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Apongo was a rebel leader in Jamaica – a diary entry sheds light on his west African origins

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In this article, Devin Leigh of University of California, Berkeley sheds light on a newly highlighted diary entry from the 18th century that offers rare insight into the life and origins of Apongo, a key rebel leader in one of the Caribbean’s most significant insurrections against British colonial rule.

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For over three centuries, between 1526 and 1866, at least 10.5 million Africans were forcibly trafficked to the Americas in the transatlantic slave trade. Over half of them (with known places of departure) left from a 3,000km stretch of the west African coast between what are today Senegal and Gabon.

Scholars trying to uncover the lives of these diasporic Africans are forced to work with historical records produced by their European and American enslavers. These writers mostly ignored Africans’ individual identities. They gave them western names and wrote about them as products belonging to a set of supposedly distinct “ethnic” brands.

Now, however, the curious biography of an 18th-century Jamaican rebel confounds this inherited language. The rebel in question is Apongo, also known as Wager. His biography is a 134-word handwritten passage in the diary of an 18th-century enslaver named Thomas Thistlewood.

As a historian of the Atlantic World in the 1700s, I use the life stories and archives of British enslavers to better understand these times.

My recent study uses Thistlewood’s biography of Apongo as a window into the origins of enslaved west Africans, particularly those from what are today the nations of Ghana and Benin.

Apongo’s story offers an opportunity to better understand the complexities of west African identity and to put a more human face on those enslaved.

Who was Apongo, aka Wager?

Like many enslaved Africans, Apongo had two names. Unfortunately, neither of them completely unlocks his backstory. “Apongo” is probably the rendering of his African name into English script according to how it sounded to his enslavers’ ears. “Wager” is a name Apongo was given by his white “master”. It had nothing to do with his African origins. In fact, it was the name of his enslaver’s ship.

Thistlewood was an English migrant to Jamaica who thought of himself as a gentleman scholar. According to one of his diary entries, Apongo led an extraordinary life defined by twists of fate. He was the prince of a west African state that paid tribute to a larger kingdom called “Dorme”. After subjugating the peoples around him, the king of Dorme seems to have sent Apongo on a diplomatic mission to Cape Coast Castle in what is today Ghana. At the time it was the headquarters of Great Britain’s trading operations on the African coast.

While there, Apongo was apparently surprised, enslaved, and trafficked to Jamaica. At the time, Jamaica was the British Empire’s most profitable colony. This was due to its sugar plantation complex based on racial slavery.

Once in Jamaica, Apongo reunited with the governor he had visited at Cape Coast. He tried to obtain his freedom but, after failing for a number of years, led and died in an uprising called Tacky’s Revolt.

Unfolding over 18 months from 1760 and named after another one of its leaders, Tacky’s Revolt left 60 Whites and over 500 Blacks dead. Another 500 Blacks were deported from the island. It was arguably the largest slave insurrection in the British Empire before the 19th century.

The mystery in the diary

To appreciate why Thistlewood’s diary entry is so valuable, we must know something about the lack of biographical information on enslaved Africans. Almost all came from societies with oral rather than literary traditions. They were then almost universally prohibited from learning to read and write by their European and American “masters”.

Enslavers almost never recorded enslaved people’s birth names. Instead, they gave them numbers for the transatlantic passage and westernised names after they arrived. Rather than recording the specific places they came from, they lumped them together into groups based on broad zones of provenance. For example, the British tended to call Africans who came from today’s Ghana “Coromatees”. Those from today’s Republic of Benin were known as “Popo”. So, despite being just one paragraph long, Thistlewood’s diary entry on Apongo is among the most detailed biographical sketches historians have of a diasporic African in the 1700s.

But it also contains a mystery. The word Thistlewood used to describe Apongo’s origins, “Dorme” or perhaps “Dome”, is unfamiliar. Since 1989, when historian Douglas Hall first wrote about Apongo, scholars have assumed it was a reference to Dahomey. This was a militarised west African kingdom in the southern part of today’s Benin.

Yet scholars never defended that assumption. Recently, it was called into question by historian Vincent Brown in Tacky’s Revolt, the first book-length study of the slave uprising Apongo helped lead. Enslaved people from what is today Ghana have a well-documented history of leading slave revolts in the Americas, particularly in British Jamaica. Brown suggested that it made more sense if “Dorme” referred to an unidentified state in that region.

