Connect with us

Perspectives

Ghana’s Democracy at a Crossroads: Justice and Jobs Key to Its Future

Published

on

In an insightful Atlantic Council report, Joseph Asunka examines Ghana’s remarkable democratic journey since the mid-1990s, pointing out the pivotal role of civil society and independent media in upholding political freedoms while underscoring persistent challenges in judicial independence and youth employment.

Drawing on three decades of data from the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, the analysis reveals Ghana’s strengths in civic vigilance and electoral integrity but warns of fragility in legal and economic freedoms amid fiscal volatility and social inequalities.

Asunka argues that addressing corruption in the judiciary, creating job opportunities for educated youth, and reforming land ownership for women are critical to preventing democratic erosion and fostering inclusive prosperity.

This piece serves as a timely blueprint for Ghana’s policymakers in 2026 and beyond, as it advocates that true democratic success hinges on equitable justice and economic empowerment.

Full Article Reproduction: Delivering justice and jobs is the real test of Ghana’s storied democracy

By Joseph Asunka | Atlantic Council | December 4, 2025

This is the first chapter in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s 2026 Atlas, which analyzes the state of freedom and prosperity in ten countries. Drawing on our thirty-year dataset covering political, economic, and legal developments, this year’s Atlas is the evidence-based guide to better policy in 2026.

Bottom lines up front

  • Civil society and independent media are the backbone of Ghana’s democracy: Their roles as watchdogs, notably real-time monitoring and publication of polling-station election results, has strengthened credibility of election outcomes.
  • Judicial independence remains fragile, with public trust in the judiciary dropping by 20 percentage points since 2011.
  • Limited job prospects for Ghana’s growing population of educated youth present a significant threat to its democratic consolidation.

Evolution of freedom

Ghana’s signature achievement since the mid-1990s is the consolidation of civic and political freedoms and a competitive political order in which citizens, journalists, and civic organizations routinely hold leaders to account. The durability of this achievement is not a result of elite benevolence or political will but the product of a dense, independent civil society and a remarkably resilient independent media ecosystem. When governments test the boundaries of civic space, the response is often swift and organized; this social infrastructure is the primary reason Ghana’s civic and political freedoms have remained consistently strong for more than two decades. This context is reflected in the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes’ political subindex for Ghana, which sits well above the economic and legal subindices. In recent years, it sits in the low-to-mid 70s out of a maximum score of 100, a pattern that aligns with lived realities. In the most recent Afrobarometer survey, conducted in 2024, an overwhelming majority of Ghanaians (85 percent) reported that they did not fear political violence or intimidation during the last national elections, a strong testament to the electoral freedoms that Ghanaians enjoy. Moreover, a majority (52 percent) expressed trust in civil society organizations, ahead of religious leaders (who are trusted by 49 percent). Only the military (trusted by 65 percent) ranks ahead of civil society organizations in Ghana.

The historical roots of this civic vigilance matter. From the anti-colonial mobilization led by Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first post-independence president, and mass professional and student associations to later generations of advocacy groups and think tanks, Ghanaians have long treated resistance to state overreach as a civic obligation.

As formal unions of lawyers, teachers, students, and medical professionals gave way to contemporary civil society and independent media organizations and research networks—among them, the Media Foundation for West Africa, the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition, the Ghana Integrity Initiative, the Ghana Center for Democratic Development, and many others, including subnational advocacy groups—the core impulse has remained the same: to protect and defend civic space, demand procedural fairness, and insist that those in power remain answerable to the public. This explains why the social reaction to efforts to undermine political freedoms is often met with resistance and why Ghana’s political openings have not been easily reversed.

Ghanaians have long treated resistance to state overreach as a civic obligation.

