In a 6-3 decision in Louisiana v. Callais, the Court has opened the door for states to enact discriminatory voting maps, overruling decades of precedent, the text of the law, and the will of Congress.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. — In a ruling that voting rights advocates are calling a devastating blow to American democracy, the U.S. Supreme Court has effectively gutted Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), the landmark 1965 civil rights law that for six decades served as the nation’s primary legal shield against racial discrimination in elections.

The 6-3 decision in Louisiana v. Callais, handed down on April 29, 2026, strikes down a congressional map that had finally allowed Black voters in Louisiana to elect candidates of their choice, and more broadly, provides a legal roadmap for states to enact racially discriminatory voting maps so long as they claim partisan intent.

“This decision — which contradicts the text of the Voting Rights Act, the will of Congress and the Constitution — is one of the most consequential setbacks for our multiracial democracy in a generation,” said Trevor Stanley, president of Campaign Legal Center, which submitted amicus briefs in the case.

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A Landmark Law, Dismantled

For sixty years, the Voting Rights Act has stood as a cornerstone of American civil rights legislation. It was enacted to dismantle the Jim Crow-era barriers that had systematically excluded Black Americans from the ballot box — literacy tests, poll taxes, and violent intimidation.

Section 2 of the VRA specifically prohibited any voting practice or procedure that results in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race or color. It allowed voters to challenge discriminatory maps and seek judicial remedies.

That protection, the Supreme Court has now ruled, has been significantly weakened.

The case originated in Louisiana, where a federal court had found that the state’s congressional map discriminated against Black voters. Louisiana was ordered to redraw its map to create an additional district where Black voters could have a meaningful opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. The state complied, adopting a map that resulted in the election of two Black Louisianians to Congress for the first time in state history.

Then a group of self-described “non-Black” voters sued, claiming the VRA-compliant map was an illegal racial gerrymander. The Supreme Court agreed.

The Loophole: ‘It’s Partisanship, Not Race’

While the majority claimed to make only minor adjustments to the legal framework for challenging discriminatory districts, voting rights experts say the decision represents a fundamental overhaul.

Going forward, voters will face new evidentiary hurdles. More critically, states can now defend against virtually any claim of racial discrimination simply by arguing that they discriminated based on political party — even when race and partisanship are nearly impossible to disentangle, particularly in the American South.

“The decision provides a roadmap for states to return to pre-1965 race discrimination in redistricting,” the Campaign Legal Center said in a statement. This is despite Congress’s repeated and overwhelming reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act, including as recently as 2006.

In practical terms, a state legislature could draw a map that systematically dilutes Black voting power — then argue in court that the map was actually designed to disadvantage Democrats, not Black voters. Under the new standard, that defense may be sufficient.

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Justice Kagan’s Scathing Dissent

In a pointed dissent, Justice Elena Kagan captured the gravity of the decision, writing:

“The Voting Rights Act ushered in awe-inspiring change, bringing this Nation closer to fulfilling the ideals of democracy and racial equality. And it has been repeatedly, and overwhelmingly, reauthorized by the people’s representatives in Congress. Only they have the right to say it is no longer needed — not the Members of this Court. I dissent, then, from this latest chapter in the majority’s now-completed demolition of the Voting Rights Act.”

Kagan’s language, “now-completed demolition,” reflects a growing recognition that this ruling follows a pattern. In 2013, the Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder struck down Section 4 of the VRA, effectively gutting federal preclearance requirements for states with histories of discrimination. Now, the Court has neutered Section 2, the last major provision allowing private citizens to challenge discriminatory maps.

What This Means for Voters

The immediate impact will be felt most acutely in Louisiana, where the court’s ruling invalidates the map that allowed two Black representatives to serve in Congress simultaneously for the first time.

But the ruling applies nationally. Any state — particularly those with significant minority populations and histories of racial discrimination — could now adopt maps that dilute minority voting power, so long as they frame their actions in partisan terms.

“Black and brown voters who have long fought for fair representation at the federal, state and local levels will be particularly impacted,” the Campaign Legal Center warned.

The decision also leaves voters with little legal recourse. The evidentiary burdens are now higher, and the partisan-appearance defense provides states with a nearly automatic shield against Section 2 claims.

