Perspectives
Sudan’s civil war: A visual guide to the brutal conflict
Christopher Tounsel of University of Washington discusses the brutal Sudan civil war that has been raging for over two and a half years as of December 2025.

Author: Christopher Tounsel, University of Washington
Sudan’s brutal civil war has dragged on for more than 2½ years, displacing millions and killing in excess of 150,000 people – making it among the most deadly conflicts in the world today.
As of December 2025, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces appear to be making gains, seizing a key oil field in central Sudan and forcing the retreat of the Sudanese Armed Forces in key cities in the country’s west.
But fighting has ebbed and flowed throughout the war, with parts of the country changing hands a number of times. It has left a complicated picture of a nation mired in violence. Here’s a visual guide to help understand what is going on and the toll it has taken on the Sudanese population.
What military forces are involved?
The two main warring parties are the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The SAF is the nation’s official military. Prior to the civil war, it was responsible with enforcing the border, protecting the country from foreign entities and maintaining internal security. As of April 2023, the SAF had an estimated force of up to 200,000 people.

The paramilitary RSF is a semi-autonomous organization that was created in 2013 to confront rebel groups. Its origins lie in the feared Janjaweed militia that gained international notoriety for its scorched-earth tactics, extrajudicial killings and sexual assaults during a campaign in Darfur between 2003 and 2005.
Rebranding as the RSF, the paramilitary force evolved to become President Omar al-Bashir’s personal security force before al-Bashir’s ouster in 2019.
After that, the RSF and the SAF worked together to stage a 2021 coup against Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok in 2021. But a power struggle emerged between the leaders of the RSF and SAF amid disagreements over the future direction of the country and whether the RSF would be incorporated into the army.
By the outbreak of the civil war in 2023, the RSF had amassed around 100,000 troops.
Various other armed groups have lent their support to the RSF and SAF during the conflict, including the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, which supports the RSF, and the army-aligned Justice and Equality Movement
Who are the main leaders?

The SAF is led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the nation’s top military commander and de facto head of state. The longtime soldier rose to the rank of regional commander in 2008 and was promoted a decade later to the position of army chief of staff.
Following Bashir’s 2019 ouster, Burhan was appointed to lead the Transitional Military Council and its successor civilian-military entity known as the Sovereign Council. As leader of the Sovereign Council, Burhan occupied the nation’s highest office.
His reputation has been marred by his own military’s attacks on civilians in Darfur in the early 2000s and, more recently, his reliance on support from Islamist groups.

The RSF leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as “Hemedti,” was Burhan’s second-in-command.
Born to a poor family that settled in Darfur, Hemedti was part of the Janjaweed militia that President Bashir deployed to crush non-Arab resistance in the country’s west. Becoming leader of the Janjaweed before going on to head the RSF, Hemedti acquired a reputation as a ruthless commander whose brutal methods disturbed some fellow officers.
Where are the weapons, funding coming from?

While the fighting has largely been contained to within Sudan’s boundaries, it is being fueled from outside the country.
Amnesty International has reported that despite a decades-old arms embargo by the United Nations Security Council, recently manufactured weapons and equipment from China, Russia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates have been used by both sides in the conflict.
The Sudanese government has accused the UAE of providing military assistance to the RSF, which in turn has been accused of using the UAE for illegal gold trafficking.
In addition to providing military assistance, the UAE has been accused of providing economic support for the RSF. In January 2025, the Biden administration sanctioned seven UAE-based companies funding Hemedti.
Saudi Arabia, which sees Sudan as an ally to counter Iran’s regional influence, has provided financial support to the SAF. In October 2025, the SAF-backed government announced that Saudi Arabia planned to invest an additional US$50 billion into Sudan, on top of the $35 billion it has already invested.
Egypt, allied with Burhan in a dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, has supplied the SAF with warplanes and pilots.
Meanwhile, Iran and Russia have each extended support for the Sudanese government. It is believed that Iran, which renewed diplomatic ties with Sudan in October 2023, has provided the SAF with attack drones, while Russia has provided Sudan’s government with diplomatic and military support.
What areas are controlled by whom?
As of December 2025, the RSF and SAF control different halves of the country split along a roughly north-south axis. The SAF controls a little more than half of the country.