Electoral integrity is a useful illustration of how these social checks operate. While the courts can usually be swayed by partisan crosscurrents when individual political actors are charged with corruption or other acts of impropriety, the dynamic is often different with election disputes. The vigilance of civil society and independent media organizations in monitoring and independently collating election results at the polling-station level often helps to provide credible evidence when electoral disputes arise. The volume and quality of that evidence strengthen adjudication, making it harder for judicial bias to gain traction and increasing the credibility of outcomes, even in contentious contests. This distinction is important: While the administration of justice in ordinary (nonpolitical) cases is broadly reliable, the politicization of corruption cases can distort judicial behavior; election cases, by contrast, have benefitted from robust, external scrutiny that fortifies the work of the courts.

This juxtaposition points to the core challenge in Ghana’s performance on legal freedom: The judiciary’s structural vulnerability to executive influence, particularly through appointments to the High Court and Supreme Court. Observers can—and do—sort judges into partisan “buckets,” a perception that inevitably erodes confidence in the system’s neutrality. Survey data clearly show a deterioration of citizens’ trust in the judicial system in the last fifteen years, falling by 20 percentage points since 2011. Yet outside of high-stakes political cases, the courts tend to function competently and deliver justice with regularity.

Recent movement in the legal subindex has been mildly positive, driven in part by improvements in informality and, to a lesser degree, by steadier security conditions after the turbulence of the early 2000s. On informality, the government’s digitalization initiatives, including the introduction of national (and tax) identification (the Ghana Card) and a digital address system, have helped to identify and increasingly formalize informal businesses. Other initiatives, such as the institution of fee-free secondary education, opened opportunities for young Ghanaians to further their education instead of entering the informal economy. The National Youth Employment Program, although relatively less successful, helped to draw young entrepreneurs into more formalized activities. Finally, a surge of capital investments into construction, alongside an expansion in mining activities, has created demand for artisans, contractors, and allied tradespeople who transact in more formal ways than the street-level microenterprise typical in developing economies. The result is a measurable reduction in the prevalence of informality, a trend visible within the relevant component of the legal subindex.

The gradual strengthening of security owes more to internal stability than to a benign regional environment. Ghana’s northern border with Burkina Faso and proximity to Nigeria’s insurgency-affected areas create constant risks, and yet Ghana has avoided the cascade of instability that has afflicted parts of the Sahel. That relative steadiness, together with the normal functioning of everyday justice for nonpolitical cases, helps explain why legal freedom is trending slightly upward despite persistent concerns about executive sway over judicial appointments and decisions.

Ghana has avoided the cascade of instability that has afflicted parts of the Sahel.

Corruption control within the justice sector is another area to watch. Across administrations, chief justices have consistently placed anti-corruption at the center of their institutional reform agendas, and recent executive appeals to rebuild public trust in the courts suggest continued political salience. However, these public commitments have not always translated into tangible reforms or outcomes. Public perception of judicial corruption remains high: According to the 2024 Afrobarometer survey, more than 40 percent of Ghanaians believe that “most or all judges and magistrates” are corrupt. The growing trend of presidents appointing loyalists to the Supreme Court has only reinforced these perceptions, contributing to Ghana’s relatively weak performance on the legal subindex. The ongoing constitutional review presents an opportunity to reform judicial appointments and promotions, tighten avenues for corruption, and strengthen judicial independence.

Ghana’s strong performance on elections, civil liberties, and political rights within the political subindex is tempered by weaker scores on legislative constraints on the executive, highlighting concerns about the effectiveness of institutional checks in practice. However, civil society remains uncompromising in defending democratic norms, including contesting attempts to erode these checks. The resulting equilibrium is not perfect—nor is it immutable—but it has proven remarkably resilient over the past generation.

Economic freedoms have followed their own trajectory, with a notable increase from the mid-2000s into the first half of the 2010s, a period that coincided with the broader “Africa Rising” narrative. This period was characterized by strong improvements in governance and economic growth, rising incomes, and a growing middle class. Consolidation of Ghana’s return to constitutional democracy commenced in the year 2000 with the transfer of power from the ruling party to an opposition party, which further boosted optimism in the country’s political and economic outlook. The new political leadership signaled a clear focus on improving the economy, and market openness and property-rights enforcement seemed to find firmer footing. Former President John Kufuor is remembered in this context for emphasizing macroeconomic health and business-climate improvements that many citizens experienced in their daily lives. The results of committed political leadership and effective economic management are reflected in the economic subindex and the other components such as investment freedom and property rights, starting in the mid-2000s.

