Perspectives
US exit from the World Health Organization marks a new era in global health policy – here’s what the US, and world, will lose
This article by Jordan Miller of the Arizona State University explains the consequences of the U.S. officially leaving the World Health Organization in January 2026, detailing how the withdrawal will weaken global disease surveillance, reduce American influence in international health policy, and hinder the country’s own ability to prepare for health threats like the annual flu.
Jordan Miller, Arizona State University
The U.S. departure from the World Health Organization became official in late January 2026, according to the Trump administration – a year after President Donald Trump signed an executive order on inauguration day of his second term declaring that he was doing so. He first stated his intention to do so during his first term in 2020, early in the COVID-19 pandemic.
The U.S. severing its ties with the WHO will cause ripple effects that linger for years to come, with widespread implications for public health. The Conversation asked Jordan Miller, a public health professor at Arizona State University, to explain what the U.S. departure means in the short and long term.
Why is the US leaving the WHO?
The Trump administration says it’s unfair that the U.S. contributes more than other nations and cites this as the main reason for leaving. The White House’s official announcement gives the example of China, which – despite having a population three times the size of the U.S. – contributes 90% less than the U.S. does to the WHO.
The Trump administration has also claimed that the WHO’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was botched and that it lacked accountability and transparency.
The WHO has pushed back on these claims, defending its pandemic response, which recommended masking and physical distancing.
The U.S. does provide a disproportionate amount of funding to the WHO. In 2023, for example, U.S. contributions almost tripled that of the European Commission’s and were roughly 50% more than the second highest donor, Germany. But health experts point out that preventing and responding quickly to public health challenges is far less expensive than dealing with those problems once they’ve taken root and spread.
However, the withdrawal process is complicated, despite the U.S. assertion that it is final. Most countries do not have the ability to withdraw, as that is the way the original agreement to join the WHO was designed. But the U.S. inserted a clause into its agreement with the WHO when it agreed to join, stipulating that the U.S. would have the ability to withdraw, as long as it provided a one-year notice and paid all remaining dues. Though the U.S. gave its notice when Trump took office a year ago, it still owes the WHO about US$260 million in fees for 2024-25. There are complicated questions of international law that remain. https://www.youtube.com/embed/uacD-03S28E?wmode=transparent&start=0 The U.S. has been a dominant force in the WHO, and its absence will have direct and lasting impacts on health systems in the U.S. and other countries.
What does US withdrawal from the WHO mean in the short term?
In short, the U.S. withdrawal weakens public health abroad and at home. The WHO’s priorities include stopping the spread of infectious diseases, stemming antimicrobial resistance, mitigating natural disasters, providing medication and health services to those who need it, and even preventing chronic diseases. Some public health challenges, such as infectious diseases, have to be approached at scale because experience shows that coordination across borders is important for success.
The U.S. has been the largest single funder of the WHO, with contributions in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually over the past decade, so its withdrawal will have immediate operational impacts, limiting the WHO’s ability to continue established programs.
As a result of losing such a significant share of its funding, the WHO announced in a recent memo to staff that it plans to cut roughly 2,300 jobs – a quarter of its workforce – by summer 2026. It also plans to downsize 10 of its divisions to four.
In addition to a long history of funding, U.S. experts have worked closely with the WHO to address public health challenges. Successes stemming from this partnership include effectively responding to several Ebola outbreaks, addressing mpox around the world and the Marburg virus outbreak in Rwanda and Ethiopia. Both the Marburg and Ebola viruses have a 50% fatality rate, on average, so containing these diseases before they reached pandemic-level spread was critically important.
The Infectious Diseases Society of America issued a statement in January 2026 describing the move as “a shortsighted and misguided abandonment of our global health commitments,” noting that “global cooperation and communication are critical to keep our own citizens protected because germs do not respect borders.”
What are the longer-term impacts of US withdrawal?
By withdrawing from the WHO, the U.S. will no longer participate in the organization’s Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System, which has been in operation since 1952. This will seriously compromise the U.S.’s ability to plan and manufacture vaccines to match the predicted flu strains for each coming year.
Annual flu vaccines for the U.S. and globally are developed a year in advance using data that is collected around the world and then analyzed by an international team of experts to predict which strains are likely to be most widespread in the next year. The WHO convenes expert panels twice per year and then makes recommendations on which flu strains to include in each year’s vaccine manufacturing formulation.
