JNIM now strikes at capitals and governs territory, and the bet that Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger placed on Russia as their sole security guarantor has failed. Analyst and researcher Joseph McCarthy writes that the fire will not stop at the Sahel’s borders, and Ghana stands directly in its path.

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The Sahel is Burning, and West Africa Cannot Look Away

By Joseph McCarthy

At dawn on 18 June 2026, fighters stormed Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey, the most heavily guarded site in Niger’s capital. It is not merely an airport. The complex houses the air force, most of the country’s drones, the headquarters of the Alliance of Sahel States’ joint force, the Russian personnel meant to help crush the insurgency, and even uranium stocks the state hopes to sell. JNIM claimed the assault, which killed eleven soldiers and two civilians. It was the second strike on that complex this year; the Islamic State’s Sahel Province claimed a January raid. Both of the region’s jihadist franchises have now breached the defences of a capital. This was not just another attack. It was a strategic signal.

It was also no act of opportunism. Hitting a fortified installation in a capital demands months of surveillance, intelligence on shift changes, the logistics to move fighters and weapons over long distances, and the ability to slip past layered security. It implies networks operating close to, or inside, the capital itself. As the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project noted, the Sahel’s insurgents have moved from localised rural fighting to coordinated strikes on vital national infrastructure. The pattern is everywhere. In Mali, JNIM has throttled Bamako with a fuel blockade since September 2025, destroying hundreds of tankers; in April, it overran the garrison town of Kati and killed the defence minister in his own home; it has since placed a bounty of two million euros on the head of Mali’s junta leader, Assimi Goïta.

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More troubling than the firepower is the governance. A Reuters investigation found that JNIM now arbitrates land disputes, collects taxes, enforces rules and imposes a rough order in territories the state has vacated. Forged from the merger of four groups, it increasingly presents itself not as a militia but as an alternative authority, building legitimacy among populations long neglected by distant governments. History is unkind here: from Afghanistan to Somalia, insurgencies that learn to govern outlast those that only fight. The contest is no longer simply about defeating armed men. It is about whether the state, rather than an armed movement, remains the most credible source of authority, justice and security.

Against all this, the juntas made a bet. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled Western forces, walked out of ECOWAS, and rebuilt their security around a single guarantor: Russia, first through the Wagner Group, then the Africa Corps. On 26 June, Burkina Faso severed diplomatic relations with France entirely, accusing Paris of backing the very terrorists it claims to fight, an allegation offered without evidence and flatly rejected. Niger’s government, for its part, blamed the Niamey attack on mercenaries funded by President Macron, again without proof. The promise was straightforward: sovereignty restored, foreign influence reduced, terrorism defeated. Judged by the junta’s own promise, the bet has failed. The violence has not receded. It has spread.

This should not be read as a uniquely Russian failure. It exposes the limits of any strategy built around a single external guarantor. No partner, whether Russia, France or the United States, can resolve a conflict rooted in governance failure, economic exclusion, local grievance and hollow institutions. Force can kill fighters. It cannot rebuild public trust, settle a quarrel between communities, open a clinic or create a job for an idle young man, and those are the very conditions the insurgents harvest for recruits. Russia carries constraints of its own: bogged down in Ukraine, its resources finite, it was outfought alongside Malian troops at Kidal even after reportedly receiving a warning of the assault. A security architecture resting on a single distracted partner does not reduce risk; it concentrates it, and when that partner underdelivers, there is no second line. The 2026 Global Terrorism Index now names the Sahel the global epicentre of terrorism, the source of more than half the world’s terrorism deaths and one in five of its attacks.

None of this stays in the Sahel. Ghana shares roughly 550 kilometres of frontier with Burkina Faso, much of it porous and threaded with informal crossings used daily by traders and herders. Southward expansion rarely begins with a spectacular attack. It begins quietly: a recruiter, a supply route, a financing cell, fighters embedding in border communities long before a shot is fired. That is precisely how the contagion crossed from Mali into Burkina Faso and Niger, and how it has already reached Benin and Togo, with Côte d’Ivoire and northern Ghana plainly exposed. Alongside the fighters’ travels, something almost as corrosive: a flood of assault rifles, explosives and military hardware that does not stop at extremist hands but arms robbers, traffickers and illegal mining syndicates, hollowing out a country’s security long before any jihadist banner appears.