The subsequent downturn around 2015 is worth noting. Rising debt-service pressures, coupled with a large budget deficit and high inflation culminated in Ghana going in for an IMF program; a similar pattern occurred around 2023-24 as reflected in the downward trend of the economic subindex. These patterns signal the fragility of gains when fiscal anchors are not backed by disciplined fiscal decisions—such as politically motivated increases in public spending during election years and subsidies on utilities and petroleum products, among others—and when investment freedom and property-rights expectations face credibility questions. These observations underscore that Ghana’s enviable political freedoms do not automatically translate into disciplined fiscal management or sustained economic openness. The freedom metrics capture this: The political subindex remains high, while the economic and legal dimensions fluctuate with policy choices that either reinforce or erode market institutions and democratic norms.

Trade freedom tells a more erratic story. Ghana’s trade policy framework has generally been open by regional standards, but the component’s volatility reflects the broader health of the economy and investors’ read on the policy environment. In periods of economic stress, policy consistency suffers, and openness on paper does not translate into confidence in practice. The trends in the data thus track not only tariff schedules and non-tariff measures but also the credibility of macroeconomic management, which is often punctuated in election years.

The trajectory of women’s economic freedom stands out as a major structural improvement. Around 2004, there was a steep rise in the economic subindex driven in part by a cluster of women’s empowerment policies of the Kufuor administration: free maternal health services, including postnatal care services that reduced a key barrier to women’s labor-market participation, and explicit efforts to expand women’s access to finance and enterprise support. Those initiatives may have helped to boost women’s economic autonomy and anchor a higher plateau that persisted in the years that followed. The component’s level has stagnated since about 2008 and hence leaves some room for improvement—but the rapid change around 2004 is unmistakable. Recent Afrobarometer survey data for Ghana show strong popular support for women to have equal rights to work as men. However, more than a quarter of Ghanaians (26 percent) identify employers’ preference for hiring men as the top barrier to women’s advancement, ahead of childcare (17 percent) and skills gaps (16 percent).

Where do remaining constraints lie? First, land ownership: In Ghana, community and family lands are predominantly controlled by male heads; women’s ownership and collateralization of land remain very limited. Given the economic value of land, women remain at a significant disadvantage that dampens entrepreneurship, constrains access to credit, and restricts intergenerational wealth transfer for women. Second, intrahousehold decision-making: In many households, women’s ability to take paid work outside the home remains mediated by male authority. These social and legal frictions are the kinds of de facto constraints that keep the Women’s Economic Freedom component below its potential despite the formal policy gains that started in the mid-2000s.

Evolution of prosperity

Ghana’s prosperity trajectory since the mid-2000s mirrors, in broad outline, the “Africa Rising” era: a period of macroeconomic optimism, improved governance, favorable terms of trade, and political stability across much of the continent. Between 2005 and the mid-2010s, the Prosperity Index registered a strong and upward trend, reflecting the robust growth in incomes and steady improvements in social indicators, even as inequality widened in the classic early-development pattern. Ghana rode this wave and, for several years, significantly outpaced the sub-Saharan Africa average.

The story of the income component is familiar but still striking in its local particulars. A large discovery of offshore oil in the late 2000s added a new driver to a commodity basket already weighted toward gold and cocoa. In the mid-2000s, when global commodity prices were favorable, Ghana’s growth accelerated sharply; in 2011, Ghana recorded a double-digit real GDP growth rate (about 11 percent), up from about 8 percent the year prior. Oil windfalls amplified these gains, though they also heightened exposure to volatility and raised questions about how resource-linked revenues were managed. The income component of the Prosperity Index captures this rise and

Commentary

More Than 9,000 Ghanaian Children Have Been Treated for Clubfoot, Yet Many More Are Still Being Left Behind

Published

on

Article by Nana Afua Adutwumwaa Adjetey, Program Manager, Ghana Clubfoot Program (CHAG–Hope Walks Ghana)


As Ghana joins the global community to commemorate World Clubfoot Day on June 3, there is an important story that deserves national attention.