Global Implications

For international audiences, the ruling carries significant weight. The United States has long positioned itself as a global model for democratic governance and has frequently criticized other nations for electoral irregularities and the suppression of minority voting rights.

This decision undercuts that moral authority.

Democracy watchdogs around the world — from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to the African Union to the European Parliament — have documented backsliding in democratic norms across multiple nations. The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling will likely be cited as evidence that even established democracies are vulnerable to the erosion of civil rights protections.

“This is not just an American story,” said a spokesperson for a leading international democracy monitoring group. “When the world’s oldest continuous democracy weakens its own voting rights protections, it sends a signal to authoritarian-leaning governments everywhere that democratic guardrails can be removed with impunity.”

What Comes Next

While the Supreme Court’s decision is a major setback, voting rights advocates stress that the fight is not over.

Congress can act to enact new federal protections against racial and partisan discrimination in redistricting, fulfilling its role as a co-equal branch of government. Legislation to restore and strengthen the Voting Rights Act has been proposed in previous sessions, though it has stalled due to partisan gridlock.

States can also adopt their own voting rights protections. Several states — including New York, Virginia, and Colorado — have enacted State Voting Rights Acts (SVRAs) that provide protections beyond federal law. Advocates are now urging other states to follow suit.

Campaign Legal Center and other pro-democracy organizations have pledged to continue litigating, advocating, and fighting to ensure that all Americans can participate meaningfully in the democratic process.

“Every generation has faced attempts to restrict access to the ballot box, and every generation has pushed back,” the organization said. “This moment is no different.”

A Long Arc Bent Toward Justice — But Now, Bent Back?

The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. famously said that “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” For voting rights advocates, that arc now appears to be bending in the opposite direction — at least in the courts.

Whether Congress or state legislatures can bend it back remains the defining question of America’s democratic future.

For now, the message from the Supreme Court is clear: the Voting Rights Act, once the backbone of federal protections against racial discrimination in elections, has been reduced to a shell. And millions of American voters, particularly Black and brown citizens, will likely pay the price

In this feature commentary, George Spencer Quaye argues that Ghana’s newly launched National AI Strategy represents far more than a routine policy document; it is a deliberate “declaration of digital sovereignty” aimed at repositioning Africa from a consumer of foreign technologies to a builder and owner of intelligent systems.

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Ghana’s AI Strategy is more than a policy, it is a declaration of digital sovereignty

By George Spencer Quaye

Last Friday, in Accra, Ghana did more than launch a strategy.

Under the leadership of H.E. President John Dramani Mahama, and through the stewardship of the Minister for Communications, Digital Technology and Innovation, Samuel Nartey George, the country issued what must be understood for what it truly is:

A declaration of digital sovereignty in the age of artificial intelligence.

At a time when global power is increasingly defined not by territory or raw resources, but by control over data, algorithms, and compute infrastructure, Ghana has made a strategic choice—to compete, to lead, and crucially, to own its place in the emerging AI order.

This is not a symbolic move. It is a political one.

The Politics of Intelligence

Artificial intelligence is often framed as a technological revolution. That framing is incomplete.

AI is about power.

It determines:

• Who controls knowledge
• Who shapes economic value
• Who defines truth in digital systems
• And ultimately, who governs the future

For too long, Africa has sat at the receiving end of global technological systems—importing platforms, exporting raw data, and absorbing outcomes shaped elsewhere.

That model is no longer sustainable.

Ghana’s National AI Strategy confronts this reality head-on. By committing to sovereign AI infrastructure, investing in local innovation ecosystems, and proposing governance institutions to regulate the deployment of intelligent systems, the government is signaling a break from dependency.

It is asserting that Africa must not only participate in the AI revolution—but must negotiate its terms.

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From Digital Dependence to Digital Control

The implications of this shift are profound.

A National AI Computing Centre is not just infrastructure—it is strategic autonomy.
An AI Fund is not just financing—it is control over innovation direction.
A Responsible AI Authority is not just regulation—it is protection against digital subjugation.

Taken together, these moves represent an attempt to reposition Ghana—and by extension Africa—from the periphery of the digital economy to its commanding heights.