Now, in my study, I have built on this work to make two related arguments. Uncovering three contemporary texts that use variant spellings of the word “Dorme” to refer to Dahomey, I argue that Thistlewood’s term was, indeed, a contemporary word for “Dahomey” in 18th-century Jamaica and that Dahomey was almost certainly the kingdom he had in mind. Moreover, I demonstrate that it was both possible and reasonable for a diplomatic mission to have taken place between Dahomey and Cape Coast in Apongo’s time. In fact, such a mission actually did take place in 1779, when King Kpengla of Dahomey sent one of his linguists to Cape Coast as an emissary.

But none of this resolves the central question. The evidence of “Coromantee” involvement in Tacky’s Revolt and other Jamaican slave rebellions – including the presence of Ghanaian names among rebels and the statements of historians at the time – is overwhelming. Additionally, although Africans from Dahomey made the trip to Cape Coast Castle during the 18th century, visitors from states in today’s Ghana were certainly much more common.

Ultimately, to argue that Apongo had origins in Dahomey, one must explain how a subject of that kingdom came to be a general in a rebellion largely characterised by Ghanaian leadership.

A question of origins

What are we to make of Apongo’s origins? One answer is that Thistlewood was wrong. Apongo was “Coromantee” and we should think of him as Ghanaian. Thistlewood merely associated him with Dahomey because that was the militarised African kingdom best known to Europeans at the time.

Another possibility is that Thistlewood was correct. Apongo was “Popo” and so we should write about him as Beninese. Thistlewood simply relayed a fact of Apongo’s life and was unconcerned with questions that now preoccupy us, such as how Apongo came to lead a rebellion that appears characterised by “Coromantee” leadership.

A third answer is that Apongo’s identity was more complex than this inherited “ethnic” language allows. Perhaps he was someone who traversed and was fluent in the cultural and political worlds of both Ghana and Benin. If that’s the case, then perhaps his story reminds us that at least these two adjacent regions were not as distinct as early-modern writers claimed and later colonial and national borders supposed.

The search for Apongo is just a small part of historians’ larger, ongoing, and collaborative work to recreate the lives of Africans taken in the transatlantic slave trade.

While asking these questions requires us to work with sources written by enslavers, we do so in the hope that we can ultimately see beyond them. Our reward is better understanding how Africans’ forgotten perspectives shaped the history of our world.

Devin Leigh, Lecturer, Global Studies, University of California, Berkeley

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Commentary

Ghana’s Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Faces Legal Challenge Over Power to Prosecute

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ACCRA, Ghana — A major legal battle is unfolding in Ghana that could reshape how the country fights corruption. At the center is the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), an independent body created to investigate and prosecute corruption cases.

A recent High Court ruling has cast doubt on the OSP’s ability to independently prosecute cases—prompting the agency to mount a swift legal challenge. For observers unfamiliar with Ghana’s legal system, the dispute raises fundamental questions about who has the authority to prosecute crimes and how anti-corruption institutions should operate.

What Triggered the Dispute?

The controversy stems from a ruling by the General Jurisdiction Division of the High Court in Accra. The court held that while the OSP can investigate corruption, it does not have constitutional authority to prosecute cases on its own.

Instead, the court said prosecutorial power lies exclusively with the Attorney-General’s Department, based on Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

The case originated from a quo warranto application, a legal action questioning whether a public office is lawfully exercising its powers, filed by private citizen Peter Achibold Hyde.

What Is the OSP and Why Does It Matter?

The OSP was established under the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017, as part of Ghana’s efforts to strengthen its anti-corruption framework.

Its mandate includes:

  • Investigating corruption and corruption-related offenses
  • Prosecuting such cases
  • Recovering proceeds of corruption

The agency was designed to operate independently of political influence, addressing long-standing concerns that corruption prosecutions could be hindered by executive control.

The Core Legal Question

At the heart of the dispute is a constitutional tension:

  • The Constitution (Article 88) gives prosecutorial authority to the Attorney-General.
  • The OSP Act (2017) appears to grant the OSP its own prosecutorial powers.

The High Court ruling effectively says: Parliament cannot override the Constitution through ordinary legislation.

This interpretation would mean the OSP can only prosecute cases if authorized by the Attorney-General.