While manufacturers will likely still be able to obtain information regarding the WHO’s conclusions, the U.S. will not contribute data in the same way, and American experts will no longer have a role in the process of data analysis. This could lead to problematic differences between WHO recommendations and those coming from U.S. authorities.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that each year in the U.S. millions of people get the flu, hundreds of thousands of Americans are hospitalized and tens of thousands die as a result of influenza. Diminishing the country’s ability to prepare in advance through flu shots will likely mean more hospitalizations and more deaths as a result of the flu.
This is just one example of many of how the U.S.’s departure will affect the country’s readiness to respond to disease threats.
Additionally, the reputational damage done by the U.S. departure cannot be overstated. The U.S. has developed its position as an international leader in public health over many decades as the largest developer and implementer of global health programs.
I believe surrendering this position will diminish the United States’ ability to influence public health strategies internationally, and that is important because global health affects health in the U.S. It will also make it harder to shape a multinational response in the event of another public health crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic.
Public health and policy experts predict that China will use this opportunity to strengthen its position and its global influence, stepping into the power vacuum the U.S. creates by withdrawing. China has pledged an additional US$500 million in support of the WHO over the next five years.
As a member of the WHO, the United States has had ready access to a vast amount of data collected by the WHO and its members. While most data the WHO obtains is ultimately made available to the public, member nations have greater access to detailed information about collection methods and gain access sooner, as new threats are emerging.
Delays in access to data could hamstring the country’s ability to respond in the event of the next infectious disease outbreak.
Could the US return under a new president?
In short, yes. The WHO has clearly signaled its desire to continue to engage with the U.S., saying it “regrets the U.S. decision to withdraw” and hopes the U.S. will reconsider its decision to leave.
In the meantime, individual states have the opportunity to participate. In late January, California announced it will join the WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network, which is open to a broader array of participants than just WHO member nations. California was also a founding member of the West Coast Health Alliance, which now includes 14 U.S. states that have agreed to work together to address public health challenges.
California Gov. Gavin Newsom has also launched an initiative designed to improve public health infrastructure and build trust. He enlisted national public health leaders for this effort, including former Centers for Disease Control and Prevention leaders Susan Monarez and Deb Houry, as well as Katelyn Jetelina, who became well known as Your Local Epidemiologist during the COVID-19 pandemic.
I think we will continue to see innovative efforts like these emerging, as political and public health leaders work to fill the vacuum being created by the Trump administration’s disinvestment in public health.
Jordan Miller, Teaching Professor of Public Health, Arizona State University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Can Moscow host Africa under drone threat? As Moscow prepares to welcome African leaders to the third Russia-Africa Summit on October 28 to 29, Ukrainian drone strikes have reportedly hit Yandex data centres and targeted the capital region, exposing a delicate contradiction at the heart of the gathering. Russia pitches itself as Africa’s security partner while its own infrastructure proves vulnerable. In this opinion piece, analyst Joseph McCarthy examines the security dilemma facing both Moscow and African governments, arguing that leaders weighing the trip must confront a deeper question: what does it mean to tie your nation’s safety to a partner that is itself under sustained attack? Read the full article below.
Yandex Strikes: Can Moscow Host Africa Under Drone Threat?
Moscow pitches itself as Africa’s security partner while its own infrastructure is exposed
By Joseph McCarthy · Analyst, Sahel governance & security
| 3YANDEX DATA CENTRES REPORTEDLY STRUCK, 8–11 OCT | 650DRONES STRUCK MOSCOW REGION, 6 OCT | 28–29 OctTHIRD RUSSIA-AFRICA SUMMIT, MOSCOW |
Every summit is a performance of strength. The third Russia-Africa Summit, due in Moscow on 28 and 29 October, is meant to show African leaders that Russia remains a confident, well-connected partner despite sanctions, isolation and a costly war. Between 8 and 11 October, Ukrainian drones complicated that script. Three data centres operated by Yandex, the technology giant behind much of Russia’s digital economy, were reportedly struck in the Ryazan, Kaluga and Vladimir regions. For Moscow and for its African guests, the episode poses a security dilemma that no communiqué will resolve.
The first attack, on the night of 7 to 8 October, reportedly set fire to a facility in Sasovo, in Ryazan region, and suspended operations. A second strike hit a site in Kaluga; a third, in Vladimir region, followed on 11 October. Yandex runs payments, email, navigation, ride-hailing, delivery and cloud computing, so the effects spread quickly. Meduza reported disruptions to Yandex Pay, Mail, Disk and Go, while businesses that depend on Yandex Cloud described outages of their own. One user told the outlet: “All my money is on Yandex, so I have no money for food.” The company says customers’ funds are safe, but the episode shows how one point of failure can become hardship for ordinary people within hours.
