Perspectives
Coup contagion? A rash of African power grabs suggests copycats are taking note of others’ success

Salah Ben Hammou, Rice University and Jonathan Powell, University of Kentucky
In a scene that has become familiar across parts of Africa of late, a group of armed men in military garb appeared on state TV on Dec. 7, 2025, to announce that they had suspended the constitution and seized control.
This time it was the West African nation of Benin, and the coup was relatively short-lived, with the government regaining full control a day later. But a week before, senior military officers in Guinea-Bissau had more success, deposing President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and effectively annulling the Nov. 23 election in which both Embaló and the main opposition leader had claimed victory. A month earlier it was Madagascar, where a mass Gen-Z uprising led to the elite CAPSAT unit of the Malagasy military ousting President Andry Rajoelina and installing Colonel Michael Randrianirina as leader.
The cluster of coup attempts follows a broader pattern. Since 2020, there have been 11 successful military takeovers in Africa: one each in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Sudan, Chad, Madagascar and Gabon; and two each in Burkina Faso and Mali. Benin represents the fifth failed coup over the same period.
The prevalence of military takeovers led United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres to warn as far back as 2021 of a coup “epidemic.”
But can coups, like the pathogens of many epidemics, be contagious? Certainly observers around the world continue to ask whether a military takeover in one country can influence the likelihood of another one happening elsewhere.
Do coups spread?
Cross-national research offers little firm evidence that a coup in one country directly increases the chances of another. And some scholars remain skeptical that such a phenomenon exists. Political scientist Naunihal Singh, for instance, argues that the recent wave’s coup plotters are drawing less from contemporary events than from their own countries’ long histories of military intervention.
In addition, he suggests that any observed regional cluster mostly reflects shared underlying conditions. For example, the countries across the Sahel region that have been the center of post-2020 African coups share a common set of coup-prone pressures: chronic insecurity driven by insurgencies, weak state capacity and widespread frustration over quality of governance.
Likewise, Michael Miller and colleagues at George Washington University, in a broader analysis, contend that would-be plotters pay closer attention to domestic dynamics than to foreign coups when deciding whether to move against their own governments.
As scholars of military coups, we recently explored the phenomenon and have come to a different conclusion.
Our forthcoming study argues that would-be plotters do indeed pay close attention when contemporaries seize power. A number of dynamics, however, could keep a statistical trend from being realized.
For one, statistical modeling typically requires contagion to occur within a tight temporal window, often 1 to 3 years.
Our findings challenge this approach. A wave of so-called “Free Officers” coups – military takeovers led by junior or mid-ranking nationalist officers, inspired by Egypt’s 1952 Free Officers movement – is a widely invoked example of contagion. The original Free Officers ousted King Farouk and went on to abolish the monarchy and end British influence in Egypt.
However, it took a full six years before a second “Free Officers” coup occurred in the region, in Iraq in 1958.

Rather than blindly follow the lead of Egypt’s coupists, would-be copycats watched closely, took notes and moved only when two factors lined up: the rewards appeared to be worth the risk, and they obtained the ability to make a takeover possible.
In the case of the post-1952 Middle East, the potential “rewards” of emulating Egypt’s Free Officers were not immediately apparent, even in countries with circumstances very similar to Egypt’s.
It wasn’t until the original Free Officers Movement’s leader, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, emerged as a revolutionary icon in the region that others attempted to emulate his success. Nasser’s status grew further through his anti-colonial sentiments and victories, like his handling of the Suez Crisis of 1956.
As Nasser’s influence grew, the perceived value of a military takeover increased, and Free Officers-inspired plots quickly proliferated against the region’s monarchies. Six years after the Egyptian coup, the first copycat coup succeeded in Iraq, followed by additional successes in Yemen, Libya and Sudan between 1962 and 1969.
A further complication to establishing a firm trend is that the success of one takeover may actually hinder the immediate progress of another. After all, would-be copycats are not the only observers.
Vulnerable leaders and their allies can take cues from coups in other countries to try to mitigate their spread at home.
Thwarted conspiracies in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which were uncovered between 1955 and 1969, demonstrated that while the sentiment to emulate Egypt’s coup was widespread, not all plotters had the capacity to act. Some governments were better prepared to block these attempts. Foreign partners like the United States and Great Britain also played no small role in helping shore up their monarchical allies against coup plots.