How Did the OSP Respond?

The OSP has strongly rejected the ruling and announced plans to overturn it.

In its official response, the agency argued:

  • The High Court lacks jurisdiction to declare parts of an Act of Parliament unconstitutional
  • Only the Supreme Court of Ghana has the authority to make such determinations
  • Its enabling law clearly provides for both investigative and prosecutorial powers

The OSP warned that allowing the ruling to stand could undermine ongoing corruption cases and weaken Ghana’s accountability systems.

The Attorney-General’s Position

Complicating matters, the Attorney-General’s office has taken a position that aligns—at least partly—with the High Court’s reasoning.

Government lawyers argue:

  • Prosecutorial power belongs solely to the Attorney-General
  • Parliament cannot transfer or dilute that power through legislation
  • The OSP may require explicit authorization before prosecuting cases

They also contend that prosecutorial authority cannot be delegated to a “juridical person” (an institution like the OSP), only to individuals.

Why This Case Is Bigger Than One Agency

This dispute has far-reaching implications for Ghana’s governance and rule of law.

1. Anti-Corruption Efforts at Risk

If the OSP loses prosecutorial authority:

  • Ongoing cases could be delayed or reassigned
  • Investigations may lose momentum
  • Public confidence in anti-corruption efforts could weaken

2. Constitutional Interpretation

The case raises a key legal question:
Can Parliament create independent prosecutorial bodies, or is that power constitutionally restricted?

3. Separation of Powers

The outcome will clarify the balance between:

  • The executive branch (through the Attorney-General)
  • Independent statutory bodies like the OSP

What Happens Next?

The legal battle is far from over.

There are now two parallel tracks:

  1. OSP’s challenge to the High Court ruling
  2. A separate case already before the Supreme Court, filed by Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey, seeking a definitive constitutional interpretation

Legal analysts expect the Supreme Court to ultimately deliver the final word.

Why Global Audiences Should Pay Attention

Ghana is often seen as one of West Africa’s more stable democracies, and its anti-corruption framework has been closely watched by international partners.

The outcome of this case could:

  • Influence how other countries design independent anti-corruption bodies
  • Shape international perceptions of Ghana’s governance
  • Affect investor confidence tied to transparency and rule of law

The Bottom Line

The clash between the OSP and the Attorney-General is more than a legal technicality—it’s a defining moment for Ghana’s anti-corruption system.

At stake is a fundamental question:
Should an independent anti-corruption body have the power to prosecute on its own, or must that authority remain centralized under the state’s chief legal officer?

The answer, likely to come from the Supreme Court, will determine not just the future of the OSP—but the direction of Ghana’s fight against corruption.

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Disputes over Africa’s ocean resources: here’s what could help avoid them

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A new research study mapping over 1,000 marine conflicts across 34 African countries between 2008 and 2018 reveals that nearly 75% of disputes stem from competition over access to ocean resources like fisheries, fishing grounds, and landing sites. The findings show that conflicts often extend beyond fisheries to involve sectors such as oil drilling, tourism, and sand mining, with government officials implicated in the vast majority of cases. Importantly, less than one-third of these conflicts were resolved. The researchers argue that achieving an inclusive and sustainable “blue economy” in Africa requires fairer governance, consistent enforcement of rules, and greater inclusion of marginalized groups—such as small-scale fishers, women, and Indigenous communities—in decision-making processes to prevent and resolve disputes.


Disputes over Africa’s ocean resources: here’s what could help avoid them

Elizabeth Selig, Stanford University; Adelina Maria Mensah, University of Ghana; Mafaniso Hara, University of the Western Cape, and Moenieba Isaacs, University of the Western Cape

Over the last several decades, the oceans have become more crowded. Aquaculture, wind and wave energy, and oil and gas exploration are taking up more space. This growth threatens the health of ocean ecosystems and coastal communities’ access to food and livelihoods that they have relied on for centuries.

It can also lead to conflicts. We define conflicts as events where the differing goals of two or more groups lead to clashes over marine resources or places.

Conflicts can work against the goals of a blue economy: environmental sustainability and equity. A blue economy uses the oceans in ways that are fair to people, do not harm the environment, and make economic sense. By contrast, an ocean economy may prioritise only economic gain.