It is the story of thousands of Ghanaian children who have been given the opportunity to walk, run, play, attend school, and pursue their dreams because they received treatment for clubfoot.
It is also the story of many other children who continue to miss that opportunity because of delayed diagnosis, stigma, misinformation, and lack of awareness.

Clubfoot is one of the most common congenital disabilities affecting children worldwide. It is a condition present at birth in which one or both feet are twisted inward and downward. If left untreated, a child may face lifelong challenges with walking, education, employment, and social inclusion.

Yet clubfoot is also one of the most treatable childhood disabilities.
When identified early and treated correctly, children born with clubfoot can live healthy, active, and productive lives.

A Hidden Challenge Affecting Hundreds of Ghanaian Families

In Ghana, an estimated 1,000 babies are born with clubfoot every year.

Many of these children are born into families who have never heard of the condition. Others are born in communities where myths, misconceptions, and stigma still surround childhood disabilities.

Some parents are told their child will eventually “grow out of it.”
Others are encouraged to seek traditional remedies before medical care.
In some cases, families hide affected children for fear of judgment and discrimination.

Unfortunately, these delays come at a cost.
Clubfoot treatment is most effective when started soon after birth. Every week and month of delay can make treatment more difficult and increase the risk of long-term disability.

The Cases We Meet Every Day
Across our clubfoot clinics in Ghana, we meet families whose stories reveal the challenges that still exist.

We meet mothers who travel long distances after hearing about treatment through a friend, church member, radio programme, or social media post.
We meet caregivers who have spent months searching for answers because they did not know where to go for help.
We meet children who arrive years after birth because no one identified the condition early enough.

Most concerning, we continue to encounter situations where clubfoot was not recognised at birth or families were not informed that treatment was available.

Many parents tell us they were never referred. Others say they were unaware clubfoot could be treated at all.
These experiences remind us that awareness remains one of the greatest barriers to eliminating disability caused by clubfoot.

The Good News: Treatment Works; And It Is Free


Despite these challenges, there is tremendous reason for hope.

The Ghana Clubfoot Program, implemented by the Christian Health Association of Ghana (CHAG) in partnership with Hope Walks, has been transforming lives since 2008.

Most importantly, treatment is provided completely free of charge for children under five years of age at CHAG–Hope Walks partner clinics across Ghana.
No child should be denied the opportunity to walk because of a family’s inability to pay.

Over the past 18 years, more than 9,000 children born with clubfoot have received treatment and care through the programme.
That means more than 9,000 children now have the opportunity to walk with confidence, attend school, participate in sports, and live productive lives.

Behind every number is a story:
A child who can now run with friends.
A student who can walk to school.
A parent whose fears have been replaced with hope.
A family whose future has been transformed.

The treatment follows the internationally recognised Ponseti Method, which uses a series of gentle casts to gradually correct the position of the foot, followed by a brace to maintain correction and prevent relapse.
When treatment begins early, success rates are extremely high.

These successes demonstrate a simple but powerful truth:
Clubfoot is treatable. Treatment is available. And treatment is free.

The Critical Role of Health Professionals
World Clubfoot Day is also an opportunity to celebrate the dedication of health professionals who change lives every day.

Midwives, nurses, doctors, physiotherapists, orthopaedic specialists, community health nurses, and Parent Advisors all play a vital role in ensuring children receive treatment early.

For many children, the journey begins with a health worker who identifies clubfoot at birth and makes a referral.
A few moments of observation can change the course of a child’s life forever.