The wider world has its own reasons to watch. Niger holds some of the planet’s richest uranium. A jihadist proto-state straddling West Africa would command migration routes toward the coast and the Mediterranean, strain fragile coastal economies, disrupt trade corridors and rattle investor confidence. At the same time, every successful strike on a capital broadcasts a template to armed groups from Nigeria to Mozambique. What looks today like a regional security crisis could become an international one. A region generating one in five of the world’s militant attacks is not a distant problem. It is a lit fuse.

Africa has paid before for believing that outside powers can guarantee its security. They cannot. Partners can offer intelligence, training and equipment; they cannot substitute for legitimate governance and functioning institutions. This crisis will be settled not only on the battlefield but in courtrooms, classrooms, local councils and marketplaces, where citizens decide whether the state or an armed movement better delivers justice and opportunity. For Ghana, the task is preventive, not reactive: intelligence cooperation, stronger borders, regional collaboration, community resilience and investment in local governance, all of it far cheaper than containment once the violence has taken root. And for the Sahel’s rulers, there is a harder truth.

Sovereignty that trades several partners for total dependence on one distant and overstretched power is not sovereignty; it is a fresh vulnerability dressed in the language of liberation. The question is no longer whether the crisis will spread beyond Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It already has. The only question left is whether West Africa acts before the Sahel becomes the world’s next strategic emergency.

Joseph McCarthy is an analyst and researcher specialising in governance, security, and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, development, and African diplomacy. Email: joecarthy30@gmail.com

As her diplomatic tenure in West Africa draws to a close, Swiss Ambassador Simone Giger pens a reflective and heartfelt tribute to Ghana’s enduring national character. Having traveled extensively across the country—from Paga to Keta and Wa to Goaso—she offers an intimate, human-centered assessment of a nation defined by its resilient democratic culture, youthful ambition, and an infectious “vibe” that fosters cohesion. In this candid farewell, Ambassador Giger explores the complex challenges threatening Ghana’s ecological treasures and argues that sustained institutional reform, rather than outside invention, is the key to unlocking the prosperous future the country so clearly deserves.

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Travelling through northern Ghana, this author once stopped in a small community after a long journey. Despite the day’s heat and the demands of daily life, residents welcomed visitors with warm smiles, easy laughter and an eagerness to share stories about their hopes for the future.

It was a simple encounter, yet it captured something profoundly Ghanaian: an enduring optimism that persists even in difficult circumstances.

In diplomacy, countries are often assessed through official meetings, economic indicators and policy documents. Yet to truly understand a nation, one must travel through it, listen to its people, appreciate its strengths, observe its contradictions and understand the aspirations that shape everyday life.

Authentic Voices, Foreign Narratives and the Fortune Madondo Case | By Joseph McCarthy

As the end of a diplomatic assignment in Ghana approaches, this author finds reason to reflect deeply on a country that has left a lasting impression, not only professionally but personally.

Over the past four years, extensive travels across Ghana—from Paga to Keta, Damongo to Donkokrom, and Wa to Goaso—have revealed a country of extraordinary diversity, complexity, creativity and resilience.

Every journey has unveiled a different dimension of Ghana. Yet one common thread consistently emerges: a nation brimming with potential.

There is something profoundly remarkable about Ghana and its national character, what many Ghanaians simply describe as the country’s “vibe”.

It is evident in the warmth extended to strangers, the humour with which difficulties are confronted and the optimism that endures even during periods of uncertainty.

Even in challenging moments, there is often a joke, a proverb or a story that helps place events in perspective.

In this author’s view, that national character has become one of the essential ingredients behind Ghana’s democratic success.

At a time when democratic systems around the world are facing increasing pressure, polarisation and distrust, Ghana continues to distinguish itself through its commitment to dialogue, constitutional order and peaceful coexistence.

Democracy here is not perfect. No democracy truly is, including Switzerland’s.

What matters is that it remains alive, active and deeply valued by citizens.

Over the years, Ghana has established itself as an important democratic reference point in West Africa.

The country has repeatedly demonstrated that political competition can coexist with stability, that transfers of power can occur peacefully and that national debates can take place within institutional frameworks rather than outside them.

Such achievements should never be taken for granted.

Democracy is not sustained by elections alone.

It requires strong institutions, active citizens, credible public discourse and a continuous willingness to negotiate consensus across political, ethnic, religious and generational lines.