Several African countries have included blue economy expansion as part of their national or regional development policies. For example, the Africa Blue Economy Strategy outlines a vision for an “inclusive and sustainable blue economy that significantly contributes to Africa’s transformation and growth”.

To achieve that vision, the underlying issues that lead to conflicts must be addressed. The first step is to document where conflicts are occurring, who is involved, and the nature of the disputes.

We were part of a team of environmental and social scientists who mapped conflicts over ocean resources and places across 34 African countries using reports from newspapers, magazines and journals from 2008 to 2018. With these data and a survey of experts working in government, civil society organisations or academia, we also identified ways that marine conflicts have been resolved.

Our research identified more than 1,000 conflicts over the study period. The conflicts we found were mainly non-violent, verbal disagreements. These conflicts may draw less attention than physical fighting. However, they are still important because they disrupt how ocean resources are managed and who benefits from them.

Nearly 75% of conflicts were related to access to ocean resources such as fisheries or places like mangrove forests, fishing grounds, and landing sites where vessels can offload their catches.

Our findings demonstrate the value of fair interventions. They also show the importance of including groups and communities in decision-making processes that affect them.

Conflict narratives

We found that most conflicts involved at least two sectors (for example, fisheries and oil drilling or industrial fisheries and small-scale fisheries). More than a quarter were not related to fisheries, such as disputes between government officials and sand miners or hotel developers and local community organisations.

These results emphasise that conflicts often go far beyond fisheries. Projects related to the blue economy will increasingly require cooperation among different sectors on planning and management to avoid conflicts.

We also found that conflicts may differ depending on cultural context and regional dynamics. For example, in South Africa’s Saldanha Bay Municipality, home to a port and thriving fisheries sector on the west coast, conflicts emerged over aquaculture and port development. Marine park regulations also caused tensions by prioritising tourists over small-scale fishers. These tourism activities negatively affected small-scale fishers’ livelihoods by limiting their access to fishing grounds and landing sites.

Government decisions to allow seismic surveying also threatened to further damage the wellbeing, earnings and food security of fisher communities. (Sound waves emitted by seismic surveys can affect fish behaviour and cause them to move elsewhere.)

In Ghana, conflicts have often taken the form of persistent disputes between industrial and small-scale fishers over access to coastal waters. Fishers have also challenged government officials about whether halting fishing for periods is effective.

In Kenya, local authorities enforced national gear restrictions differently across neighbouring communities. These restrictions regulate what kinds of fishing equipment (like nets or spearguns) may be used. Lack of coordination and ineffective ways of handling disagreements led to conflicts between traditional leaders of neighbouring communities and county and national government authorities.

Moving beyond conflict

Our analysis found that there is room for improvement in settling the grievances that cause conflicts and prevent resolution. Less than a third of the conflicts we examined were resolved, which puts social equity and environmental sustainability at risk.

Several findings from our work point to actions that may help avert or settle conflicts.

Government officials, including governing bodies, enforcement agents and local or national politicians, were involved in the vast majority of conflicts we recorded. This pattern reflects the central roles they have in creating rules as well as enforcing them. Better practices that focus on inclusive processes for developing rules and consistent implementation of them are essential for managing conflicts.

Policymakers must assess how potential actions could affect a range of groups. People who are often marginalised – small-scale fishers, women and Indigenous communities – require more attention. For example, in South Africa, communities were able to document how proposed seismic activity would affect access to their fishing grounds. They then brought a court case in 2022 that prevented those activities from proceeding.

Although that conflict was resolved, the case demonstrates how small-scale fishers’ livelihoods are not always recognised in decision-making. This indifference threatens the equity central to a blue economy.

In parallel, efforts should concentrate on fair enforcement of existing rules to create greater accountability. These actions can build trust. For the conflicts we analysed, inadequate governance, such as failing to enforce rules or applying them unevenly, was commonly reported as both a direct and indirect cause of conflict.

However, conflicts can also lead to governance changes and governments can play constructive roles in conflict resolution. For example, Ghana’s 2025 Fisheries and Aquaculture Act doubles the area reserved exclusively for small-scale fishers. This new law may help ease tensions within the fisheries sector.

The experts we surveyed also highlighted that greater community engagement is critical to conflict resolution. In Kenya, conflicts were helped by group forums and dialogues that fostered agreements on which fishing gears to restrict and how to coordinate across communities.