We therefore encourage all healthcare professionals to make clubfoot screening part of every newborn assessment and to ensure every identified child is referred promptly for treatment.

Breaking the Stigma


As a nation, we must confront the stigma that continues to surround disability.

Clubfoot is not a curse.
It is not caused by wrongdoing.
It is not a punishment.
It is a medical condition that can be treated successfully.

Families should never feel ashamed to seek help.
Communities should support parents rather than judge them.
Children born with clubfoot deserve the same opportunities, dignity, and inclusion as every other child.

A National Call to Action
As we commemorate World Clubfoot Day 2026, we call on all Ghanaians to become part of the solution.

We call on health workers to identify and refer clubfoot cases immediately after birth.
We call on parents and caregivers to seek treatment as early as possible.
We call on religious leaders, traditional leaders, and community influencers to help raise awareness and eliminate stigma.
We call on media organisations to continue educating the public about clubfoot and the availability of free treatment.
We call on policymakers and health stakeholders to strengthen support for early detection, disability inclusion, and child health services.

Many families are still unaware that clubfoot treatment is available free of charge in Ghana. This lack of awareness continues to delay treatment for children who could otherwise receive life-changing care at no cost.

Over the past 18 years, the Ghana Clubfoot Program has demonstrated that clubfoot can be treated successfully.
Our challenge now is to ensure every child born with clubfoot is identified early enough to benefit from that treatment.

No child should be denied the opportunity to walk because of lack of information.
No family should suffer in silence because they do not know help is available.

This World Clubfoot Day, let us commit to one simple but powerful message:
SEE EARLY. TREAT EARLY. WALK FREELY.

For information on free clubfoot treatment in Ghana:
Ghana Clubfoot Program (CHAG–Hope Walks Ghana)
📞 024 487 9948

“Over 9,000 children have already been given the chance to walk through treatment. Our challenge now is to ensure that no child is left behind because of late detection, stigma, or lack of information.”
Mrs. Nana Afua Adutwumwaa Adjetey, Program Manager, Ghana Clubfoot Program (CHAG–Hope Walks Ghana)

Continue Reading

Perspectives

IMANI PULSE: Ghana’s Political Conversation Is Shifting From Personalities to Performance

Published

on

Ghanaians are done choosing sides based on personalities. The latest IMANI-PULSE analysis of 10,000 online conversations shows the debate has shifted to a sharper question: Who can actually deliver?


The latest IMANI-PULSE Sentiment Analysis Report for May 2026 reveals a notable transformation in Ghana’s online political discourse.

Drawing on 10,000 mentions across Facebook, X, TikTok, YouTube, podcasts, web sources, news feeds, and other digital platforms, the analysis found that public conversations are increasingly focused on governance outcomes, policy delivery, economic credibility, international engagement, and political preparedness rather than political personalities.

The report recorded an almost perfectly neutral overall sentiment score of -0.01, suggesting that citizens are becoming less emotionally partisan and more focused on evaluating leadership performance and accountability.

Key findings include:

🔸 Policy discussions dominated political discourse, accounting for 78.2% of classified conversations.

🔸 Infrastructure delivery and accountability emerged as major drivers of engagement.

🔸 Foreign policy and international engagement became the dominant issue cluster during the second half of May.

🔸 Economic credibility and IMF-related accountability remained central themes.

🔸 Opposition rebuilding and political preparedness increasingly shaped discussions around future elections.

“Rather than asking who they support, citizens appeared to be asking whether leaders can deliver, whether promises have been fulfilled, and whether competing political actors possess the credibility required to address future challenges,” the report revealed.

The report concludes that Ghana’s online political conversation is becoming increasingly issue-driven, with citizens prioritising delivery, accountability, economic management, and governance outcomes over partisan loyalty.

Read the full report here.