One can observe that Ghana’s diversity presents both opportunities and challenges. Yet this author has often admired the manner in which the country continues to navigate these varied interests while preserving national cohesion.

In many respects, this is where Ghana’s democratic future becomes particularly important.

The country possesses extraordinary human capital.

Wherever this author travelled, young people displayed ambition, intelligence, creativity and determination.

Ghana’s greatest resource is not found beneath the ground.

It resides in its people, their ideas and their aspirations.

Ideas and aspirations, however, require systems that function effectively if they are to translate into meaningful and productive outcomes.

When institutions are transparent, responsive, accountable and trusted, they unlock innovation, investment and opportunity.

When they are weak or inconsistent, they risk frustrating the very energy capable of propelling a nation forward.

This is why governance reforms remain so important to Ghana’s long-term trajectory.

One development that particularly impressed this author during the diplomatic assignment has been Ghana’s constitutional review process.

What stands out is not only the process itself, but also the spirit behind it – a willingness to reflect critically on how democratic governance can evolve to meet contemporary realities and future expectations.

This demonstrates political maturity.

Constitutions should never be viewed as static documents frozen in time.

Strong democracies periodically examine whether their systems remain responsive, inclusive and effective.

Ghana’s consultative approach reflects a country seeking not merely to preserve democracy, but to improve it.

Switzerland is proud to support these home-grown efforts and remains committed to supporting the constitutional reform process until its hoped-for successful conclusion.

History demonstrates that democratic stability does not emerge automatically.

It requires deliberate investment in participation, inclusion and dialogue.

Swiss democracy itself evolved gradually through compromise, negotiation and the understanding that national cohesion is strengthened when citizens feel ownership over public decisions.

One can observe important similarities between Ghana and Switzerland.

Both countries are diverse societies that have chosen coexistence over division.

Both understand that stability is strongest when different voices are heard and accommodated.

Both appreciate the importance of consensus-building in national life.

This shared philosophy has shaped bilateral cooperation over many decades.

Today, the partnership continues to evolve in both breadth and depth.

Switzerland currently supports initiatives focused on democratic governance, parliamentary cooperation, decentralisation, peace and security, cultural exchange, environmental integrity, climate adaptation and economic development.

Switzerland and Ghana may differ in geography, history and scale, yet both countries share a belief in dialogue and cooperation as foundations for national progress.

Despite Ghana’s bright prospects, one cannot ignore the challenges confronting the country.

No nation can fully realise its potential without confronting difficult issues directly.

During the years spent in Ghana, citizens from various walks of life spoke openly about concerns surrounding institutional effectiveness, economic opportunity, environmental degradation and governance accountability.

Such conversations reflected not pessimism, but a desire to see the country fulfil its promise.

Particularly concerning is the destruction caused by illegal mining activities.

Ghana’s rivers, forests and landscapes are among its greatest treasures.

Environmental degradation is not merely an ecological issue.

It is fundamentally a matter of intergenerational responsibility.

Future prosperity depends on preserving the natural foundation upon which communities, livelihoods and national identity are built.

Yet despite these challenges, this author remains deeply optimistic about Ghana’s future.

That optimism stems not from idealism but from observation.

The future of democracy globally will not be shaped only by geopolitical actors or large states.

Medium-sized countries such as Switzerland and Ghana also have important roles to play.

They can demonstrate that democratic resilience, peaceful coexistence and institutional reform remain both possible and necessary.

As this diplomatic assignment draws to a close, there is profound gratitude for the opportunity to have lived and worked in Ghana.

Over the years, this author has come to admire the country not only for its democratic achievements, but also for its humanity – its warmth, creativity, humour and enduring sense of possibility.

The task ahead is not to invent Ghana’s future.

Rather, it is to create the institutional conditions necessary for that future to emerge fully.

From all that has been observed across the country, there is every reason to believe that Ghana can achieve precisely that.

The author, Simone Giger, is the Swiss Ambassador to Ghana, Togo and Benin

This article by Joseph McCarthy, an analyst and researcher focusing on governance, security, and political transitions in the Sahel, argues that modern influence in Africa often spreads not through propaganda but through credible African voices that carry narratives aligned with the interests of external powers. Read the full article below.

