Perspectives
How Maduro’s capture went down – a military strategist explains what goes into a successful special op
R. Evan Ellis, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, surmises in this article that the predawn seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on Jan. 3, 2026, was a complicated affair. It was also, operationally, a resounding success for the U.S. military.
Operation Absolute Resolve achieved its objective of seizing Maduro through a mix of extensive planning, intelligence and timing. R. Evan Ellis, a military strategist and former Latin America policy adviser to the U.S. State Department, walked The Conversation through what is publicly known about the planning and execution of the raid.
How long would this op have been in the works?

Operation Absolute Resolve was some months in the planning, as the Pentagon acknowledged in its briefing on Jan. 3. My presumption is that from the beginning of the U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean and the establishment of Joint Task Force Southern Spear in the fall, military planners were developing options for the president to capture or eliminate Maduro and other key Chavista leadership, should coercive efforts at persuading a change in the Venezuelan situation fail.

Prior to Southern Spear, U.S. military activities in the region were directly overseen by Southern Command – the part of the Department of Defense responsible for Central America, South America and most of the Caribbean. But establishing a dedicated joint task force in October 2025 helped facilitate the coordination of a large operation, like the one conducted to seize Maduro.
Planning for the Jan. 3 operation likely became more detailed and realistic as the administration settled on a concrete set of options. U.S. forces practiced the raid on a replica of the presidential compound. “They actually built a house which was identical to the one they went into with all the same, all that steel all over the place,” President Donald Trump told “Fox & Friends Weekend.”
Why did the US choose to act now?
The buildup had been going on for months, and the arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford in November was a key milestone. That gave the U.S. the capability to launch a high volume of attacks against land targets and added to the already huge array of American military hardware stationed in the Caribbean.
It joined an Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group, which included a helicopter dock ship and two landing platform vessels. An additional six destroyers and two cruisers were stationed in the region with the capability of launching hundreds of missiles for both land attack and air defense, as well as a special operations mother ship.
Trump’s authorization of CIA operations in Venezuela was probably also a key factor. It is likely that individuals inside Venezuela played invaluable roles not only in obtaining intelligence, but also in cooperating with key people in Maduro’s military and government to make sure they did – or did not do – certain things at key moments during the Jan. 3 operation.
With the complex array of plans and preparations in place by December, the U.S. military was likely ready to execute, but it had to wait for opportune conditions to maximize the probability of success.
What constitutes the opportune moment?
There are arguably three things needed for the opportune moment: good intelligence, the establishment of reliable cooperation arrangements on the ground, and favorable tactical conditions.
Intel would have been crucial. Trump acknowledged his authorization of covert CIA operations in Venezuela in October, and evidently, by the end of the year, analysts had gathered the information needed to make this operation go smoothly. The intelligence would have had to include knowing exactly where Maduro would be at the time of the operation, and the situation around him.
Over the past few months, according to media reporting, the intelligence community had agents on the ground in Venezuela, likely having conversations with people in the military, the Chavista leadership and beyond, who had crucial information or whose behavior was relevant to different parts of the operation – such as perhaps shutting down a system, standing down a military unit or being absent from a post at a key moment. A report from The New York Times indicates that the U.S. had a human source close to Maduro who was able to provide details of his day-to-day life, down to what he ate.
The more tactical conditions that were needed for the opportune moment involved things like the weather – you didn’t want storms or high winds or cloud cover that would put U.S. aircraft in danger as they flew in some very treacherous low-level routes through the mountains that separate Fort Tiun – the military compound in Caracas where Maduro was captured – from the coast.
How did the operation unfold?
Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has given some details about how the plan was executed.
We know the U.S. launched aircraft from multiple sites – the operation involved at least 20 different launch sites for 150 planes and helicopters. These would have involved aircraft for jamming operations, some surveillance, fighter jets to strike targets, and some to provide an escort for the helicopters bringing in a special forces unit and members of the FBI.