Delivering on blue economy aspirations will likely require national and community-led efforts. A dual approach can help to establish more effective governance and engage an increasingly diverse set of people in resolving conflicts for the benefit of all of society.

Tim McClanahan co-authored this article.

Elizabeth Selig, Deputy Director, Center for Ocean Solutions, Stanford University; Adelina Maria Mensah, Snr Research Fellow, University of Ghana; Mafaniso Hara, Professor, University of the Western Cape, and Moenieba Isaacs, Professor, University of the Western Cape

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Ghana’s credibility at stake in LGBTQ policy debate

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In this opinion piece, Isaac Ofori argues that Ghana’s prolonged indecision on the proposed anti-LGBTQ legislation is damaging the nation’s credibility. He critiques the politicization of the issue—from campaign promises by President Mahama to the current administration’s claim that it is not a priority—and warns that this policy vacuum fuels social tension and misinformation. Ofori calls for leadership that provides constitutional clarity rather than ambiguity, balancing majority values with human rights obligations to preserve Ghana’s reputation as a stable democracy.


Ghana’s credibility at stake in LGBTQ policy debate

By Isaac Ofori (Tutor at Winneba Senior High School)

The ongoing national debate over the proposed anti-LGBTQ legislation has uncovered a deeper challenge within Ghana’s governance system: the difficulty of balancing constitutional principles, political convenience, and societal values during times of intense public pressure.

What should have been a structured legislative process has turned into a prolonged cycle of political battles, judicial actions, and shifting signals from the executive branch.

This pattern raises an important question for public policy: can Ghana sustain credibility both at home and abroad without a clear, principled, and consistent stance on such a critical issue?

At the heart of the controversy is the procedural deadlock that arose before the bill could be signed into law by former President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo. The referral of the issue to the Supreme Court of Ghana added a constitutional layer that, although necessary, effectively delayed executive action.

In a constitutional democracy, such caution is neither a sign of weakness nor avoidance; it reflects fidelity to the rule of law. However, Ghana’s Parliament’s failure to navigate this situation decisively has created a policy vacuum, which continues to fuel public frustration.

What followed was the politicization of the issue, arguably undermining both policy integrity and public discourse. The opposition at the time, led by the National Democratic Congress (NDC), made the matter a central campaign theme.

Statements and rhetoric from key figures, including then-candidate and now-President John Dramani Mahama, heightened public expectations that a clear legal position would be established. Religious institutions, reflecting prevailing societal values, reinforced this momentum, turning a legislative proposal into a moral referendum.

However, governance, unlike campaigning, requires coherence, consistency, and accountability. The apparent shift in urgency by the current administration, particularly the claim that the LGBTQ issue is not a national priority, indicates a disconnect between campaign promises and actual leadership.

Such ambiguity risks damaging public trust. More importantly, it leaves all stakeholders, religious organizations, civil society, and the LGBTQ community in a state of uncertainty.

From a policy perspective, ambiguity is costly. For supporters of the bill, the lack of clear action indicates hesitation or political caution. For critics, including international human rights groups, it reinforces perceptions of inconsistency and a selective commitment to rights-based governance.

Ghana’s long-standing reputation as a stable democracy rooted in the rule of law is best preserved not through silence but through clarity grounded in constitutional principles.

Recognizing how the framing of this debate has sometimes contributed to increased social tensions is also crucial. Political messaging during elections arguably heightened fears and solidified public opinion, making responsible policymaking more difficult. When political leaders use sensitive social issues for electoral advantage, they have a duty to handle the consequences with equal seriousness once in office.

The path forward needs leadership that rises above partisan interests. If the current administration takes a firm stance, it should communicate it openly and act within the constraints of the Constitution.

However, if the issue remains contested within the executive branch, a broader national conversation grounded in law, human rights commitments, and Ghanaian cultural values becomes crucial. What cannot continue is a policy void that allows speculation, misinformation, and social hostility to flourish.

Ultimately, leadership’s role is not just to mirror public opinion but to guide it responsibly. Issues related to rights, identity, and law require a careful balance between majority values and constitutional safeguards.

Ghana cannot afford prolonged indecision on a matter that lies at the intersection of domestic unity and international oversight. This moment demands clarity, not as a political tactic but as a constitutional duty.


This article was first published on GhanaWeb on April 1, 2026

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