Authentic Voices, Foreign Narratives and the Fortune Madondo Case

How Russian narratives are travelling through authentic African voices, and what the Fortune Madondo case reveals about it

By Joseph McCarthy

For years, the word disinformation conjured a familiar picture: troll farms, fake accounts and automated bots flooding the internet with crude propaganda. Those methods still exist, but influence operations have matured. The most effective messenger today is rarely an anonymous account. It is a real person, with a real name, a credible public profile and convictions he appears to hold sincerely.

The case of Fortune Madondo illustrates the shift. He is no online provocateur hiding behind a pseudonym; he is a Zimbabwean teacher and the founder of a youth organisation, with a documented life in his community. He writes under his own name, identified in his byline only as an “African Teacher,” with no institution given, and his views seem consistent with his stated beliefs. What matters is less who he is than what he carries. Across more than fifty articles in twelve months, most of them on Pan-African platforms, the line never wavers: praise for the military juntas of the Sahel, attacks on Western governments and on AFRICOM, condemnation of France’s role in Africa, and the celebration of resource sovereignty against foreign plunder. Whether by design or by conviction, these themes closely align with the narratives Moscow has sought to amplify across the continent.

That alignment, not the man, is the point. Influence no longer requires recruitment, payment or instruction. A foreign power’s objectives can be served just as well by people who believe every word they write, because the force of the message lies in its local authenticity. A reader will trust an African voice discussing African problems far sooner than a communiqué from Moscow. So the useful question is not whether Fortune Madondo is a Russian agent; there is no public evidence that he is. The question is who benefits when local voices, sincere or not, repeatedly reinforce narratives that happen to serve a foreign strategy.

Consider how this interacts with Pan-Africanism. Russia has spent years presenting itself as a champion of African sovereignty and an enemy of colonialism, language that resonates because it draws on real historical wounds. Madondo’s writing sits comfortably within that tradition, and many African intellectuals share his instincts. Yet the scrutiny runs in only one direction. The West is relentlessly interrogated; Moscow, despite its expanding military, mining, and political footprint, is almost never asked the same questions. If Pan-Africanism is the defence of African sovereignty against all external control, the principle must apply evenly. When French deployments are called neo-colonial, Russian military contractors deserve the same examination; when Western extraction is condemned, so should Russian mining concessions. When he co-signed an appeal in late 2024 demanding both that Russian troops leave Ukraine and that French troops leave Africa, the false symmetry itself did Moscow’s work. A Pan-Africanism that suspects only one power risks sliding from a doctrine of independence into an instrument of another’s ambition.

The Madondo question also points to a place: Ghana. Over the past two years, the country has drawn growing attention from foreign actors keen to enter its media space, and the reason is structural. Ghana is one of Africa’s most respected democracies and a heavyweight in anglophone media; what is published in Accra travels across West Africa and beyond. In December 2025, Ghanaian journalists attended a SputnikPro seminar co-organised by the Russian Embassy and the Ghana-Russia Centre, led by Vasily Pushkov of Rossiya Segodnya, the state group behind the Sputnik news agency. Other moves followed, among them a cooperation agreement with Ghana’s main journalism university and the opening of a Russian cultural centre. None of this is illegal. But influence secured in Ghana enjoys a multiplier effect that few other markets offer.

The mechanism is quieter than propaganda and more durable. People do not trust propaganda; they trust outlets they already consider credible. A publication earns that trust through genuine local reporting, and the reader then assumes that everything on the page has cleared the same editorial bar. That is where credibility is transferred: from the newsroom’s real work to syndicated columns, opinion pieces and, on some platforms, verbatim Russian state material set at the same level as a story on local agriculture. Repetition completes the effect. Ten near-identical articles across ten outlets read as an independent consensus; the reader concludes that everyone is saying this, when in truth, the same viewpoint is simply circling back. Influence here comes not from proving a claim, but from normalising it.

The significance of the Madondo case, then, is not the unmasking of an operative; the evidence does not support that, and the chase would miss the point. It is the growing difficulty of telling sincere conviction apart from narratives engineered to serve someone else’s strategy, in an environment where influence travels through authentic voices, trusted platforms and ideas that genuinely resonate. The defence is not a hunt for enemies but the slower work of critical thinking, editorial transparency and media literacy. The question is no longer simply who is speaking. It is whose interests are served when the same narrative is amplified, again and again, across the continent.

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Joseph McCarthy is an analyst and researcher focusing on governance, security, and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, development, and African diplomacy. Email: joecarthy30@gmail.com