As an integral part of the operation, the U.S. carried out a series of cyber activities that may have played a role in undermining not only Venezuela’s defense systems, but also its understanding of what was going on. Although the nature of U.S. cyber activities is only speculation here, a coherent, alerted Venezuelan command and control system could have cost the lives of U.S. force members and given Maduro time to seal himself in his safe room, creating a problem – albeit not an insurmountable one – for U.S. forces.
There was also, according to Trump, a U.S.-generated interruption to some part of the power grid. In addition, it appears that there may have been diversionary strikes in other parts of the country to give a false impression to the Venezuelan military that U.S. military activity was directed toward some other, lesser land target, as had recently been the case.
U.S. aircraft then basically disabled Venezuelan air defenses.
As U.S. rotary wing and other assets converged on the target in Caracas – with cover from some of the most capable fighters in the U.S. inventory, including F-35s and F-22s, as well as F-18s – other U.S. assets decimated the air defense and other threats in the area.
It would be logical if elite members of the U.S. 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment were used in the approach to the compound in Caracas. Their skills would have been required if, as I presume, they came in via the canyon route that separates Caracas from the coast. I have driven the road through those mountains, and it is treacherous – especially for an aircraft at low altitude.
Once the team landed, it would have have taken a matter of minutes to infiltrate the compound where Maduro was.
Any luck involved?
According to Trump, the U.S. team grabbed Maduro just as he was trying to get into his steel vault safe room.
“He didn’t get that space closed. He was trying to get into it, but he got bum-rushed right so fast that he didn’t get into that,” the U.S. president told Fox & Friends Weekend.
Although the U.S. was reportedly fully prepared for that eventuality, with high-power torches to cut him out, that delay could have cost time and possibly lives.
It was thus critical to the U.S. mission that forces were able to enter the facility, reach and secure Maduro and his wife in a minimal amount of time.
R. Evan Ellis, Senior Associate, Americas Program, The Center for Strategic and International Studies
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Opinion
The Sahel is Burning, and West Africa Cannot Look Away
JNIM now strikes at capitals and governs territory, and the bet that Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger placed on Russia as their sole security guarantor has failed. Analyst and researcher Joseph McCarthy writes that the fire will not stop at the Sahel’s borders, and Ghana stands directly in its path.
The Sahel is Burning, and West Africa Cannot Look Away
By Joseph McCarthy
At dawn on 18 June 2026, fighters stormed Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey, the most heavily guarded site in Niger’s capital. It is not merely an airport. The complex houses the air force, most of the country’s drones, the headquarters of the Alliance of Sahel States’ joint force, the Russian personnel meant to help crush the insurgency, and even uranium stocks the state hopes to sell. JNIM claimed the assault, which killed eleven soldiers and two civilians. It was the second strike on that complex this year; the Islamic State’s Sahel Province claimed a January raid. Both of the region’s jihadist franchises have now breached the defences of a capital. This was not just another attack. It was a strategic signal.
It was also no act of opportunism. Hitting a fortified installation in a capital demands months of surveillance, intelligence on shift changes, the logistics to move fighters and weapons over long distances, and the ability to slip past layered security. It implies networks operating close to, or inside, the capital itself. As the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project noted, the Sahel’s insurgents have moved from localised rural fighting to coordinated strikes on vital national infrastructure. The pattern is everywhere. In Mali, JNIM has throttled Bamako with a fuel blockade since September 2025, destroying hundreds of tankers; in April, it overran the garrison town of Kati and killed the defence minister in his own home; it has since placed a bounty of two million euros on the head of Mali’s junta leader, Assimi Goïta.
More troubling than the firepower is the governance. A Reuters investigation found that JNIM now arbitrates land disputes, collects taxes, enforces rules and imposes a rough order in territories the state has vacated. Forged from the merger of four groups, it increasingly presents itself not as a militia but as an alternative authority, building legitimacy among populations long neglected by distant governments. History is unkind here: from Afghanistan to Somalia, insurgencies that learn to govern outlast those that only fight. The contest is no longer simply about defeating armed men. It is about whether the state, rather than an armed movement, remains the most credible source of authority, justice and security.