Recovery may be slow. Reports suggest that replacing specialised equipment could take months, and Russian officials have reportedly acknowledged the difficulty. That matters beyond one company. Moscow has spent years encouraging reliance on domestic platforms as Western technology withdrew. The Yandex strikes show that domestic ownership is not the same as security. Technological sovereignty also means being able to protect, maintain and restore systems under attack.
Moscow will call such strikes aggression against civilian targets. Yet they come after years of Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure, so the exposure Russia now faces cannot be separated from the war it chose to launch. That context does not make the risk to visitors any smaller; it explains why it is unlikely to disappear before the summit.
Here lies the first half of the dilemma, and it is Moscow’s. Hosting African leaders in the capital is a statement of confidence, but it also puts that confidence on display. Russia must keep airspace open, transport moving and digital systems running while the war reaches ever deeper into its territory. On 20 September, roughly 450 drones were reportedly aimed at the capital; on 6 October, around 650 struck the Moscow region. Every intercept shows that defences work. Every strike that lands, and every airport closure, suggests the opposite. The summit cannot merely proceed; it must avoid becoming a showcase for exposure. Moscow will almost certainly respond with heavy security, restricted airspace and tightly managed movement. That may protect delegates, but it also turns the gathering into a fortress, held in spite of the war rather than in a country at ease with itself.
None of this proves that Russia cannot protect the summit. Vulnerability to long-range drones is not the same as losing the ability to defend territory, and the more widely a country’s civilian and commercial infrastructure is distributed, the harder it is to shield. Delegations may well land, meet and leave without incident. But that is a probability, not a guarantee, and guarantees are precisely what Russia is selling.
That brings us to the second half of the dilemma, which belongs to African governments. The immediate question is personal safety. In early September, Air Tanzania suspended its Dar es Salaam to Moscow route after a risk assessment, then resumed it days later. Further attacks could prompt airspace restrictions, diversions and tighter security that complicate movement between airports, hotels and venues. These are scenarios, not confirmed disruptions, yet every government weighing the trip must price them in, including the level at which it chooses to be represented.
The deeper question is strategic. Security cooperation is the core of Russia’s offer to Africa: Moscow says it has military agreements with more than 40 African states, and Russian security personnel are embedded in countries such as Mali and the Central African Republic. Governments that rely on that protection are tying their own security to a partner that is itself under sustained attack. A security provider at war is also a provider that is stretched, distracted and targeted. The more a government leans on Russia to guarantee its safety, the more it imports the risks of Russia’s war.
“The more a government leans on Russia to guarantee its safety, the more it imports the risks of Russia’s war.”
Call it a dilemma of dependence. The relationship meant to be a source of protection can become a channel for exposure, and the closer the embrace, the harder it is to step back.
What should African governments do? Engage, but with open eyes. They can ask for written security and contingency arrangements for their delegations, diversify their security partnerships so that no single patron’s vulnerability becomes their own, and insist that cooperation strengthens national institutions rather than simply protecting incumbent governments. Strategic autonomy means having choices. It does not mean choosing between Moscow and everyone else, or accepting one patron’s risks as the price of its protection.
The Kremlin wants the summit to show that sanctions have not isolated Russia. The Yandex strikes complicate that message without defeating it. They pose a simple test for any partner who offers security: can it secure itself? The answer will not come from speeches in Moscow. It will come from whether the summit runs smoothly, and from what follows. Until then, African leaders have every reason to listen politely, travel carefully and commit slowly.
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Joseph McCarthy is an analyst and researcher specialising in governance, security and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, development and African diplomacy. joecarthy30@gmail.com
Perspectives
Policy Brief: ‘A Test of Agency: Ghana’s BRICS Application and the Future of Strategic Diversification’ | By Col Festus Aboagye (rtd)
Ghana’s proposed BRICS membership has generated considerable debate. Yet the issue is often presented as a binary choice between traditional Western partnerships and emerging powers.
In ‘A Test of Agency: Ghana’s BRICS Application and the Future of Strategic Diversification’, Colonel Festus Aboagye (Retired) argues that a more useful lens is strategic agency: Ghana’s capacity to choose, manage, and, where necessary, disengage from external partnerships to pursue its national interests.