Africa’s coup wave
The case of the Free Officers Movement shows that plotters wait for clear signals that a coup is worth the risk. In Africa today, those signals are more immediate, even without a monumental figure like Egypt’s Nasser.
Coupists now see visible domestic support for military takeovers and muted international consequences for those who seize power.
It is increasingly clear to us that the region has seen a large increase in public support for military rule during this post-2020 wave.
Military coupists like Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traoré and Mali’s Assimi Goïta have not only attracted domestic support but also regional popularity, lauded for their anti-colonial rhetoric against France and their willingness to confront the Economic Community of West Africa States.
Data from Afrobarometer, which has regularly asked about respondents’ positions on having military rule, illustrate this shift clearly.
In the survey wave that ended in 2013, less than 11% of respondents in Benin said they supported or strongly supported army rule. This nearly doubled to 19% by 2021 and has now tripled, with 1 in 3 people in Benin expressing support for military rule. While a majority still opposes military rule, the direction of this change is significant.
These attitudes are reinforced by military leaders’ promises to “clean up” corrupt or ineffective governments. In Madagascar, for example, over 60% of citizens in 2024 said it was permissible for the armed forces to remove leaders who abuse power.
Highly visible images of cheering pro-military crowds in countries like Niger and Gabon further signal that a takeover can gain public support.
International indifference
The international signals are just as important. From the near-absent reaction to the Zimbabwean military’s removal of Robert Mugabe in 2017 to the lukewarm response to Chad’s military takeover in 2021, these cases suggest that international punishment can be temporary or even nonexistent.
The message is reinforced when coup leaders who are initially condemned, like Madagascar’s Randrianirina, later gain acceptance from regional organizations like the South African Development Community. In Guinea-Bissau, attention on last month’s coup has somehow seemed to focus more on President Embaló’s alleged involvement in the coup than on the military’s unconstitutional seizure of power.
And the lessons drawn from international responses involve more than just the seizure of power. Contemporary military leaders are staying in power much longer than their predecessors in the early 2000s, either by indefinitely delaying elections or by directly contesting them.
Although the African Union’s framework specifically forbids coup leaders from standing in elections, there has been virtually no consequences for coupists consolidating their rule via elections in places like Chad and Gabon.
This is not lost on would-be plotters, who see their contemporaries seize and legitimize their authority with minimal pushback.
To some degree, the spread of coups depends on how they are received. And in the case of the recent rash of military takeovers in Africa, the international community and domestic policymakers have done little in the way of stemming that spread.
Salah Ben Hammou, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Rice University and Jonathan Powell, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Commentary
Ghana’s Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Faces Legal Challenge Over Power to Prosecute
ACCRA, Ghana — A major legal battle is unfolding in Ghana that could reshape how the country fights corruption. At the center is the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), an independent body created to investigate and prosecute corruption cases.
A recent High Court ruling has cast doubt on the OSP’s ability to independently prosecute cases—prompting the agency to mount a swift legal challenge. For observers unfamiliar with Ghana’s legal system, the dispute raises fundamental questions about who has the authority to prosecute crimes and how anti-corruption institutions should operate.
What Triggered the Dispute?
The controversy stems from a ruling by the General Jurisdiction Division of the High Court in Accra. The court held that while the OSP can investigate corruption, it does not have constitutional authority to prosecute cases on its own.
Instead, the court said prosecutorial power lies exclusively with the Attorney-General’s Department, based on Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.
The case originated from a quo warranto application, a legal action questioning whether a public office is lawfully exercising its powers, filed by private citizen Peter Achibold Hyde.
What Is the OSP and Why Does It Matter?
The OSP was established under the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017, as part of Ghana’s efforts to strengthen its anti-corruption framework.
Its mandate includes:
- Investigating corruption and corruption-related offenses
- Prosecuting such cases
- Recovering proceeds of corruption
The agency was designed to operate independently of political influence, addressing long-standing concerns that corruption prosecutions could be hindered by executive control.
The Core Legal Question
At the heart of the dispute is a constitutional tension:
- The Constitution (Article 88) gives prosecutorial authority to the Attorney-General.
- The OSP Act (2017) appears to grant the OSP its own prosecutorial powers.
The High Court ruling effectively says: Parliament cannot override the Constitution through ordinary legislation.