Against all this, the juntas made a bet. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled Western forces, walked out of ECOWAS, and rebuilt their security around a single guarantor: Russia, first through the Wagner Group, then the Africa Corps. On 26 June, Burkina Faso severed diplomatic relations with France entirely, accusing Paris of backing the very terrorists it claims to fight, an allegation offered without evidence and flatly rejected. Niger’s government, for its part, blamed the Niamey attack on mercenaries funded by President Macron, again without proof. The promise was straightforward: sovereignty restored, foreign influence reduced, terrorism defeated. Judged by the junta’s own promise, the bet has failed. The violence has not receded. It has spread.
This should not be read as a uniquely Russian failure. It exposes the limits of any strategy built around a single external guarantor. No partner, whether Russia, France or the United States, can resolve a conflict rooted in governance failure, economic exclusion, local grievance and hollow institutions. Force can kill fighters. It cannot rebuild public trust, settle a quarrel between communities, open a clinic or create a job for an idle young man, and those are the very conditions the insurgents harvest for recruits. Russia carries constraints of its own: bogged down in Ukraine, its resources finite, it was outfought alongside Malian troops at Kidal even after reportedly receiving a warning of the assault. A security architecture resting on a single distracted partner does not reduce risk; it concentrates it, and when that partner underdelivers, there is no second line. The 2026 Global Terrorism Index now names the Sahel the global epicentre of terrorism, the source of more than half the world’s terrorism deaths and one in five of its attacks.
None of this stays in the Sahel. Ghana shares roughly 550 kilometres of frontier with Burkina Faso, much of it porous and threaded with informal crossings used daily by traders and herders. Southward expansion rarely begins with a spectacular attack. It begins quietly: a recruiter, a supply route, a financing cell, fighters embedding in border communities long before a shot is fired. That is precisely how the contagion crossed from Mali into Burkina Faso and Niger, and how it has already reached Benin and Togo, with Côte d’Ivoire and northern Ghana plainly exposed. Alongside the fighters’ travels, something almost as corrosive: a flood of assault rifles, explosives and military hardware that does not stop at extremist hands but arms robbers, traffickers and illegal mining syndicates, hollowing out a country’s security long before any jihadist banner appears.
The wider world has its own reasons to watch. Niger holds some of the planet’s richest uranium. A jihadist proto-state straddling West Africa would command migration routes toward the coast and the Mediterranean, strain fragile coastal economies, disrupt trade corridors and rattle investor confidence. At the same time, every successful strike on a capital broadcasts a template to armed groups from Nigeria to Mozambique. What looks today like a regional security crisis could become an international one. A region generating one in five of the world’s militant attacks is not a distant problem. It is a lit fuse.
Africa has paid before for believing that outside powers can guarantee its security. They cannot. Partners can offer intelligence, training and equipment; they cannot substitute for legitimate governance and functioning institutions. This crisis will be settled not only on the battlefield but in courtrooms, classrooms, local councils and marketplaces, where citizens decide whether the state or an armed movement better delivers justice and opportunity. For Ghana, the task is preventive, not reactive: intelligence cooperation, stronger borders, regional collaboration, community resilience and investment in local governance, all of it far cheaper than containment once the violence has taken root. And for the Sahel’s rulers, there is a harder truth.
Sovereignty that trades several partners for total dependence on one distant and overstretched power is not sovereignty; it is a fresh vulnerability dressed in the language of liberation. The question is no longer whether the crisis will spread beyond Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It already has. The only question left is whether West Africa acts before the Sahel becomes the world’s next strategic emergency.
Joseph McCarthy is an analyst and researcher specialising in governance, security, and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, development, and African diplomacy. Email: joecarthy30@gmail.com
Perspectives
From Crossroads to Counter‑Offensive | Colonel Festus Aboagye (Retired) Discusses Ghana’s Anti-Narcotics Posture
Ghana’s 2026 World Drug Day commemoration marks a decisive turning point in the nation’s long struggle against narcotics trafficking, signaling a shift from reactive interdiction to an assertive, intelligence‑led posture that is already yielding tangible results. Yet, as a new policy brief by Colonel Festus Aboagye (Retired) makes clear, the strategic contest over governance integrity remains unresolved.