The brief explores the potential benefits, risks, and policy choices surrounding BRICS engagement. It offers a framework for evaluating future commitments through the lenses of accountability, transparency, sovereignty, and strategic flexibility.
‘A Test of Agency: Ghana’s BRICS Application and the Future of Strategic Diversification’ | By Col. Festus Aboagye (rtd)
Ghana’s decision to seek BRICS membership is a significant foreign-policy initiative. Public discussion has tended to fall into two camps. One sees BRICS as an escape from excessive dependence on Western institutions and markets.
The other sees a step towards alignment with China, Russia and other emerging powers. Both could be oversimplifications. The more important question is whether participation would strengthen Ghana’s strategic agency: its ability to choose, scrutinise, alter and, where necessary, exit external partnerships in pursuit of national interests.
This brief argues that the application is best understood as a test of agency rather than alignment.
- An announcement, not yet an application. On 6 October 2026, Ghana announced a Cabinet decision to apply. On the available evidence, no formal application had been submitted by 10 October 2026.
A forum, not an alliance or a common market. BRICS confers no automatic trade preferences, finance or security guarantees. Most gains would depend on agreements with individual members and institutions.
The benefits lie in diversification, not replacement. Membership could broaden Ghana’s partners, strengthen its bargaining position, and provide a platform to push for global governance reform.
The risks are real but conditional. They include new dependency, fiscal exposure, technology lock-in, diplomatic pressure, and reactions from Western partners, including a United States tariff threat.
Outcomes, not symbolism. Membership should be judged by whether it broadens options, strengthens leverage and preserves accountability.
Click here to read the full article.
As Moscow prepares to host the third Russia-Africa Summit on 28–29 October 2026, the gathering arrives at a moment of heightened scrutiny. Nearly five years into its war in Ukraine, Russia is seeking to prove that its partnerships with African states have survived Western sanctions and remain strategically valuable. But the deeper question is what Africa gains in return. Drawing on trade figures, security partnerships in the Sahel, and the intersection of military cooperation with resource interests, this analysis by Joseph McCarthy examines whether the relationship is genuinely reciprocal or whether Africa is becoming an increasingly important source of the political influence, strategic resources, and economic resilience that Moscow needs to sustain its own geopolitical ambitions. Read the full article below.
Russia-Africa Summit: The Search for Resources, Influence and War Resilience
As the Ukraine war deepens Russia’s search for strategic resources, political allies and economic resilience, the third Russia-Africa Summit raises a difficult question: what does Africa gain in return?
Russia’s renewed engagement with Africa should be understood against the backdrop of a war in Ukraine that has become a test of Moscow’s economic, military and political endurance. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has faced extensive Western sanctions, restrictions on trade and finance, and increasing pressure on the sources of revenue that sustain its war effort. In this environment, Africa has acquired a significance that extends beyond traditional diplomacy. The continent offers Moscow political partnerships, alternative markets, military cooperation and, critically, access to valuable natural resources and potential revenue streams that can help Russia withstand external pressure.
This helps explain the evolution of the Russia-Africa summits. The first summit, held in Sochi in 2019, was largely presented as an effort to rebuild and institutionalise Russia’s relationship with Africa, with trade, investment, security and political cooperation at the centre of the agenda. By the time of the second summit in St Petersburg in 2023, however, the geopolitical context had changed dramatically. Russia was already deep into its war in Ukraine and under extensive Western sanctions. The summit therefore served not only to deepen economic and political relations but also to demonstrate that Moscow remained capable of maintaining significant partnerships outside the Western bloc.
The third summit schedule on 28-29 October 2026, comes at an even more consequential moment. Russia is seeking to demonstrate that its relationship with Africa has survived the prolonged Ukraine war and remains capable of producing strategic benefits. The question for African governments should increasingly be whether the relationship is producing comparable benefits for them. Moscow’s partnership with Africa cannot be assessed only through diplomatic declarations, military agreements or high-level summits. It should also be judged by what African states receive in return and by what Russia gains from the relationship.
One of the most important areas to examine is natural resources. Russia’s interest in Africa is not simply about obtaining diplomatic support. Access to gold and other strategic commodities can provide alternative sources of revenue at a time when Moscow is seeking to reduce the impact of Western sanctions. Gold is particularly important because it can be traded through opaque networks and converted into revenue outside conventional financial channels. The U.S. Treasury has previously linked Wagner-associated gold operations in Africa to the financing of the group’s activities, including its operations in Ukraine. This does not mean that every Russian engagement with an African resource-producing state is designed to finance the Ukraine war.