This interpretation would mean the OSP can only prosecute cases if authorized by the Attorney-General.
How Did the OSP Respond?
The OSP has strongly rejected the ruling and announced plans to overturn it.
In its official response, the agency argued:
- The High Court lacks jurisdiction to declare parts of an Act of Parliament unconstitutional
- Only the Supreme Court of Ghana has the authority to make such determinations
- Its enabling law clearly provides for both investigative and prosecutorial powers
The OSP warned that allowing the ruling to stand could undermine ongoing corruption cases and weaken Ghana’s accountability systems.
The Attorney-General’s Position
Complicating matters, the Attorney-General’s office has taken a position that aligns—at least partly—with the High Court’s reasoning.
Government lawyers argue:
- Prosecutorial power belongs solely to the Attorney-General
- Parliament cannot transfer or dilute that power through legislation
- The OSP may require explicit authorization before prosecuting cases
They also contend that prosecutorial authority cannot be delegated to a “juridical person” (an institution like the OSP), only to individuals.
Why This Case Is Bigger Than One Agency
This dispute has far-reaching implications for Ghana’s governance and rule of law.
1. Anti-Corruption Efforts at Risk
If the OSP loses prosecutorial authority:
- Ongoing cases could be delayed or reassigned
- Investigations may lose momentum
- Public confidence in anti-corruption efforts could weaken
2. Constitutional Interpretation
The case raises a key legal question:
Can Parliament create independent prosecutorial bodies, or is that power constitutionally restricted?
3. Separation of Powers
The outcome will clarify the balance between:
- The executive branch (through the Attorney-General)
- Independent statutory bodies like the OSP
What Happens Next?
The legal battle is far from over.
There are now two parallel tracks:
- OSP’s challenge to the High Court ruling
- A separate case already before the Supreme Court, filed by Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey, seeking a definitive constitutional interpretation
Legal analysts expect the Supreme Court to ultimately deliver the final word.
Why Global Audiences Should Pay Attention
Ghana is often seen as one of West Africa’s more stable democracies, and its anti-corruption framework has been closely watched by international partners.
The outcome of this case could:
- Influence how other countries design independent anti-corruption bodies
- Shape international perceptions of Ghana’s governance
- Affect investor confidence tied to transparency and rule of law
The Bottom Line
The clash between the OSP and the Attorney-General is more than a legal technicality—it’s a defining moment for Ghana’s anti-corruption system.
At stake is a fundamental question:
Should an independent anti-corruption body have the power to prosecute on its own, or must that authority remain centralized under the state’s chief legal officer?
The answer, likely to come from the Supreme Court, will determine not just the future of the OSP—but the direction of Ghana’s fight against corruption.
Perspectives
Disputes over Africa’s ocean resources: here’s what could help avoid them
A new research study mapping over 1,000 marine conflicts across 34 African countries between 2008 and 2018 reveals that nearly 75% of disputes stem from competition over access to ocean resources like fisheries, fishing grounds, and landing sites. The findings show that conflicts often extend beyond fisheries to involve sectors such as oil drilling, tourism, and sand mining, with government officials implicated in the vast majority of cases. Importantly, less than one-third of these conflicts were resolved. The researchers argue that achieving an inclusive and sustainable “blue economy” in Africa requires fairer governance, consistent enforcement of rules, and greater inclusion of marginalized groups—such as small-scale fishers, women, and Indigenous communities—in decision-making processes to prevent and resolve disputes.
Disputes over Africa’s ocean resources: here’s what could help avoid them
Elizabeth Selig, Stanford University; Adelina Maria Mensah, University of Ghana; Mafaniso Hara, University of the Western Cape, and Moenieba Isaacs, University of the Western Cape
Over the last several decades, the oceans have become more crowded. Aquaculture, wind and wave energy, and oil and gas exploration are taking up more space. This growth threatens the health of ocean ecosystems and coastal communities’ access to food and livelihoods that they have relied on for centuries.
It can also lead to conflicts. We define conflicts as events where the differing goals of two or more groups lead to clashes over marine resources or places.
Conflicts can work against the goals of a blue economy: environmental sustainability and equity. A blue economy uses the oceans in ways that are fair to people, do not harm the environment, and make economic sense. By contrast, an ocean economy may prioritise only economic gain.