Twelve months after the Crossroads Republic paper rated Ghana’s narco‑state risk at 2.7 out of 5 — moderate but escalating — the country has made measurable progress. The Narcotics Control Commission (NACOC) has expanded from fewer than 10 district commands to 77 across all 16 regions; arrests, prosecutions and seizures are up sharply; and a special narcotics court and enhanced prosecutorial powers — both recommendations from 2025 — are now in place. But the threat has evolved in parallel: methamphetamine concealed in charcoal shipments, synthetic and new psychoactive substances, cyber‑enabled trafficking, a 7% drug‑test failure rate among security‑service applicants, and localised consumption hotspots (73.5% lifetime use in Madina) all point to a challenge that is far from contained.
The reform most central to averting state capture — political‑party‑campaign‑finance transparency — has gone unaddressed. Though Ghana may be winning tactical battles, the strategic contest over the integrity of governance remains open.
Read the full 20‑page policy brief, “From Crossroads to Counter‑Offensive”, by Colonel Festus Aboagye (Retired):
Share, discuss, and join the conversation on sustaining Ghana’s resilience against the evolving narcotics threat.
#WorldDrugDay #PolicyBrief #Governance #Resilience #Ghana #NarcoTrafficking #StateCapture
Commentary
Reflections on Ghana And the Future it Deserves | By Simone Giger, Swiss Ambassador to Ghana
As her diplomatic tenure in West Africa draws to a close, Swiss Ambassador Simone Giger pens a reflective and heartfelt tribute to Ghana’s enduring national character. Having traveled extensively across the country—from Paga to Keta and Wa to Goaso—she offers an intimate, human-centered assessment of a nation defined by its resilient democratic culture, youthful ambition, and an infectious “vibe” that fosters cohesion. In this candid farewell, Ambassador Giger explores the complex challenges threatening Ghana’s ecological treasures and argues that sustained institutional reform, rather than outside invention, is the key to unlocking the prosperous future the country so clearly deserves.
Travelling through northern Ghana, this author once stopped in a small community after a long journey. Despite the day’s heat and the demands of daily life, residents welcomed visitors with warm smiles, easy laughter and an eagerness to share stories about their hopes for the future.
It was a simple encounter, yet it captured something profoundly Ghanaian: an enduring optimism that persists even in difficult circumstances.
In diplomacy, countries are often assessed through official meetings, economic indicators and policy documents. Yet to truly understand a nation, one must travel through it, listen to its people, appreciate its strengths, observe its contradictions and understand the aspirations that shape everyday life.
As the end of a diplomatic assignment in Ghana approaches, this author finds reason to reflect deeply on a country that has left a lasting impression, not only professionally but personally.
Over the past four years, extensive travels across Ghana—from Paga to Keta, Damongo to Donkokrom, and Wa to Goaso—have revealed a country of extraordinary diversity, complexity, creativity and resilience.
Every journey has unveiled a different dimension of Ghana. Yet one common thread consistently emerges: a nation brimming with potential.
There is something profoundly remarkable about Ghana and its national character, what many Ghanaians simply describe as the country’s “vibe”.
It is evident in the warmth extended to strangers, the humour with which difficulties are confronted and the optimism that endures even during periods of uncertainty.
Even in challenging moments, there is often a joke, a proverb or a story that helps place events in perspective.
In this author’s view, that national character has become one of the essential ingredients behind Ghana’s democratic success.
At a time when democratic systems around the world are facing increasing pressure, polarisation and distrust, Ghana continues to distinguish itself through its commitment to dialogue, constitutional order and peaceful coexistence.
Democracy here is not perfect. No democracy truly is, including Switzerland’s.
What matters is that it remains alive, active and deeply valued by citizens.
Over the years, Ghana has established itself as an important democratic reference point in West Africa.
The country has repeatedly demonstrated that political competition can coexist with stability, that transfers of power can occur peacefully and that national debates can take place within institutional frameworks rather than outside them.
Such achievements should never be taken for granted.
Democracy is not sustained by elections alone.