In the AI era, those commanding heights are no longer mines or oil fields.
They are data centres, algorithms, and digital infrastructure.

A Continental Imperative

Ghana’s move must not remain a national story.

It must become a continental turning point.

Because the reality is stark: if African countries do not build sovereign AI capabilities, they risk entering a new era of digital colonialism—one where decisions about African economies, societies, and governance are increasingly mediated by foreign-owned intelligent systems.

This is not alarmism. It is already happening.

From financial algorithms to content moderation systems, from credit scoring to predictive analytics, Africa is being modeled, interpreted, and influenced by systems it does not control.

Ghana’s strategy is therefore not just timely—it is necessary.

But it cannot stand alone.

From Strategy to Doctrine: The Role of MOBEX Africa

At MOBEX Africa, we view this moment as pivotal.

Our theme—“Resetting Africa’s Digital Identity and Sovereignty; From Promise to Practice”—was conceived around the recognition that Africa must move from digital participation to digital control.

The launch of Ghana’s AI Strategy validates that thesis.

But validation is not enough. What is required now is coordination, alignment, and execution at scale.

At the upcoming MOBEX Africa Tech Innovation Conference, we will:

• Interrogate national AI strategies and their readiness for implementation
• Convene policymakers, regulators, and industry leaders to define governance frameworks
• Showcase real-world applications of AI in public systems
• Advance the development of an Accra Declaration on AI Sovereignty

The Test Ahead

Commendation is deserved.

The leadership shown by President Mahama, Minister Sam George, and the Government of Ghana in taking this bold, forward-looking step must be acknowledged.

But strategy is only the beginning.

The real challenge lies ahead:

• Can Ghana build and sustain world-class AI infrastructure?
• Can it develop and retain the talent required to power it?
• Can it regulate effectively without stifling innovation?
• Can it bring the private sector along as a true partner?

These questions will determine whether this moment becomes a milestone—or a missed opportunity.

A Moment That Must Define a Generation

Africa stands at a crossroads.

One path leads to continued dependence—where the continent consumes technologies it neither owns nor controls.

The other leads to sovereignty—where Africa builds, governs, and benefits from its own intelligent systems.

Ghana has chosen the latter.

Now the task is to ensure that choice is not isolated, but replicated, scaled, and sustained across the continent.

Because in the age of artificial intelligence, sovereignty will not be declared in speeches.

It will be built in systems.

About the author

George Spencer Quaye is the founder and Chief Executive Officer of MOBEX Africa. He is a governance and digital transformation strategist, public policy commentator and board-level leader. He writes on leadership, political reform and Africa’s development trajectory. He’s currently serving as the Chairman of the Governing Board of the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority.

In this feature article, former Special Prosecutor Martin Amidu examines the constitutional challenge brought by one Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey against the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959), currently pending before Ghana’s Supreme Court. Amidu notes that the Attorney-General has filed a Statement of Case that substantially agrees with the plaintiff’s position that Sections 3(3) and 4 of Act 959 violate Articles 88, 93(2), and 296 of the 1992 Constitution. He criticizes CDD-Ghana Executive Director H. Kwasi Prempeh for attacking the Supreme Court’s unanimous ruling that refused the OSP’s application to join the case as a second defendant, arguing that the ruling was consistent with Article 88(5), which requires all civil proceedings against the State to be instituted against the Attorney-General. Amidu, the first to be appointed Special Prosecutor, identifies defects in both the plaintiff’s writ, noting that Sections 3(3) and 4 do not actually confer the powers the plaintiff claims, and the Attorney-General’s proposed case, which he describes as lacking neutrality and balance. He concludes that the relationship between the Special Prosecutor and the Attorney-General under the current government has broken down beyond repair, and the two cannot co-exist effectively in the fight against corruption.

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The constitutionality of the Office of the Special Prosecutor 2017 (ACT 959)

By Martin Amidu (Former Special Prosecutor)

Date: Saturday, 18 April 2026

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INTRODUCTION

One Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey has succeeded in raising the question of the constitutionality of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959) for interpretation and declaratory reliefs before the Supreme Court in an action he commenced against the Attorney-General on 8 December 2025. An earlier attempt by Mr. Ken Agyei Kuranchie in 2023 challenging the constitutionality of Act 959 was discontinued in July 2024 by the Supreme Court for lack of prosecution and without liberty to bring a further action against the Attorney-General.