Several African countries have included blue economy expansion as part of their national or regional development policies. For example, the Africa Blue Economy Strategy outlines a vision for an “inclusive and sustainable blue economy that significantly contributes to Africa’s transformation and growth”.
To achieve that vision, the underlying issues that lead to conflicts must be addressed. The first step is to document where conflicts are occurring, who is involved, and the nature of the disputes.
We were part of a team of environmental and social scientists who mapped conflicts over ocean resources and places across 34 African countries using reports from newspapers, magazines and journals from 2008 to 2018. With these data and a survey of experts working in government, civil society organisations or academia, we also identified ways that marine conflicts have been resolved.
Our research identified more than 1,000 conflicts over the study period. The conflicts we found were mainly non-violent, verbal disagreements. These conflicts may draw less attention than physical fighting. However, they are still important because they disrupt how ocean resources are managed and who benefits from them.
Nearly 75% of conflicts were related to access to ocean resources such as fisheries or places like mangrove forests, fishing grounds, and landing sites where vessels can offload their catches.
Our findings demonstrate the value of fair interventions. They also show the importance of including groups and communities in decision-making processes that affect them.
Conflict narratives
We found that most conflicts involved at least two sectors (for example, fisheries and oil drilling or industrial fisheries and small-scale fisheries). More than a quarter were not related to fisheries, such as disputes between government officials and sand miners or hotel developers and local community organisations.
These results emphasise that conflicts often go far beyond fisheries. Projects related to the blue economy will increasingly require cooperation among different sectors on planning and management to avoid conflicts.
We also found that conflicts may differ depending on cultural context and regional dynamics. For example, in South Africa’s Saldanha Bay Municipality, home to a port and thriving fisheries sector on the west coast, conflicts emerged over aquaculture and port development. Marine park regulations also caused tensions by prioritising tourists over small-scale fishers. These tourism activities negatively affected small-scale fishers’ livelihoods by limiting their access to fishing grounds and landing sites.
Government decisions to allow seismic surveying also threatened to further damage the wellbeing, earnings and food security of fisher communities. (Sound waves emitted by seismic surveys can affect fish behaviour and cause them to move elsewhere.)
In Ghana, conflicts have often taken the form of persistent disputes between industrial and small-scale fishers over access to coastal waters. Fishers have also challenged government officials about whether halting fishing for periods is effective.
In Kenya, local authorities enforced national gear restrictions differently across neighbouring communities. These restrictions regulate what kinds of fishing equipment (like nets or spearguns) may be used. Lack of coordination and ineffective ways of handling disagreements led to conflicts between traditional leaders of neighbouring communities and county and national government authorities.
Moving beyond conflict
Our analysis found that there is room for improvement in settling the grievances that cause conflicts and prevent resolution. Less than a third of the conflicts we examined were resolved, which puts social equity and environmental sustainability at risk.
Several findings from our work point to actions that may help avert or settle conflicts.
Government officials, including governing bodies, enforcement agents and local or national politicians, were involved in the vast majority of conflicts we recorded. This pattern reflects the central roles they have in creating rules as well as enforcing them. Better practices that focus on inclusive processes for developing rules and consistent implementation of them are essential for managing conflicts.
Policymakers must assess how potential actions could affect a range of groups. People who are often marginalised – small-scale fishers, women and Indigenous communities – require more attention. For example, in South Africa, communities were able to document how proposed seismic activity would affect access to their fishing grounds. They then brought a court case in 2022 that prevented those activities from proceeding.
Although that conflict was resolved, the case demonstrates how small-scale fishers’ livelihoods are not always recognised in decision-making. This indifference threatens the equity central to a blue economy.
In parallel, efforts should concentrate on fair enforcement of existing rules to create greater accountability. These actions can build trust. For the conflicts we analysed, inadequate governance, such as failing to enforce rules or applying them unevenly, was commonly reported as both a direct and indirect cause of conflict.
However, conflicts can also lead to governance changes and governments can play constructive roles in conflict resolution. For example, Ghana’s 2025 Fisheries and Aquaculture Act doubles the area reserved exclusively for small-scale fishers. This new law may help ease tensions within the fisheries sector.
The experts we surveyed also highlighted that greater community engagement is critical to conflict resolution. In Kenya, conflicts were helped by group forums and dialogues that fostered agreements on which fishing gears to restrict and how to coordinate across communities.