About IMANI Africa:

IMANI Africa has carved a niche in Ghana’s policy environment by producing objective, independent analysis and critique across multiple disciplines using tried and tested methodologies. Through effective communication and partnerships with public-spirited media and civil society, IMANI works to shape national, regional, and global agendas in order to close the “citizen participation gap” in governance. With over 50 media allies across Africa, IMANI distinguishes itself through its media impact and its capacity to reach ordinary citizens via mass-circulation newspapers, the internet, and popular television and radio shows. Pound for pound, IMANI Africa has the highest media profile of any think tank in West Africa.

Continue Reading

Commentary

How Ghana Forced the Vatican’s Hand: What Pope Leo XIV Said and Didn’t Say in Historic Apology for Church’s Role in Slavery

Published

on

When Pope Leo XIV issued an unprecedented apology on Monday for the Holy See’s role in legitimizing centuries of slavery, it did not happen in a vacuum.

Just two months earlier, Ghana had achieved what many thought impossible: convincing the United Nations General Assembly to declare the trafficking and enslavement of Africans “the gravest crime against humanity.”

That resolution, spearheaded by Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama and adopted with 123 votes in favor on March 25, 2026, created the political and moral architecture that made the Vatican’s apology nearly inevitable. The Holy See, after all, could hardly ignore a world body declaring that the system its own 15th-century papal bulls had legitimized now ranks as humanity’s worst offense.

“The discussions surrounding the Resolution included debates about historical references to the Church, Papal Bulls and the transatlantic slave trade, making the Pope’s apology especially significant,” Ghana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement welcoming Leo XIV’s encyclical, Magnifica Humanitas (Magnificent Humanity).

The government described the Pope’s apology as “an act of moral courage” and a significant contribution to “the global pursuit of historical truth, justice and human dignity.”

What the Pope Said—And Didn’t Say

In his 82-page encyclical, released on May 25, 2026, Pope Leo XIV did something no pontiff had done before: he explicitly acknowledged that past popes had given European sovereigns explicit authority to subjugate and enslave “infidels.”

“Already in the early modern period, the Apostolic See of Rome, responding to requests from Sovereigns, intervened several times in order to regulate and legitimize forms of subjugation, and, in certain cases, the enslavement of ‘infidels,'” Leo wrote.

He acknowledged that “in antiquity and the Middle Ages many individuals and even ecclesiastical institutions had slaves,” and that it took “eighteen centuries” for the Church to explicitly recognize slavery’s full incompatibility with human dignity.

“It is impossible not to feel deep sorrow when contemplating the immense suffering and humiliation endured by so many,” Leo wrote. “For this, in the name of the Church, I sincerely ask for pardon.”

Previous popes had apologized for Christians’ involvement in the slave trade. St. John Paul II, during a 1985 visit to Cameroon, asked forgiveness of Africans on behalf of Christians who participated, and in 1992 on Gorée Island, Senegal, he denounced the “tragedy of a civilization that called itself Christian.” But no pope had ever publicly acknowledged—much less apologized for—the role that past pontiffs played in legitimizing the trade.

Shannen Dee Williams, a historian at the University of Dayton and author of Subversive Habits, called the apology a “monumental step toward the essential truth-telling and reparation that many Catholics have prayed and worked to witness.”

A History of Apologies: The Growing Chorus

Leo XIV’s apology joins a growing list of institutional acknowledgments of complicity in slavery and the slave trade. While each has been significant in its own right, none has carried the full weight of a formal, institutional acknowledgment from the Vatican—until now.

The Church of England (2006): On February 8, 2006, the Church of England’s General Synod voted 238 to 0 to apologize for the Church’s role in the transatlantic slave trade. The vote acknowledged that Anglican leaders owned thousands of slaves on plantations in Barbados and that the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts branded enslaved people with hot irons bearing the letters “SOCIETY.” The apology came 199 years after Britain abolished the slave trade, and its unanimous passage was described as a “wake-up call” to pursue concrete solutions.