The Defendant in the Adamtey action, the Attorney-General, failed to timely file a defence to the action as required by the Rules of the Supreme Court, despite the fact that the Deputy Attorney-General was the source of a leak of the fact that the Plaintiff had commenced the action against the constitutionality of Act 959. Exactly four months after the commencement of the action by the Plaintiff against the Republic of Ghana, with the Attorney-General as Defendant, the Defendant filed an application on 8 April 2026 in the Supreme Court praying for leave for extension of time to file the Statement of Case for the Defendant, fixed for hearing on 16 April 2026. The Statement of Case of the Defendant, as required by the Rules of the Supreme Court, was exhibited to the application for extension of time as “Exhibit AG1” and contains the Attorney-General’s case, which substantially agrees with the Plaintiff’s case. (The Court has since granted the extension of time.)

Between 8 December 2025, when the Plaintiff filed his action, and 8 April 2026, when the Defendant filed his application for extension of time, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) sought, by an application filed in the Supreme Court on 15 December 2025 and disposed of on 27 January 2026, to join the action as Second Defendant. The Supreme Court refused the joinder in a unanimous ruling, stating that:

“…We are of the view that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not a necessary party to the action and that this suit may be properly adjudicated upon without their presence as parties. This application for joinder is therefore refused.”

Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey’s action against the Attorney-General was known and available to the public and to anti-corruption civil society organisations since the case was filed in the Supreme Court on 8 December 2025. The Rules of the Supreme Court allow Interested Parties, who take the view that a constitutional action raises issues impacting them, to apply to join such action. There is no evidence that since the Plaintiff filed his action on 8 December 2025, any person or civil society organisation has applied to join the action as an Interested Party to make submissions contesting the Plaintiff’s case.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE REACTION TO DEFENDANT’S CASE

Nonetheless, immediately after the Defendant, the Attorney-General’s application for extension of time became public, the Executive Director of a civil society organisation called CDD-Ghana took to social media to attack the ruling of the Supreme Court delivered on 27 January 2026 for refusing to allow the OSP to join the action as Second Defendant.

The anti-corruption civil society organisations, which are organised under the umbrella of CDD-Ghana, have a stake in the existence of the OSP, as it impacts their ability to source donations from donors for their anti-corruption campaigns.

Mr. H. Kwasi Prempeh, the Executive Director of the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), who played a central role with President Akufo-Addo and his Attorney-General, Ms. Gloria Akuffo, in the drafting and submission of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Bill, 2017 to Parliament for enactment into law as Act 959, now blames the Supreme Court for complying with the mandatory terms of Article 88(5) of the Constitution in refusing the joinder application by the OSP. Article 88(5) of the 1992 Constitution states that “all civil proceedings against the State shall be instituted against the Attorney-General as defendant.” The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court dated 27 January 2026 refusing the OSP’s application for joinder is consistent with Article 88(5) of the Constitution.

In any case, the post facto condemnation of the ruling of the Supreme Court is premised on the false assumption that, despite the wording of Article 88(5) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s ruling endorsed any conduct of the Attorney-General that colludes with the substance of the Plaintiff’s action in the Statement of Case. Nothing under adversarial justice prevents a Defendant from admitting the case of the Plaintiff or part thereof, as the Attorney-General’s draft Statement of Case proposes, however unethical it may seem.

Mr. H. Kwasi Prempeh is not qualified to hold himself out as a person qualified to practise law in Ghana, let alone qualify for appointment to any court in Ghana, and should not behave as though he understands the constitutional law of Ghana and the rules of practice of the Supreme Court better than the Chief Justice and the four other Justices of the Supreme Court who refused the joinder application of the OSP. The fact that the Akufo-Addo Government, with whom he was associated, appointed him to the Law Reform Commission does not qualify him to speak as though he is a properly qualified legal practitioner in Ghana.