It does, however, demonstrate why African resources can have strategic value for a Russia seeking to sustain its power and resilience under sanctions. The same logic extends beyond gold. Russia has increasingly shown interest in energy and critical raw materials, while its security partnerships in countries such as Mali and the Central African Republic have created relationships in which military and political cooperation can intersect with economic and resource interests. The emerging model therefore deserves closer scrutiny, Russia provides security assistance and political backing, while gaining influence, commercial opportunities and potentially privileged access to resources.
Mali provides one of the clearest case studies. Russia’s military presence in the country began with the arrival of Wagner personnel in 2021 and subsequently evolved into the Africa Corps structure. Moscow has presented this relationship as an alternative to Western security partnerships and as evidence of Russia’s willingness to assist African states in defending their sovereignty. Yet the relationship also raises a fundamental question: what does Russia receive in return for its military and political support?
That question becomes particularly important when the wider context of the Ukraine war is considered. If Russia can secure access to gold and other strategic resources, strengthen relationships with resource-rich governments and establish alternative economic channels, those relationships can help Moscow mitigate the effects of sanctions and sustain its broader strategic capacity. The relationship should therefore not be viewed solely through the narrow lens of counterterrorism. It is also part of a wider contest over resources, influence and economic resilience.
The economic figures contained in the summit case study reinforce the need to ask what kind of partnership Moscow is actually building. At the 2019 Sochi summit, Vladimir Putin announced a target of increasing Russia-Africa trade to $40 billion. According to Russian data cited in the document, trade stood at $27.7 billion in 2025, while Russia accounted for less than 1 percent of foreign direct investment in Africa. These figures do not prove that Russia’s Africa strategy has failed, nor do they capture every form of strategic value that Moscow derives from the continent. If Russia’s conventional economic footprint remains relatively modest, why is Moscow investing so heavily in strategic relationships with African states? One answer is that the value of Africa to Russia cannot be measured by trade and investment alone. Political influence, military access, diplomatic support, alternative markets and access to natural resources can all have strategic value. For a country fighting a prolonged war under sanctions, these forms of influence can become as important as conventional economic indicators.
This is why the third Russia-Africa Summit should be examined as more than another diplomatic gathering. Moscow wants to use the summit to demonstrate that its partnership with Africa remains strong despite the Ukraine war. The circumstances surrounding the meeting expose the tension at the heart of that claim. African officials are being asked to travel to Moscow while Ukrainian drone attacks have repeatedly disrupted air traffic around the Russian capital. On September 20 an attack involving more than 450 drones caused fresh disruption in the Moscow region, while Air Tanzania temporarily suspended its Moscow route following a risk assessment. The irony is difficult to ignore. Russia presents itself as a security partner for Africa, yet some African officials must consider their own security when travelling to the Russian capital. More importantly, African governments must now assess whether the strategic benefits of their relationship with Moscow justify the risks and costs associated with it.
For Ghana, this calculation is particularly important. The security consequences of Russia’s growing involvement in the Sahel cannot be separated from Ghana’s own national and regional security interests. A source close to the Ghanaian delegation cited in the summit document questions whether the relationship is genuinely “win-win” and points directly to the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel and its spillover towards Ghana’s northern borders. This should concern African governments is Russia’s engagement with Africa primarily delivering security and development benefits to African states, or is Africa increasingly becoming an important source of the political influence, strategic resources and economic resilience that Moscow needs to sustain its own geopolitical ambitions?
The answer is unlikely to be simple. Russia’s relationship with Africa serves multiple purposes, and resource access is only one component of a broader strategy. But the Ukraine war has changed the calculation. What may once have been presented principally as an effort to expand trade, investment and diplomatic relations now also has to be viewed through the lens of Russia’s need to preserve strategic autonomy, withstand sanctions and maintain the capacity to wage a prolonged war.
The third Russia-Africa Summit therefore represents a test not simply of whether African leaders will continue to engage Moscow, but of whether Russia can convince them that this engagement is genuinely reciprocal. For African states, the critical question is no longer whether Russia wants a deeper relationship with Africa. It clearly does. The more important question is what Moscow needs from Africa, what Africa receives in return, and whether the balance between the two is becoming increasingly unequal.
Joseph McCarthy is an analyst and researcher specialising in governance, security and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, development and African diplomacy. joecarthy30@gmail.com
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