The SAF has a stronghold in the nation’s capital Khartoum. In the east, the army controls the city of Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast. The SAF also controls approximately three-quarters of the Sudanese border with Egypt to the north.
Strategically, the areas under SAF control provide the advantages of access to the Red Sea – a crucial transport hub through which 12% of the world’s maritime trade passes – as well as the historic demographic and administrative epicenter of Khartoum, situated at the confluence of the Blue and White Niles, and the livestock-rich Kassala state.
In all, Sudanese researcher Jihad Mashamoun estimates that as of November 2025, the SAF controlled 60% of the country.
Meanwhile, the RSF has consolidated control over Darfur – the massive western region that has been a hub for gold mining and trafficking routes – and the regional capital of el-Fasher, an economic hub connecting routes to Libya to the north, the Nile to the east and Chad to the west.
As researcher Bravin Onditi has noted, el-Fasher’s fall to the RSF in late October eliminated the SAF’s last stronghold in Darfur from which it could assert authority in western Sudan.
Outside of Darfur, the RSF controls most the country’s oil fields, many of the goldfields in central and southwest Sudan, and splits control over important grazing lands with the SAF.
What has been the toll on Sudan’s citizens?
One of the war’s distinguishing horrors has been repeated incidents of civilian killings.
Both sides have been accused of war crimes that include targeted attacks on civilians, medical centers and food systems. Mass killings in Khartoum, Darfur, Kordofan, Gezira, Sennar and White Nile states reflect the general scope of slaughter that has swept the country.
In some instances, this violence has taken on a decidedly ethnic dimension. Human Rights Watch reports that from late April to early November 2023, the RSF and its allied militias systematically sought to remove — including by murder — ethnic Masalit people from El Geneina, capital of West Darfur.
In October 2025, following the RAF’s siege of el-Fasher, the world watched in horror as satellite images of “clusters” consistent with bodies and blood-red discoloration could be seen on the ground. The U.N. Security Council held an emergency meeting condemning the RSF’s killing of nearly 500 people in el-Fasher’s Saudi Maternity Hospital.
More than 9.5 million people are classified as internally displaced, having fled violence. The International Organization for Migration reports that North and South Darfur states host the largest number of internally displaced people, followed by Central and East Darfur states.
Meanwhile, over 4 million have fled to the neighboring countries of Egypt, South Sudan and Chad.
Image sources:
FD-63 – Dağlıoğlu Silah, Saiga MK .223, Kalashnikov Group, Tigr DMR, Kalashnikov Group, M05E1, Zastava Arms, PP87 82MM mortar bomb, Amnesty International, CKJ-G7 drone jammer, Amnesty International, Streit Gladiator, Streit Group, Terrier LT-79, Streit Group, INKAS Titan-S, INKAS Armored Vehicles
Christopher Tounsel, Associate Professor of History, University of Washington
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Opinion
The Sahel is Burning, and West Africa Cannot Look Away
JNIM now strikes at capitals and governs territory, and the bet that Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger placed on Russia as their sole security guarantor has failed. Analyst and researcher Joseph McCarthy writes that the fire will not stop at the Sahel’s borders, and Ghana stands directly in its path.
The Sahel is Burning, and West Africa Cannot Look Away
By Joseph McCarthy
At dawn on 18 June 2026, fighters stormed Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey, the most heavily guarded site in Niger’s capital. It is not merely an airport. The complex houses the air force, most of the country’s drones, the headquarters of the Alliance of Sahel States’ joint force, the Russian personnel meant to help crush the insurgency, and even uranium stocks the state hopes to sell. JNIM claimed the assault, which killed eleven soldiers and two civilians. It was the second strike on that complex this year; the Islamic State’s Sahel Province claimed a January raid. Both of the region’s jihadist franchises have now breached the defences of a capital. This was not just another attack. It was a strategic signal.
It was also no act of opportunism. Hitting a fortified installation in a capital demands months of surveillance, intelligence on shift changes, the logistics to move fighters and weapons over long distances, and the ability to slip past layered security. It implies networks operating close to, or inside, the capital itself. As the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project noted, the Sahel’s insurgents have moved from localised rural fighting to coordinated strikes on vital national infrastructure. The pattern is everywhere. In Mali, JNIM has throttled Bamako with a fuel blockade since September 2025, destroying hundreds of tankers; in April, it overran the garrison town of Kati and killed the defence minister in his own home; it has since placed a bounty of two million euros on the head of Mali’s junta leader, Assimi Goïta.
