, filed by Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey, seeking a definitive constitutional interpretation
Legal analysts expect the Supreme Court to ultimately deliver the final word.
Why Global Audiences Should Pay Attention
Ghana is often seen as one of West Africa’s more stable democracies, and its anti-corruption framework has been closely watched by international partners.
The outcome of this case could:
- Influence how other countries design independent anti-corruption bodies
- Shape international perceptions of Ghana’s governance
- Affect investor confidence tied to transparency and rule of law
The Bottom Line
The clash between the OSP and the Attorney-General is more than a legal technicality—it’s a defining moment for Ghana’s anti-corruption system.
At stake is a fundamental question:
Should an independent anti-corruption body have the power to prosecute on its own, or must that authority remain centralized under the state’s chief legal officer?
The answer, likely to come from the Supreme Court, will determine not just the future of the OSP—but the direction of Ghana’s fight against corruption.
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