It requires strong institutions, active citizens, credible public discourse and a continuous willingness to negotiate consensus across political, ethnic, religious and generational lines.
One can observe that Ghana’s diversity presents both opportunities and challenges. Yet this author has often admired the manner in which the country continues to navigate these varied interests while preserving national cohesion.
In many respects, this is where Ghana’s democratic future becomes particularly important.
The country possesses extraordinary human capital.
Wherever this author travelled, young people displayed ambition, intelligence, creativity and determination.
Ghana’s greatest resource is not found beneath the ground.
It resides in its people, their ideas and their aspirations.
Ideas and aspirations, however, require systems that function effectively if they are to translate into meaningful and productive outcomes.
When institutions are transparent, responsive, accountable and trusted, they unlock innovation, investment and opportunity.
When they are weak or inconsistent, they risk frustrating the very energy capable of propelling a nation forward.
This is why governance reforms remain so important to Ghana’s long-term trajectory.
One development that particularly impressed this author during the diplomatic assignment has been Ghana’s constitutional review process.
What stands out is not only the process itself, but also the spirit behind it – a willingness to reflect critically on how democratic governance can evolve to meet contemporary realities and future expectations.
This demonstrates political maturity.
Constitutions should never be viewed as static documents frozen in time.
Strong democracies periodically examine whether their systems remain responsive, inclusive and effective.
Ghana’s consultative approach reflects a country seeking not merely to preserve democracy, but to improve it.
Switzerland is proud to support these home-grown efforts and remains committed to supporting the constitutional reform process until its hoped-for successful conclusion.
History demonstrates that democratic stability does not emerge automatically.
It requires deliberate investment in participation, inclusion and dialogue.
Swiss democracy itself evolved gradually through compromise, negotiation and the understanding that national cohesion is strengthened when citizens feel ownership over public decisions.
One can observe important similarities between Ghana and Switzerland.
Both countries are diverse societies that have chosen coexistence over division.
Both understand that stability is strongest when different voices are heard and accommodated.
Both appreciate the importance of consensus-building in national life.
This shared philosophy has shaped bilateral cooperation over many decades.
Today, the partnership continues to evolve in both breadth and depth.
Switzerland currently supports initiatives focused on democratic governance, parliamentary cooperation, decentralisation, peace and security, cultural exchange, environmental integrity, climate adaptation and economic development.
Switzerland and Ghana may differ in geography, history and scale, yet both countries share a belief in dialogue and cooperation as foundations for national progress.
Despite Ghana’s bright prospects, one cannot ignore the challenges confronting the country.
No nation can fully realise its potential without confronting difficult issues directly.
During the years spent in Ghana, citizens from various walks of life spoke openly about concerns surrounding institutional effectiveness, economic opportunity, environmental degradation and governance accountability.
Such conversations reflected not pessimism, but a desire to see the country fulfil its promise.
Particularly concerning is the destruction caused by illegal mining activities.
Ghana’s rivers, forests and landscapes are among its greatest treasures.
Environmental degradation is not merely an ecological issue.
It is fundamentally a matter of intergenerational responsibility.
Future prosperity depends on preserving the natural foundation upon which communities, livelihoods and national identity are built.
Yet despite these challenges, this author remains deeply optimistic about Ghana’s future.
That optimism stems not from idealism but from observation.
The future of democracy globally will not be shaped only by geopolitical actors or large states.
Medium-sized countries such as Switzerland and Ghana also have important roles to play.
They can demonstrate that democratic resilience, peaceful coexistence and institutional reform remain both possible and necessary.
As this diplomatic assignment draws to a close, there is profound gratitude for the opportunity to have lived and worked in Ghana.
Over the years, this author has come to admire the country not only for its democratic achievements, but also for its humanity – its warmth, creativity, humour and enduring sense of possibility.
The task ahead is not to invent Ghana’s future.
Rather, it is to create the institutional conditions necessary for that future to emerge fully.
From all that has been observed across the country, there is every reason to believe that Ghana can achieve precisely that.
The author, Simone Giger, is the Swiss Ambassador to Ghana, Togo and Benin
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