More troubling than the firepower is the governance. A Reuters investigation found that JNIM now arbitrates land disputes, collects taxes, enforces rules and imposes a rough order in territories the state has vacated. Forged from the merger of four groups, it increasingly presents itself not as a militia but as an alternative authority, building legitimacy among populations long neglected by distant governments. History is unkind here: from Afghanistan to Somalia, insurgencies that learn to govern outlast those that only fight. The contest is no longer simply about defeating armed men. It is about whether the state, rather than an armed movement, remains the most credible source of authority, justice and security.
Against all this, the juntas made a bet. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled Western forces, walked out of ECOWAS, and rebuilt their security around a single guarantor: Russia, first through the Wagner Group, then the Africa Corps. On 26 June, Burkina Faso severed diplomatic relations with France entirely, accusing Paris of backing the very terrorists it claims to fight, an allegation offered without evidence and flatly rejected. Niger’s government, for its part, blamed the Niamey attack on mercenaries funded by President Macron, again without proof. The promise was straightforward: sovereignty restored, foreign influence reduced, terrorism defeated. Judged by the junta’s own promise, the bet has failed. The violence has not receded. It has spread.
This should not be read as a uniquely Russian failure. It exposes the limits of any strategy built around a single external guarantor. No partner, whether Russia, France or the United States, can resolve a conflict rooted in governance failure, economic exclusion, local grievance and hollow institutions. Force can kill fighters. It cannot rebuild public trust, settle a quarrel between communities, open a clinic or create a job for an idle young man, and those are the very conditions the insurgents harvest for recruits. Russia carries constraints of its own: bogged down in Ukraine, its resources finite, it was outfought alongside Malian troops at Kidal even after reportedly receiving a warning of the assault. A security architecture resting on a single distracted partner does not reduce risk; it concentrates it, and when that partner underdelivers, there is no second line. The 2026 Global Terrorism Index now names the Sahel the global epicentre of terrorism, the source of more than half the world’s terrorism deaths and one in five of its attacks.
None of this stays in the Sahel. Ghana shares roughly 550 kilometres of frontier with Burkina Faso, much of it porous and threaded with informal crossings used daily by traders and herders. Southward expansion rarely begins with a spectacular attack. It begins quietly: a recruiter, a supply route, a financing cell, fighters embedding in border communities long before a shot is fired. That is precisely how the contagion crossed from Mali into Burkina Faso and Niger, and how it has already reached Benin and Togo, with Côte d’Ivoire and northern Ghana plainly exposed. Alongside the fighters’ travels, something almost as corrosive: a flood of assault rifles, explosives and military hardware that does not stop at extremist hands but arms robbers, traffickers and illegal mining syndicates, hollowing out a country’s security long before any jihadist banner appears.
The wider world has its own reasons to watch. Niger holds some of the planet’s richest uranium. A jihadist proto-state straddling West Africa would command migration routes toward the coast and the Mediterranean, strain fragile coastal economies, disrupt trade corridors and rattle investor confidence. At the same time, every successful strike on a capital broadcasts a template to armed groups from Nigeria to Mozambique. What looks today like a regional security crisis could become an international one. A region generating one in five of the world’s militant attacks is not a distant problem. It is a lit fuse.
Africa has paid before for believing that outside powers can guarantee its security. They cannot. Partners can offer intelligence, training and equipment; they cannot substitute for legitimate governance and functioning institutions. This crisis will be settled not only on the battlefield but in courtrooms, classrooms, local councils and marketplaces, where citizens decide whether the state or an armed movement better delivers justice and opportunity. For Ghana, the task is preventive, not reactive: intelligence cooperation, stronger borders, regional collaboration, community resilience and investment in local governance, all of it far cheaper than containment once the violence has taken root. And for the Sahel’s rulers, there is a harder truth.
Sovereignty that trades several partners for total dependence on one distant and overstretched power is not sovereignty; it is a fresh vulnerability dressed in the language of liberation. The question is no longer whether the crisis will spread beyond Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It already has. The only question left is whether West Africa acts before the Sahel becomes the world’s next strategic emergency.