Delivering on blue economy aspirations will likely require national and community-led efforts. A dual approach can help to establish more effective governance and engage an increasingly diverse set of people in resolving conflicts for the benefit of all of society.
Tim McClanahan co-authored this article.
Elizabeth Selig, Deputy Director, Center for Ocean Solutions, Stanford University; Adelina Maria Mensah, Snr Research Fellow, University of Ghana; Mafaniso Hara, Professor, University of the Western Cape, and Moenieba Isaacs, Professor, University of the Western Cape
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Commentary
Ghana’s credibility at stake in LGBTQ policy debate
In this opinion piece, Isaac Ofori argues that Ghana’s prolonged indecision on the proposed anti-LGBTQ legislation is damaging the nation’s credibility. He critiques the politicization of the issue—from campaign promises by President Mahama to the current administration’s claim that it is not a priority—and warns that this policy vacuum fuels social tension and misinformation. Ofori calls for leadership that provides constitutional clarity rather than ambiguity, balancing majority values with human rights obligations to preserve Ghana’s reputation as a stable democracy.
Ghana’s credibility at stake in LGBTQ policy debate
By Isaac Ofori (Tutor at Winneba Senior High School)
The ongoing national debate over the proposed anti-LGBTQ legislation has uncovered a deeper challenge within Ghana’s governance system: the difficulty of balancing constitutional principles, political convenience, and societal values during times of intense public pressure.
What should have been a structured legislative process has turned into a prolonged cycle of political battles, judicial actions, and shifting signals from the executive branch.
This pattern raises an important question for public policy: can Ghana sustain credibility both at home and abroad without a clear, principled, and consistent stance on such a critical issue?
At the heart of the controversy is the procedural deadlock that arose before the bill could be signed into law by former President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo. The referral of the issue to the Supreme Court of Ghana added a constitutional layer that, although necessary, effectively delayed executive action.
In a constitutional democracy, such caution is neither a sign of weakness nor avoidance; it reflects fidelity to the rule of law. However, Ghana’s Parliament’s failure to navigate this situation decisively has created a policy vacuum, which continues to fuel public frustration.
What followed was the politicization of the issue, arguably undermining both policy integrity and public discourse. The opposition at the time, led by the National Democratic Congress (NDC), made the matter a central campaign theme.
Statements and rhetoric from key figures, including then-candidate and now-President John Dramani Mahama, heightened public expectations that a clear legal position would be established. Religious institutions, reflecting prevailing societal values, reinforced this momentum, turning a legislative proposal into a moral referendum.
However, governance, unlike campaigning, requires coherence, consistency, and accountability. The apparent shift in urgency by the current administration, particularly the claim that the LGBTQ issue is not a national priority, indicates a disconnect between campaign promises and actual leadership.
Such ambiguity risks damaging public trust. More importantly, it leaves all stakeholders, religious organizations, civil society, and the LGBTQ community in a state of uncertainty.
From a policy perspective, ambiguity is costly. For supporters of the bill, the lack of clear action indicates hesitation or political caution. For critics, including international human rights groups, it reinforces perceptions of inconsistency and a selective commitment to rights-based governance.
Ghana’s long-standing reputation as a stable democracy rooted in the rule of law is best preserved not through silence but through clarity grounded in constitutional principles.
Recognizing how the framing of this debate has sometimes contributed to increased social tensions is also crucial. Political messaging during elections arguably heightened fears and solidified public opinion, making responsible policymaking more difficult. When political leaders use sensitive social issues for electoral advantage, they have a duty to handle the consequences with equal seriousness once in office.
The path forward needs leadership that rises above partisan interests. If the current administration takes a firm stance, it should communicate it openly and act within the constraints of the Constitution.
However, if the issue remains contested within the executive branch, a broader national conversation grounded in law, human rights commitments, and Ghanaian cultural values becomes crucial. What cannot continue is a policy void that allows speculation, misinformation, and social hostility to flourish.
Ultimately, leadership’s role is not just to mirror public opinion but to guide it responsibly. Issues related to rights, identity, and law require a careful balance between majority values and constitutional safeguards.
Ghana cannot afford prolonged indecision on a matter that lies at the intersection of domestic unity and international oversight. This moment demands clarity, not as a political tactic but as a constitutional duty.
This article was first published on GhanaWeb on April 1, 2026
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