The proper course for any person or body of persons who disagree with the position taken by the Attorney-General on the action filed by the Plaintiff on 8 December 2025 challenging the constitutionality of Act 959 is to apply to the Supreme Court as Interested Parties and submit arguments as to why the provisions of Act 959 being challenged are constitutional.

DEFECTS OF THE PLAINTIFF’S WRIT AND CAUSE OF ACTION

On 8 December 2025, one Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey commenced an action in the Supreme Court of Ghana against the Attorney-General challenging the constitutionality of portions of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959). The Plaintiff sought eight reliefs. The main contention of the Plaintiff, discernible from the first five reliefs, is that Sections 3(3) and 4 of Act 959 are inconsistent with and contravene Articles 88, 93(2) and 296 of the 1992 Constitution and are accordingly void.

Article 88(3) and (4) delegates the executive authority and responsibility of the President under Article 58 of the Constitution to the Attorney-General for the initiation and conduct of all prosecutions of criminal offences. All criminal offences are to be prosecuted in the name of the Republic of Ghana at the suit of the Attorney-General or any other person authorised by him in accordance with any law.

The substance of the Plaintiff’s first five reliefs anchored on Section 3(3) of Act 959 states that:

“A declaration that Sections 3(3) and 4 of Act 959, in purporting to make the Office of the Special Prosecutor independent of the Attorney-General in the initiation, conduct, and termination of prosecutions, violates the Constitution.”

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The problem which any experienced and erudite constitutional advocate in the Supreme Court will immediately recognise is that Sections 3(3) and 4 of Act 959 do not confer upon the Special Prosecutor the powers the Plaintiff claims they do. Section 3 of Act 959 deals with the functions of the OSP and not the powers of the Special Prosecutor.

Section 4 of Act 959 deals with the mandate of the Office, and subsection (2) thereof subjects the powers of the Special Prosecutor to Article 88(4) of the Constitution and therefore cannot be said to be void. The Plaintiff also attempts in reliefs (a) and (b) to rely on Article 296 of the Constitution on discretionary power, as though it applies to prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney-General. However, experienced legal representation by an Interested Party may argue that prosecutorial discretion derives from the common law as part of the existing law under Article 11 of the Constitution, which restricts judicial interference in prosecutorial discretion.

The sixth relief appears contradictory, or at best alternative, when it seeks:

“A declaration that any statutory delegation of prosecutorial authority made pursuant to Act 959 does not bind subsequent Attorneys-General and lapses upon the assumption of office of a new Attorney-General unless re-authorised by that Attorney-General.”

This relief cannot co-exist with the first five reliefs and cannot properly constitute part of the same cause of action. The Plaintiff appears to concede that Act 959 is intra vires Article 88, except in relation to its effect on succeeding Attorneys-General.

DEFECTS OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S PROPOSED CASE

The draft Statement of Case of the Defendant exhibited to the application for extension of time filed on 8 April 2026 also contains contradictory submissions, misrepresentations of fact and law, which any experienced practitioner of constitutional law appearing as an Interested Party may bring to the attention of the Court.

The Attorney-General is at all times an officer of the Court, expected to assist in the administration of justice without fear or favour. One would therefore expect the Defendant’s Statement of Case to objectively and impartially address the implications of the nomination of the Special Prosecutor by the Attorney-General for appointment by the President, and its effect on prosecutorial powers under Act 959.

The Supreme Court may also be assisted by comparative reasoning, including the US Supreme Court decision in Morrison v Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), which upheld independent counsel provisions under the Ethics in Government Act.

CONCLUSION

This discourse should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the constitutionality of Act 959. I have previously indicated that I anticipated challenges to Act 959 during my tenure as Special Prosecutor, and I was not surprised when such challenges eventually arose.

The Attorney-General’s Statement of Case, as proposed, does not appear to present a neutral or balanced response capable of assisting the Supreme Court in resolving the constitutional issues fairly. Rather, it appears to substantially align with the Plaintiff’s case.

At the end of the day, the relationship between the Special Prosecutor and the Attorney-General under this Government appears to have broken down beyond repair. The Special Prosecutor and the Attorney-General, as presently constituted, cannot co-exist effectively in the fight against corruption.