Joseph McCarthy is an analyst and researcher specialising in governance, security, and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, development, and African diplomacy. Email: joecarthy30@gmail.com
Perspectives
From Crossroads to Counter‑Offensive | Colonel Festus Aboagye (Retired) Discusses Ghana’s Anti-Narcotics Posture
Ghana’s 2026 World Drug Day commemoration marks a decisive turning point in the nation’s long struggle against narcotics trafficking, signaling a shift from reactive interdiction to an assertive, intelligence‑led posture that is already yielding tangible results. Yet, as a new policy brief by Colonel Festus Aboagye (Retired) makes clear, the strategic contest over governance integrity remains unresolved.
Twelve months after the Crossroads Republic paper rated Ghana’s narco‑state risk at 2.7 out of 5 — moderate but escalating — the country has made measurable progress. The Narcotics Control Commission (NACOC) has expanded from fewer than 10 district commands to 77 across all 16 regions; arrests, prosecutions and seizures are up sharply; and a special narcotics court and enhanced prosecutorial powers — both recommendations from 2025 — are now in place. But the threat has evolved in parallel: methamphetamine concealed in charcoal shipments, synthetic and new psychoactive substances, cyber‑enabled trafficking, a 7% drug‑test failure rate among security‑service applicants, and localised consumption hotspots (73.5% lifetime use in Madina) all point to a challenge that is far from contained.
The reform most central to averting state capture — political‑party‑campaign‑finance transparency — has gone unaddressed. Though Ghana may be winning tactical battles, the strategic contest over the integrity of governance remains open.
Read the full 20‑page policy brief, “From Crossroads to Counter‑Offensive”, by Colonel Festus Aboagye (Retired):
Share, discuss, and join the conversation on sustaining Ghana’s resilience against the evolving narcotics threat.
#WorldDrugDay #PolicyBrief #Governance #Resilience #Ghana #NarcoTrafficking #StateCapture
Commentary
Reflections on Ghana And the Future it Deserves | By Simone Giger, Swiss Ambassador to Ghana
As her diplomatic tenure in West Africa draws to a close, Swiss Ambassador Simone Giger pens a reflective and heartfelt tribute to Ghana’s enduring national character. Having traveled extensively across the country—from Paga to Keta and Wa to Goaso—she offers an intimate, human-centered assessment of a nation defined by its resilient democratic culture, youthful ambition, and an infectious “vibe” that fosters cohesion. In this candid farewell, Ambassador Giger explores the complex challenges threatening Ghana’s ecological treasures and argues that sustained institutional reform, rather than outside invention, is the key to unlocking the prosperous future the country so clearly deserves.
Travelling through northern Ghana, this author once stopped in a small community after a long journey. Despite the day’s heat and the demands of daily life, residents welcomed visitors with warm smiles, easy laughter and an eagerness to share stories about their hopes for the future.
It was a simple encounter, yet it captured something profoundly Ghanaian: an enduring optimism that persists even in difficult circumstances.
In diplomacy, countries are often assessed through official meetings, economic indicators and policy documents. Yet to truly understand a nation, one must travel through it, listen to its people, appreciate its strengths, observe its contradictions and understand the aspirations that shape everyday life.
As the end of a diplomatic assignment in Ghana approaches, this author finds reason to reflect deeply on a country that has left a lasting impression, not only professionally but personally.
Over the past four years, extensive travels across Ghana—from Paga to Keta, Damongo to Donkokrom, and Wa to Goaso—have revealed a country of extraordinary diversity, complexity, creativity and resilience.
Every journey has unveiled a different dimension of Ghana. Yet one common thread consistently emerges: a nation brimming with potential.
There is something profoundly remarkable about Ghana and its national character, what many Ghanaians simply describe as the country’s “vibe”.
It is evident in the warmth extended to strangers, the humour with which difficulties are confronted and the optimism that endures even during periods of uncertainty.
Even in challenging moments, there is often a joke, a proverb or a story that helps place events in perspective.
In this author’s view, that national character has become one of the essential ingredients behind Ghana’s democratic success.
At a time when democratic systems around the world are facing increasing pressure, polarisation and distrust, Ghana continues to distinguish itself through its commitment to dialogue, constitutional order and peaceful coexistence.
Democracy here is not perfect. No democracy truly is, including Switzerland’s.
What matters is that it remains alive, active and deeply valued by citizens.
Over the years, Ghana has established itself as an important democratic reference point in West Africa.