The U.S. House of Representatives (2008): For the first time in American history, the U.S. House of Representatives formally apologized for slavery and the era of Jim Crow segregation. The non-binding resolution expressed regret for the “fundamental injustice, cruelty, brutality, and inhumanity of slavery” and for laws that “established a system of de jure and de facto segregation and discrimination”. The Senate never passed a companion resolution, leaving the apology incomplete.

JPMorgan Chase (2005): The American banking giant apologized for its predecessor banks’ involvement in the slave trade, acknowledging that two Louisiana banks it had acquired accepted enslaved people as collateral on loans. The company established a $5 million scholarship program for Black students in Louisiana.

Greene King and Lloyd’s of London (2020): In the wake of the Black Lives Matter protests, the British pub chain and the insurance market both apologized and committed to reparations after the Legacies of British Slavery database revealed their historic ties to the trade. Greene King, founded by a prominent slave trader, pledged to invest in Black and minority ethnic communities and create new programs to support diversity.

The Hudson’s Bay Company (2021): Canada’s oldest corporation launched its “Charter for Change” initiative, committing $30 million over ten years to partnerships advancing racial equality, with a focus on Black Canadians and Indigenous peoples. The company acknowledged its “roles in the colonization of Canada” but stopped short of a formal apology specifically for slavery, despite research showing its early governors amassed wealth through West Indian slave labor and its founder, Samuel Cunard, profited from goods produced by enslaved people.

The Bank of Nova Scotia and CIBC (2020s): Canadian banks with founding ties to the slave trade—Scotiaba’s first president William Lawson amassed wealth through West Indian trade, and 13 of its 17 founders did the same—have funded Black community programs but have not issued formal apologies or reparations.

Why Ghana’s Resolution Changed Everything

The UN resolution, adopted on March 25, 2026, was the culmination of months of diplomatic effort led by President Mahama. It passed with 123 votes in favor, 52 abstentions, and only three countries—Argentina, Israel, and the United States—voting against it.

“The resolution is not about apportioning blame across generations or nations,” Ghana’s Foreign Minister Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa said at the time. “It is about creating space for truth, education, and a more honest global conversation”.

For the Vatican, that conversation became impossible to ignore. The resolution specifically noted the role of religious institutions—including the Catholic Church—in legitimizing the trade. Ghana’s government explicitly linked the two events in its statement welcoming the Pope’s apology, saying the discussions at the UN “included debates about historical references to the Church, Papal Bulls and the transatlantic slave trade.”

From Apology to Action

As the Vatican’s first U.S.-born pope—a man whose own family history, according to genealogical research published by Henry Louis Gates Jr., includes both enslaved people and slaveholders—Leo XIV acknowledged that words alone are insufficient.

The encyclical connects the historical apology to contemporary forms of slavery, warning that “new forms of subjugation and slavery” have emerged “in the context of digital development” and the technological revolution.

Leo writes that the Church must condemn all forms of trafficking “if we want to avoid the need to ask for pardon again in the future for having failed to respect the treasure of human dignity.”

Ghana is already moving to fill the gap between apology and action. The government has announced plans to host a High-Level Consultative Conference in Accra from June 17 to 19, 2026, under President Mahama’s leadership, focusing on “next steps following the adoption of the UN Resolution and sustaining global engagement on historical justice and reconciliation.”

The Rev. Christopher J. Kellerman, a Jesuit priest and author of All Oppression Shall Cease: A History of Slavery, Abolitionism, and the Catholic Church, welcomed Leo’s apology but cautioned that more is needed.

“Pope Leo has strengthened the moral credibility of the church with this admission and apology today,” he told the Associated Press. “Hopefully, a future document will explain in more detail the church’s involvement with slaveholding.”

For descendants of enslaved Africans—in Ghana, in the Caribbean, in the United States, and across the diaspora—the convergence of Ghana’s diplomatic victory and the Vatican’s institutional apology represents something unprecedented: a moment when the world’s highest moral authorities, secular and religious, have aligned in acknowledging the truth.

Whether that truth translates into reparative justice remains the open question of our time.

Continue Reading

Trending