The country has repeatedly demonstrated that political competition can coexist with stability, that transfers of power can occur peacefully and that national debates can take place within institutional frameworks rather than outside them.
Such achievements should never be taken for granted.
Democracy is not sustained by elections alone.
It requires strong institutions, active citizens, credible public discourse and a continuous willingness to negotiate consensus across political, ethnic, religious and generational lines.
One can observe that Ghana’s diversity presents both opportunities and challenges. Yet this author has often admired the manner in which the country continues to navigate these varied interests while preserving national cohesion.
In many respects, this is where Ghana’s democratic future becomes particularly important.
The country possesses extraordinary human capital.
Wherever this author travelled, young people displayed ambition, intelligence, creativity and determination.
Ghana’s greatest resource is not found beneath the ground.
It resides in its people, their ideas and their aspirations.
Ideas and aspirations, however, require systems that function effectively if they are to translate into meaningful and productive outcomes.
When institutions are transparent, responsive, accountable and trusted, they unlock innovation, investment and opportunity.
When they are weak or inconsistent, they risk frustrating the very energy capable of propelling a nation forward.
This is why governance reforms remain so important to Ghana’s long-term trajectory.
One development that particularly impressed this author during the diplomatic assignment has been Ghana’s constitutional review process.
What stands out is not only the process itself, but also the spirit behind it – a willingness to reflect critically on how democratic governance can evolve to meet contemporary realities and future expectations.
This demonstrates political maturity.
Constitutions should never be viewed as static documents frozen in time.
Strong democracies periodically examine whether their systems remain responsive, inclusive and effective.
Ghana’s consultative approach reflects a country seeking not merely to preserve democracy, but to improve it.
Switzerland is proud to support these home-grown efforts and remains committed to supporting the constitutional reform process until its hoped-for successful conclusion.
History demonstrates that democratic stability does not emerge automatically.
It requires deliberate investment in participation, inclusion and dialogue.
Swiss democracy itself evolved gradually through compromise, negotiation and the understanding that national cohesion is strengthened when citizens feel ownership over public decisions.
One can observe important similarities between Ghana and Switzerland.
Both countries are diverse societies that have chosen coexistence over division.
Both understand that stability is strongest when different voices are heard and accommodated.
Both appreciate the importance of consensus-building in national life.
This shared philosophy has shaped bilateral cooperation over many decades.
Today, the partnership continues to evolve in both breadth and depth.
Switzerland currently supports initiatives focused on democratic governance, parliamentary cooperation, decentralisation, peace and security, cultural exchange, environmental integrity, climate adaptation and economic development.
Switzerland and Ghana may differ in geography, history and scale, yet both countries share a belief in dialogue and cooperation as foundations for national progress.
Despite Ghana’s bright prospects, one cannot ignore the challenges confronting the country.
No nation can fully realise its potential without confronting difficult issues directly.
During the years spent in Ghana, citizens from various walks of life spoke openly about concerns surrounding institutional effectiveness, economic opportunity, environmental degradation and governance accountability.
Such conversations reflected not pessimism, but a desire to see the country fulfil its promise.
Particularly concerning is the destruction caused by illegal mining activities.
Ghana’s rivers, forests and landscapes are among its greatest treasures.
Environmental degradation is not merely an ecological issue.
It is fundamentally a matter of intergenerational responsibility.
Future prosperity depends on preserving the natural foundation upon which communities, livelihoods and national identity are built.
Yet despite these challenges, this author remains deeply optimistic about Ghana’s future.
That optimism stems not from idealism but from observation.
The future of democracy globally will not be shaped only by geopolitical actors or large states.
Medium-sized countries such as Switzerland and Ghana also have important roles to play.
They can demonstrate that democratic resilience, peaceful coexistence and institutional reform remain both possible and necessary.
As this diplomatic assignment draws to a close, there is profound gratitude for the opportunity to have lived and worked in Ghana.
Over the years, this author has come to admire the country not only for its democratic achievements, but also for its humanity – its warmth, creativity, humour and enduring sense of possibility.
The task ahead is not to invent Ghana’s future.
Rather, it is to create the institutional conditions necessary for that future to emerge fully.
From all that has been observed across the country, there is every reason to believe that Ghana can achieve precisely that.
The author, Simone Giger, is the Swiss Ambassador to Ghana, Togo and Benin
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